**1NC**

**DA**

**China’s engagement in Latin America is high now and its zero sum- even if US engagement is happening now, China’s influence is overpowering us**

**Rosenthal, 9/11** – political consultant and writer who is currently interning at The Center for Security Policy in Washington DC (Terence, 2013, “China’s Pivot to Latin America”, Global Balita, http://globalbalita.com/2013/09/11/chinas-pivot-to-latin-america/)//VP

The quest for global naval power runs parallel to competition for control of markets in Latin America.. The two largest world economies, the United States, and China are vying for control of these markets. China has an enormous population of approximately 1.3 billion people but is only able to use a very small percentage of its land mass. Its’ consumer market is the wealthiest it has been in modern times. China desires access to key resources such as petroleum, coal, iron, uranium, as well as agricultural products. Latin America is in high global demand, with 500 million people, and a $3trillion market. In its quest to be Latin America’s foremost business partner, China has risen out of ambiguity to become one of the top three exporters, sometimes surpassing the United States in countries like Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, Chile, and Brazil. China has sought to be the prime lender in Latin America, loaning $110 billion dollars thus exceeding the World Bank’s contribution for the past two years. Some of China’s other most noteworthy loans include $28 billion to Venezuela, $10.2 billion to the Argentine debt swap, and 10 billion to Brazilian oil company, Petrobras. China wishes to benefit from developing infrastructure, ports, roads and rail systems in Latin America. In Nicaragua, China is planning the start of a canal bigger than the Panama Canal, facilitating passage to larger container ships than the Panama Canal is now able to handle. In Panama, China controls the leases at both ends of the Panama Canal and is in the process of widening the Canal in order to accommodate larger vessels. This constitutes excellent strategic positioning for China, giving them virtual control over two major passageways. Though a huge amount of the world’s trade transits the Panama Canal, the United States remains its biggest user. China’s economic relations in the Caribbean are also growing by leaps and bounds. Consider a $2.6 billion resort, among a gaggle of Chinese owned hotels and casinos being built by the Chinese in the Bahamas, 80 miles off the U.S. coast. Or Complant, a Chinese company, investing millions of dollars in Jamaica’s sugar industry. The Bahamas and Jamaica are great strategic places for the Chinese to invest due to their close proximity to the U.S., as well as in Cuba, with whom they already have solid military, diplomatic and commercial relations. In recent years, China has embarked on a well-planned pivot to Latin America, focusing on a multifaceted military approach. In terms of soft military power, the Chinese naval hospital, Peace Ark has sailed the Caribbean offering medical and military services, similar to America’s USNS Comfort, but, with the addition of military council. China conducts military exchange and arm sales with Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. In Argentina, the Chinese are providing technological assistance with aircraft and helicopters and in Brazil with civilian and military operations. In addition, specific attention is being paid to Venezuela as a launching pad for military and diplomatic influence in South America.

**US-Cuba relations decrease Chinese influence in the region**

**Benjamin-Alvadaro ‘6** (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special,” http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf)

Additionally, Venezuela remains the fourth largest importer of oil to the United States and one can surmise that the existing trade arrangements between the U.S. and Venezuela will remain intact, the evolution of the Bolivarian revolution under Chavez and **a growing Chinese presence in the region notwithstanding.** Additionally, pursuing such a path would allow United States policymakers to take advantage of what Cuba has to offer in the following areas: domestic technical capabilities; continuing human capital development; strategic positioning in the Caribbean, and an improved diplomatic stature. Cuba, by any measure, possesses a largely untapped technical capacity owing to advanced training and education in the core mathematic and scientific areas. This was clearly demonstrated by its attempt to develop a nuclear energy capability in the 1980s and 1990s whereby thousands of Cubans pursued highly technical career paths leaving Cuba with among the highest ratios of scientists and engineers to the general population in all of the Americas. Moreover, the foundation of Cuba’s vaunted public education system remains intact and increased investment under various scenarios suggests that Cuba will continue to produce a welleducated workforce that will be critical to its future economic vitality. This raises an important consideration that being the role that Cuba will play in the region in the 21st century. It suffices to say that Cuba remains the strategically important state by virtue of its geographical location alone, in efforts against drug and human trafficking and related national and regional security matters. The extent to which a stable Cuban government has cooperated with the U.S. in drug interdiction efforts in the past suggests that the results from improved diplomatic relations between neighbors would have the effect of improving national security concerns related to terrorist activity, illicit weapons transfers and the like. Ultimately, **a successful normalization of relations** between the U.S. and Cuba in these areas may well enhance and stabilize regional relations that could possibly lessen (or at a minimum, balancing) **fears of a Chinese incursion** in hemispheric affairs. To lessen those fears it may be useful to review the present structure of joint-venture projects in the energy sector in Cuba to ascertain the feasibility and possible success of such an undertaking become available to American firms. Moreover, it is interesting to note that U.S. firms in the agriculture sector have successfully negotiated and consummated sales to Cuba totaling more than $1 billion dollars over the past four years under conditions that are less than optimal circumstances but have well-served the commercial interests of all parties involved.

**China’s engagement in Latin America is key to its economy**

**Farnsworth, 12** – Vice-president of the Council of the Americas in Washington DC (Eric, “Memo to Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America,” Americas Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter, 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth)//VP

What is China doing in the Americas? It’s a good question—and an increasingly important one for policymakers in Washington. According to one U.S. analyst, it’s about “goodwill, good business and strategic position.”1 Perhaps. But the jury is still out, mostly because China’s interest in the Western Hemisphere is barely a decade old. For many years, beyond attempts to wean Latin American and Caribbean nations away from support for Taiwan and efforts to build Third World solidarity, China’s footprint in the Americas was light. That has now changed. Since then-President Jiang Zemin’s 13-day trip to Latin America in April 2001 and the subsequent visits of President Hu Jintao in 2004 and 2011, Chinese engagement with the region has exploded. Today, China is the top trade partner of Brazil and Chile, and the second trade partner of Argentina and Peru. By late 2010, Chinese enterprises had invested almost $44 billion in the region, according to China’s National Development and Reform Commission, almost a quarter of which was invested in 2010 alone. Top investment targets included Brazil, but also Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Innovative financing by Chinese entities was often behind the deals—and in some cases, such as Ecuador and Venezuela, investments took the form of loans secured by guaranteed future deliveries of oil. That is a marked change from 2003, the year before Hu’s first visit, when China invested just $1 billion in all of Latin America. By now the outlines of the story are well known. As part of the dash for economic growth that the Chinese Communist Party believes will help to maintain its legitimacy—an average annual rate of 9.8 percent from 1979 to 2009, including an 8.7 percent growth rate in 2009 when much of the rest of the world faced economic collapse—Beijing is on a global quest to lock in the natural resources that fuel its growth. From Southeast Asia to Africa to Latin America and beyond, China is scouring the globe to invest in primary commodities. By the end of 2011, more than $3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves provided an impressive war chest from which to purchase the global assets that China’s leaders believe they need to support economic growth—and thus political stability—for the medium to longer term. As China faces its own near-term leadership transition, efforts to purchase domestic political stability with foreign trade and investment are likely to intensify. At the same time, Latin American nations that have been the primary trade and investment partners with China have also gained handsomely, at least in the short term, in the sectors that produce primary goods. Longer term questions abound regarding the balance and terms of trade, the nature of the investments that China is making, and the values that are being promoted or undermined by such investments.2 Additionally, nations that are not supplying significant amounts of commodities to China, including Mexico and Central America, view China more as an aggressive competitor than as an economic partner. The costs and benefits of trade with China are unequally distributed across the Americas.

**That solves global economic collapse and nuclear lashout**

**Buzan and Foot 04 –** professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College, (Barry and Rosemary, “Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal”, ed., Questia, p. 145-147, USC Libraries)//JK

China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - **get**ting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

**Topicality**

**A. Interpretation – Removing sanctions is a form of appeasement**

**Stern 6** (Martin, University of Maryland Graduate, Debunking detente, 11/27/06, http://www.diamondbackonline.com/article\_56223e79-7009-56a3-8afe-5d08bfff6e08.html)

Appeasement is defined as "granting concessions to potential enemies to maintain peace." Giving Iran international legitimacy and removing sanctions would have maintained peace with a potential enemy without changing the undemocratic practices of the enemy. If this isn't appeasement, I don't know how better to define the word.

**Engagement and appeasement are distinct**

**Resnick 1** (Evan, Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United States Programme at RSIS, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2, http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?sid=1b56e6b4-ade2-4052-9114-7d107fdbd019%40sessionmgr12&vid=2&hid=24&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN=4437301

Thus, a rigid conceptual distinction can be drawn between engagement and appeasement. Whereas both policies are positive sanctions--insofar as they add to the power and prestige of the target state--engagement does so in a less direct and less militarized fashion than appeasement. In addition, engagement differs from appeasement by establishing an increasingly interdependent relationship between the sender and the target state. At any juncture, the sender state can, in theory, abrogate such a relationship at some (ideally prohibitive) cost to the target state.(n34) Appeasement, on the other hand, does not involve the establishment of contacts or interdependence between the appeaser and the appeased. Territory and/or a sphere of influence are merely transferred by one party to the other either unconditionally or in exchange for certain concessions on the part of the target state.

**B. Violation – they remove restrictions – that’s appeasement**

**C. Voting issue**

**1. Limits – infinite amount of restrictions the aff can remove – explodes neg research burden**

**2. Ground – Lose spending links based off of increases in funding**

**DA**

**INSERT UNIQUENESS**

**Plan drains capital**

**Stieglitz, 11**

Matthew, Law Clerk at Vladeck, Waldman, Elias & Engelhard, P.C, Judicial Intern at United States District Court, Masters @ Cornell University, http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/Fellows2011/Stieglitz-\_Final\_Paper.pdf

This collaboration represented positive dialogue with Cuba, yet it did nothing to improve relations with Cuba. Subsequent to the Balsero crisis, the US Congress acted to enforce stricter standards towards the island in a landmark legislation that would effectively relegate the presidency to the backburner in relation to Cuba. Driven in part by CANF and the **lobbying efforts** of the exile community, the Cuban Liberty & Solidarity Act was passed in 1996 (also known as the Helms-Burton Act) further complicating relations with Cuba (Bardach, 2002). Essentially, the legislation cedes greater authority to the US Congress in ending the trade embargo, making a potential **pro-embargo majority in Congress** the **powerbrokers on everything US-Cuba related.** Simply stated, the Cuban Liberty & Democratic Solidarity Act disempowers the presidency in relation to Cuba. While the legislation calls for a variety of different elements, it has two key components in relation to the presidency: the embargo can only be repealed by Congressional vote, and it cannot be repealed until a democratic government is elected in Cuba that includes neither Fidel nor Raul Castro. This clearly hinders normalization because it effectively mitigates any transition efforts or progressive policies that the Castro brothers sponsor. Unless the legislation is repealed or amended, any progressive efforts or dialogue from the Cuban government will be irrelevant so long as the Castro brothers continue to lead the government. It also constrains the US presidency, as President Obama—or any future president— cannot simply end the embargo with Cuba. Instead, presidents must defer to the US Congress, which will make progressive policy with Cuba **difficult.** This again **exemplifies the strength and importance of the Cuban-American lobby** in policy discussions with Cuba. Not only did their efforts result in Congressional legislation that effectively ceded control of US relations with Cuba to Congress, but they also **imposed the agenda** of the electorate on American foreign policy. Subsequent to this legislation passing, the Cuban-American lobby would again work to have its voice heard when a young boy, Elian González, was found floating in American waters, one of three survivors of an ill-fated voyage that claimed the lives of eleven people, including his mother. Under the Wet Foot, Dry Foot policy, Elian González could not be granted asylum in the United States because he was found in water. While his family in the US was more than willing to take the boy in, his status as a minor complicated matters with his father remaining in Cuba. This placed the Clinton Administration in the middle of a **highly contested** debate that the Cuban-American electorate **immediately moved to shape** (Bardach, 2002). The González case called into questions components of family law, immigration law, refugee policy, and politics, and presented the Cuban-American electorate its greatest opportunity to embarrass the Castro government. For President Clinton, it presented a crisis that necessitated caution, and would ultimately entail a moral debate that stirred immense media coverage of the Cuba dilemma itself. González's mother drowned in late 1999 while traveling with her son to the United States, and while the INS originally placed him with paternal family in Miami, his father objected to González remaining in the United States (Bardach, 2002). What ensued was a media nightmare, with national media outlets descending on Miami to interview the boy. Local politicians became involved, with the case eventually being deliberated in court where the family’s asylum petition was dismissed and González was ordered to return to his father. President Clinton almost exclusively deferred to Attorney General Janet Reno during the proceedings, who ultimately ordered the return of González to his father prior to the court decision. González’s return to Cuba coincided with the beginning of yet another decade in which the Cuban trade embargo would continue, and to date is the last controversial event of US-Cuba policy during the Castro regime (Bardach, 2002). Reflecting upon the Castro reign during the 20th century, two themes emerge: the prominence of the Cuban-American community, and the actions of US presidents towards Cuba. The **clout of the Cuban-American lobby cannot be understated,** as the 2000 presidential election showed us. President George W. Bush secured his victory as president in no small part due to the Cuban-American vote, which he and Al Gore campaign vigorously for. As such, the Gore and Bush campaigns remained relatively silent on the Elian González case, leaving the matter to the courts so as **not to risk any backlash from the Cuban-American community**. After his victory, President Bush tightened restrictions on Cuba much like his Republican predecessors. He further restricted travel to the island for CubanAmericans, reduced the amount of remittances that could be sent to the island, placed Cuba on terror-watch lists after 9/11, and maintained that Cuba was a strategic threat to national security (Erlich, 2009). Further, cultural and academic exchanges were suspended, and many Cuban and American artists found themselves unable to attain visas to travel between Cuba and the United States to share the rich culture of both nations. By the time President Bush left office, the only Americans legally allowed to enter Cuba were journalists, family members (who could only go once every three years), and those visiting the island for religious reasons.

**PC is key**

**McMorris-Santoro, 10/15**

Evan McMorris-Santoro, political reporter for Buzzfeed; “Obama Has Already Won The Shutdown Fight And He’s Coming For Immigration Next,” 10/15/2013, http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/obama-has-already-won-the-shutdown-fight-and-hes-coming-for //bghs-ms

The White House and Democrats are “ready” to jump back into the immigration fray when the fiscal crises ends, Sharry said. And advocates are already drawing up their plans to put immigration back on the agenda — plans they’ll likely initiate the morning after a fiscal deal is struck.¶ “We’re talking about it. We want to be next up and we’re going to position ourselves that way,” Sharry said. “There are different people doing different things, and **our movement will be increasingly confrontational with Republicans**, including civil disobedience. A lot of people are going to say, ‘We’re not going to wait.’”¶ The White House isn’t ready to talk about the world after the debt limit fight yet, but officials have signaled strongly they want to put immigration back on the agenda.¶ Asked about future strategic plans after the shutdown Monday, a senior White House official said, “That’s a conversation for when the government opens and we haven’t defaulted.” But on Tuesday, Press Secretary Jay Carney specifically mentioned immigration when asked “how the White House proceeds” after the current fracas is history.¶ “Just like we wish for the country, for deficit reduction, for our economy, that the House would follow the Senate’s lead and pass comprehensive immigration reform with a big bipartisan vote,” he said. “That might be good for the Republican Party. Analysts say so; Republicans say so. We hope they do it.”¶ The president set immigration as his next priority in an interview with Univision Tuesday.¶ “Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform,” Obama said. He also set up another fight with the House GOP on the issue.¶ “We had a very strong Democratic and Republican vote in the Senate,” Obama said. “The only thing right now that’s holding it back is, again, Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives.”¶ Don’t expect the White House effort to include barnstorming across the country on behalf of immigration reform in the days after the fiscal crisis ends, reform proponents predict. Advocates said the White House has tried hard to help immigration reform along, and in the current climate that means trying to **thread the needle with Republicans** who support reform but have also reflexively opposed every one of Obama’s major policy proposals.¶ Democrats and advocates seem to hope the GOP comes back to immigration on its own, albeit with a boost from Democrats eager to join them. Po cir lls show Republicans have taken on more of the blame from the fiscal battle of the past couple of weeks. But Tom Jensen, a pollster with the Democratic firm Public Policy Polling, said moving to pass immigration reform could be just what the doctor ordered to get the public back on the side of the Republicans.¶ “We’ve consistently found that a sizable chunk of Republican voters support immigration reform, and obviously a decent number of Republican politicians do too,” Jensen said. “After this huge partisan impasse, they may want to focus on something that’s not quite as polarized, and immigration would certainly fit the bill since we see voters across party lines calling for reform.”

**Visa policy is dragging down US-India relations now – only CIR can reaffirm our alliance with India**

**Zee News 12**

[“Krishna, Hillary to discuss visa fee hike in NY”, October 1st, 2012, http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/krishna-hillary-to-discuss-visa-fee-hike-in-ny\_802978.html]

New York: The issue of US visa fee hike, which has hurt several Indian IT firms, is expected to come up for discussion when External Affairs Minister SM Krishna meets US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton here on Monday on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session. India has "consistently" taken up the issue of the visa fee hike with the US and the issue will figure in talks between Krishna and Clinton, official sources said. The US had raised visa fee in 2010 to fund its enhanced costs on securing border with Mexico under the Border Security Act. Some of the top Indian companies TCS, Infosys, Wipro and Mahindra Satyam were affected by the US action and India is expected to soon seek consultations with the US at the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the issue. The sources said that young Indian professionals working in the US have been the "cornerstone" of India-US relations and are a pillar in the improved bilateral relations that has brought the two countries closer. Hiking visa fees or limiting the number of work visas available to Indian companies is tantamount to **"undermining that pillar and growth in India-US relations,"** they added. "Raising visa fees and putting other barriers is not in consonance with the forward thinking of growing bilateral ties," the sources said. This will be the third bilateral meeting between Krishna and Clinton this year. They had previously met in India in April and again in June in Washington. The sources said that the two countries have a fairly elaborate agenda and the visa issue is one of the issues in a broader relationship. Krishna will also address the 67th session of the UN General Assembly today. part of the world are **essential** to the peace and prosperity of the world.

**Solves laundry list of global conflicts – spills over and solves Asian power vacuum**

**Armitage et al ’10** [Richard is the President of Armitage International and former Deputy Secretary of State. R. Nicholas Burns is a Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Richard Fontaine is the President of the Center for New American Security. “Natural Allies: A Blueprint for the Future of U.S.-India Relations,” October, Center for New American Security, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Burns%20-%20Natural%20Allies.pdf]

A strengthened U.S.-India strategic partnership is thus imperative in this new era. The transformation of U.S. ties with New Delhi over the past 10 years, led by Presidents Clinton and Bush, stands as one of the most significant triumphs of recent American foreign policy. It has also been a bipartisan success. In the last several years alone, the United States and India have completed a landmark civil nuclear cooperation agreement, enhanced military ties, expanded defense trade, increased bilateral trade and investment and deepened their global political cooperation.¶ Many prominent Indians and Americans, however, now fear this rapid expansion of ties has stalled. Past projects remain incomplete, few new ideas have been embraced by both sides, and the forward momentum that characterized recent cooperation has subsided. The Obama administration has taken significant steps to break through this inertia, including with its Strategic Dialogue this spring and President Obama’s planned state visit to India in November 2010. Yet there remains a sense among observers in both countries that this critical relationship is falling short of its promise.¶ We believe it is critical to rejuvenate the U.S.- India partnership and put U.S. relations with India on a more solid foundation. The relationship requires a bold leap forward. The United States should establish a vision for what it seeks in the relationship and give concrete meaning to the phrase “strategic partnership.” A nonpartisan working group of experts met at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) over the past eight months to review the main pillars of the U.S.-India relationship and we articulate here a specific agenda of action.¶ In order to chart a more ambitious U.S.-India strategic partnership, we believe that the United States should commit, publicly and explicitly, to work with India in support of its permanent membership in an enlarged U.N. Security Council; seek a broad expansion of bilateral trade and investment, beginning with a Bilateral Investment Treaty; greatly expand the security relationship and boost defense trade; support Indian membership in key export control organizations, a step toward integrating India into global nonproliferation efforts; and liberalize U.S. export controls, including the removal of Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) subsidiaries from the U.S. Entity List.¶ These and the other actions outlined in this report will require India to make a number of commitments and policy changes, including taking rapid action to fully implement the Civil Nuclear Agreement; raising its caps on foreign investment; reducing barriers to defense and other forms of trade; enhancing its rules for protecting patents and other intellectual property; further harmonizing its export control lists with multilateral regimes; and seeking closer cooperation with the United States and like-minded partners in international organizations, including the United Nations. ¶ The U.S. relationship with India should be rooted in shared interests and values and should not be simply transactional or limited to occasional collaboration. India’s rise to global power is, we believe, in America’s strategic interest. As a result, the United States should not only seek a closer relationship with India, but actively assist its further emergence as a great power.¶ U.S. interests in a closer relationship with India include:¶ • Ensuring a stable Asian and global balance of power.¶ • Strengthening an open global trad[e]ing system.¶ • Protecting and preserving access to the global commons (air, sea, space, and cyber realms).¶ • Countering terrorism and violent extremism.¶ • Ensuring access to secure global energy resources.¶ • Bolstering the international nonproliferation regime.¶ • Promoting democracy and human rights.¶ • Fostering greater stability, security and economic prosperity in South Asia, including in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.¶ A strong U.S.-India strategic partnership will prove indispensable to the region’s continued peace and prosperity. Both India and the United States have a vital interest in maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia. Neither seeks containment of China, but the likelihood of a peaceful Chinese rise increases if it ascends in a region where the great democratic powers are also strong. Growing U.S.-India strategic ties will ensure that Asia will not have a vacuum of power and will make it easier for both Washington and New Delhi to have productive relations with Beijing. In addition, a strengthened relationship with India, a natural democratic partner, will signal that the United States remains committed to a strong and enduring presence in Asia.¶ The need for closer U.S.-India cooperation goes well beyond regional concerns. In light of its rise, India will play an increasingly vital role in addressing virtually **all major global challenges**. Now is the time to transform a series of bilateral achievements into a lasting regional and global partnership.

**CP**

**Text: The United States federal government should propose that it {PLAN} to through binding consultation to the Federal government of Brazil. The United States federal government should support this proposal during consultation and abide by the results of the consultation.**

**The counterplan builds effective cooperation and is critical to U.S. Brazil relations**

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Whether Brazil’s future policies will, like those of the United States, reflect greater caution and sensitivity to third party interests remains an open question. But there can be no question that Brazil’s global activism is here to stay. “The days when domestic weaknesses (an acumulo de vulnerabilidades) limited our scope of action abroad have been left behind,” stated Antonio de Aguiar Patriota in his first speech as the new Foreign Minister under President Rousseff on January 2, 2011.33 Brazilians cannot underestimate what is left to be done domestically, he argued, but they now expect “to engage on all major international debates.” The United States and Brazil, concludes one American observer, seem destined to keep bumping into each other all over the world.34 The key requirement for both countries is therefore to give strategic shape and rationality to these otherwise random interactions. Prospects and Policy Recommendations The United States has a basic national security interest in Brazil’s continuing democratic and marketoriented success, which improves its will and capacity to help address pressing global problems. We are in a rapidly changing period of international relations, in which a high premium is put on skilled and effective diplomacy in order to provide a measure of management to situations that could spin out of control. We are still haunted by nuclear weapons. In these circumstances, Brazil plays an important role. It is in the U.S. interest to find as many ways as possible not only to cooperate with Brazil, but also to engage with Brasilia as a regional and global partner in the maintenance of peace and prosperity. A prerequisite for improved mutual engagement will be changes in perspective on both sides. Mutually beneficial engagement requires the United States to welcome Brazil’s emergence as a global power. Brazil is more than a tropical China35; it is culturally and politically close to the United States and Europe. Brazil, in turn, needs to realize that the United States accepts its rise. Brazil also needs to recognize that the United States still matters greatly to Brasilia and that more can be achieved working with Washington than against it. The United States and Brazil have vast overlapping interests, but a formal strategic partnership is probably out of the question for both countries. In the United States, Brazil must compete for policy attention with China, India, Russia, Japan, Mexico, and several European countries. It poses no security threat to the United States. Moreover, despite Brazil’s importance in multilateral organizations, particularly the UN, Brazil can be of limited practical assistance at best to the United States in its two current wars. Brazil’s interests, in turn, may be fairly said to include the need to distinguish itself from the United States. Diplomatically, this means neither country can expect automatic agreement from the other. Interests differ and it may be politically necessary to highlight differences even when interests are similar. But both countries should make **every effort to develop** a habit of **“permanent consultation”** in an effort to coordinate policies, work pragmatically together where interests are common, and reduce surprises even while recognizing that specific interests and policies often may differ. A first operational step, therefore, is for both countries to hold regular **policy-level consultations**, increase exchanges of information, and coordinate carefully on multilateral matters. This is much easier said than done. The list of global issues on which Brazil is becoming a major player includes conflict resolution, all aspects of energy, including nuclear matters, **all types of trade**, the environment, space, and the development of international law, including law of the seas and nonproliferation. To share information and ensure effective consultation on so many functional issues will require finding ways to lessen the geographic stovepiping natural to bureaucracy. The U.S. Department of State, for example, has historically organized itself into geographical bureaus responsible for relations with countries in particular regions, leaving functional issues to offices organized globally. This organization hampers the exchange of information and consultation with countries such as Brazil, whose reach and policies go beyond their particular geographic region. One result is that multilateral affairs are still often an isolated afterthought in the U.S. Government. Are there things the United States and Brazil could do, whether bilaterally or in the World Trade Organization, that would offset some of the negative effects of the China trade on manufacturing in both their countries?36 Just posing the question reveals the complexity of the task.

**Brazil says yes – thinks current embargo policy is absurd**

**Hakim**, president emeritus and senior fellow of the IAD, **2010**

(10/21/10, Peter, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, previously taught at both MIT and Columbia, MA of Public and International Affairs from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School, MS in Physics at the University of Pennsylvania, “US-Brazil Relations: Expect More Conflict,” Infolatam, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2490) ahayes

US and Brazil also take **polar opposite positions** with regard to Cuba’s role in hemispheric affairs. In this instance, it is Washington that **stands alone** in its refusal to end its diplomatic and economic isolation of Cuba. Every other country in the Americas has re-established normal relations with the island. For most Brazilians and other Latin Americans, US policy toward Cuba is virtually incomprehensible.

**U.S. – Brazil relations are high but consultation is necessary to maintain them – solves general conflict and a laundry list of impacts**

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Relations with the United States Currently, relations between the United States and Brazil may be characterized as friendly. The United States has increasingly regarded Brazil as a significant power, especially in its role as a stabilizing force in Latin America. U.S. officials assert that the United States seeks to increase cooperation with moderate leftist governments in Latin America (like Brazil) in order to ease mounting tensions among countries in South America, and to deal with populist governments in the region. Brazil under President Lula has helped diffuse potential political crises in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and supported Colombia’s ongoing struggle against terrorist organizations and drug traffickers. Brazil is also commanding the U.N. stabilization force in Haiti. Brazil and the United States have worked closely on a wide range of bilateral and regional issues, and Brazil-U.S. cooperation has increased in recent years, as reflected in the continuing high level contacts between the two governments, particularly on energy issues. Early in 2007, two high-level meetings between Presidents Bush and Lula culminated in the March 2007 signing of a U.S.-Brazil Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to promote bio-fuels development in the Western Hemisphere.59 The initiative was expanded in November 2008 to include additional countries in Africa, Central America, and the Caribbean (See “Ethanol and Other Biofuels” section below).60 Although Brazil and the United States share common goals for regional stability, Brazil’s independent approach to foreign policy has led to periodic disputes with the United States on trade and political issues, including how (and whether) to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and Brazil’s vocal opposition to the war in Iraq and the U.S. embargo of Cuba. Despite President Lula’s friendly relationship with President Obama, a number of differences between Brazil and the United States have emerged in recent months. In addition to ongoing disputes over the U.S. tariff on Brazilian ethanol and the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, Brazil has criticized the United States for failing to take a stronger stance on the political crisis in Honduras and has reacted negatively to a recent agreement that will provide the United States with access to seven Colombian military bases, which the Brazilian foreign minister described as “a strong military presence whose aim and capability seems to go well beyond what might be needed inside Colombia.”61 Brazil is considered a middle-income country and does not receive large amounts of U.S. foreign assistance. Brazil received $21.5 million in U.S. aid in FY2009, will receive an estimated $25 million in FY2010, and would receive $20.9 million under the Obama Administration’s request for FY2011. U.S. assistance priorities in Brazil include supporting environmental programs and the strengthening of local capacity to address threats to the Amazon, promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency to mitigate climate change, strengthening the professionalism and peacekeeping capabilities of the Brazilian military, and reducing the transmission of communicable diseases.62 The Bush Administration came to view Brazil as a strong partner **whose cooperation should be sought in order to solve regional and global problems**, and the Obama Administration appears to view Brazil in a similar light. Current issues of concern to both Brazil and the United States include counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts, energy security, trade, human rights, the fight against HIV/AIDS, and the environment Counternarcotics Although Brazil is not a major drug-producing country, it serves as a major transit country for illicit drugs from neighboring Andean countries destined primarily for Europe. Urban gangs— such as São Paulo’s First Command of the Capital (PCC) and Rio de Janeiro’s Red Command (CV)—have begun playing greater roles in narcotics and weapons smuggling, establishing their presence in other countries in the region and forging ties with Colombian and Mexican traffickers. Brazil has also become the second-largest consumer (after the United States) of cocaine in the world. With U.S. support, Brazil has taken several steps to improve its counternarcotics capabilities. In 2004, Brazil implemented an Air Bridge Denial program, which authorizes lethal force for air interdiction, and in 2006, Brazil passed an anti-drug law that prohibits and penalizes the cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs. Brazil has also worked with its neighbors to construct Joint Intelligence Centers at strategic points along its borders and invested in a sensor and radar project called the Amazon Vigilance System in an attempt to control illicit activity in its Amazon region. In 2009, Brazil’s federal police captured 18.9 metric tons of cocaine, 1.4 metric tons of cocaine base, 513 kilograms of crack cocaine, 150.6 metric tons of marijuana, 3.3 kilograms of heroin, and 183.3 tons of precursor chemicals.63 Brazil received $992,000 in U.S. counternarcotics assistance in FY2008, was expected to receive $1 million in FY2009, and an would receive an estimated $1 million in FY2010 under the Obama Administration’s request.64 U.S. counternarcotics assistance includes training for the Brazil’s federal police, support for interdiction programs at Brazil’s ports, and expanding the capabilities of special investigations units. Counterterrorism and the Tri-Border Area65 The Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay has long been used for arms smuggling, money laundering, and other illicit purposes. According to the 2009 State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, the United States remains concerned that Hezbollah and Hamas are raising funds through illicit activities and from sympathizers in the sizable Middle Eastern communities in the region. Indeed, reports have indicated that Hezbollah earns over $10 million a year from criminal activities in the TBA.66 Although it has been reported that al Qaeda’s operations chief Khalid Shaikh Mohammed lived in the Brazilian TBA city of Foz de Iguazu in 1995 and Brazilian authorities arrested Ali al-Mahdi Ibrahim—who was wanted by Egypt for his alleged role in the 1997 massacre of tourists at Luxor—in the TBA in 2003, the State Department report states that there have been no corroborated reports that any Islamic groups have an operational presence in the area.67 The United States joined with the countries of the TBA in the “3+1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security” in 2002 and the group built a Joint Intelligence Center to combat trans-border criminal organizations in the TBA in 2007. The United States has also worked bilaterally with Brazil to improve its counterterrorism capabilities. In addition to providing counterterrorism training, the United States has worked with Brazil to implement the Container Security Initiative (CSI) at the port of Santos. While the State Department Country Reports on Terrorism lauded the Brazilian government as a “cooperative partner in countering terrorism,” it also noted that Brazil’s failure to strengthen its legal counterterrorism framework by passing long-delayed anti-money laundering and counterterrorism bills “significantly undermined its overall commitment to combating terrorism.”68 Brazil, like many Latin American nations, has been reluctant to adopt specific antiterrorism legislation as a result of the difficulty of defining terrorism in a way that does not include the actions of social movements and other groups whose actions of political dissent were condemned as terrorism by repressive military regimes in the past.69 Nonetheless, some Brazilian officials continue to push for antiterrorism legislation, asserting that the country will face new threats as a result of hosting the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics.70 In January 2009, the Western Hemisphere Counterterrorism and Nonproliferation Act of 2009 (H.R. 375, Ros-Lehtinen) was introduced in the House. Among other provisions, the bill calls on the U.S. Secretary of State to negotiate with Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay to establish a Regional Coordination Center (RCC) in the TBA to serve as a joint operational facility dedicated to coordinating efforts, capacity, and intelligence to counter current and emerging threats and prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. A similar provision can be found in the Foreign Relations Authorization and Reform Act for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 (H.R. 2475, Ros-Lehtinen), which was introduced in the House in May 2009. Energy Security In the last few years, there has been significant congressional interest in issues related to Western Hemisphere energy security. Brazil is widely regarded as a world leader in energy policy for successfully reducing its reliance on foreign oil through increased domestic production and the development of alternative energy resources. In addition to being the world’s second largest producer of ethanol, Brazil currently generates over 85% of its electricity through hydropower.71 At the same time, Brazil has attained the ability to produce large amounts of enriched uranium as part of its nuclear energy program. More recently, Brazil’s state-run oil company, Petrobras, a leader in deep-water oil drilling, has discovered what may be the world’s largest oil field find in 25 years.72 Ethanol and Other Biofuels73 Brazil stands out as an example of a country that has become a net exporter of energy, partially by increasing its use and production of ethanol. On March 9, 2007, the United States and Brazil, the world’s two largest ethanol-producing countries, signed a Memorandum of Understanding to promote greater cooperation on ethanol and biofuels in the Western Hemisphere. The agreement involves: (1) technology sharing between the United States and Brazil; (2) feasibility studies and technical assistance to build domestic biofuels industries in third countries; and, (3) multilateral efforts to advance the global development of biofuels. The first countries to receive U.S.- Brazilian assistance were the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, and St. Kitts and Nevis.74 Since March 2007, the United States and Brazil have moved forward on all three facets of the agreement. U.S. and Brazilian consultants have carried out feasibility studies that identified shortterm technical assistance opportunities in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador. On November 20, 2008, the United States and Brazil announced an agreement to expand their biofuels cooperation and form new partnerships with Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, GuineaBissau, and Senegal.75 The United States and Brazil are also working with other members of the International Biofuels Forum (IBF) to make biofuels standards and codes more uniform. In March 2009, the Western Hemisphere Energy Compact (S. 587, Lugar) was introduced. The legislation would provide $6 million in FY2010 to expand U.S.-Brazil biofuels cooperation.76 Despite this progress, several potential obstacles to increased U.S.-Brazil cooperation on biofuels exist, including current U.S. tariffs on most Brazilian ethanol imports. The United States currently allows duty-free access on sugar-based ethanol imports from many countries through the Caribbean Basin Initiative, Central American Free Trade Agreement, and the Andean Trade Preferences Act, among others.77 Some Brazilian ethanol is processed at plants in the Caribbean for duty-free entry into the United States, but exports arriving directly from Brazil are currently subject to a 54-cent-per-gallon tax, plus a 2.5% tariff. Several bills were introduced in the 110th Congress that would have eliminated or adjusted the ethanol tariff. Nuclear Energy Between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, Brazil sought to develop nuclear weapons as it competed with Argentina for political and military dominance of the Southern Cone. Brazil’s 1988 constitution limits nuclear activity to peaceful purposes, however, and in 1991, Brazil and Argentina reached an agreement not to pursue nuclear weapons. Although Brazil subsequently joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and a number of other multilateral nonproliferation regimes, some international observers became concerned when Brazil commissioned a uranium enrichment plant in 2004 and refused to give International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors full access to the centrifuge plant in 2005. The Brazilian government maintained that it needed to enrich uranium in order to produce its own fuel, and it justified its refusal to give IAEA inspectors access by citing security concerns over the proprietary aspects of the country’s nuclear technology. Negotiations between Brazil and the IAEA ended in October 2005 when the Bush Administration lent its support to Brazil by asserting that limited inspections should be enough for Brazil to comply with its international obligations.78 President Lula has stated Brazil’s intention to spend $540 million over the next eight years to build a third nuclear power plant and a nuclear-powered submarine. In September 2008, the Brazilian Minister for Energy and Mining announced that he would like Brazil to build 60 new nuclear energy plants over the next 50 years. He claimed this expansion of nuclear power is the only way that Brazil will be able to meet the energy needs of its growing population while avoiding massive carbon emissions through the burning of fossil fuels.79 Oil The recent discovery of substantial oil fields in the Santos Basin, which extends 500 miles along the Brazilian coast, has the potential to turn Brazil into a major oil and gas producer and an important source of energy for the United States. The Tupi field, discovered in November 2007, has confirmed oil reserves of between five and eight billion barrels, and it is estimated that the entire Santos Basin could hold up to 50 billion barrels of oil. President Lula asserts that the oil fields have the potential to transform Brazil and improve living conditions for its people. He intends to implement a new regulatory framework, which will increase the state’s role in the exploitation of the reserves while investing the profits in a new social fund for education, infrastructure, science and technology, and poverty reduction.80 Exploiting the new fields will be difficult and costly, however, as the oil is located in the so-called “pre-salt” layer, beneath layers of rock and salt up to 7,000 meters below the seabed. Brazil’s state-owned oil company, Petrobras, has announced that it will need $270 billion in investment over the next 10 years to develop the reserves.81 Some foreign investors have questioned whether the company will be able to access sufficient finance should the Brazilian government implement its proposed regulatory framework. 82 Nonetheless, Petrobras has already received several financing commitments. In April 2009, the Export-Import Bank of the United States approved a preliminary $2 billion loan commitment to Petrobras.83 Since then, the U.S. government has reportedly indicated that it is prepared to go beyond the original agreement to provide up to $10 billion in financing.84 In May 2009, Brazil and China signed an agreement under which China will provide Petrobras with $10 billion in financing in exchange for guaranteed oil deliveries of 150,000 barrels per day (bdp) in 2009 and 200,000 bpd for the next decade.85 Brazil’s stateowned National Bank of Economic and Social Development (BNDES) will provide Petrobras with an additional $12.5 billion over 20 years.86 Trade Issues Trade issues are central to the bilateral relationship between Brazil and the United States, with both countries being heavily involved in subregional, regional, and global trade talks. Brazil has sought to strengthen Mercosur and to establish free trade agreements with most of the countries in South America, while also pursuing efforts to negotiate a Mercosur-European Union free trade agreement. The United States has been actively involved in the Doha negotiations and, until late 2005, pressed for action on the region-wide Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). Since negotiations for the FTAA have been largely abandoned, the United States has continued to sign bilateral and subregional agreements with countries throughout Latin America. Bilateral trade between the United States and Brazil totaled $46.2 billion in 2009, a nearly 23% decline from 2008. U.S. exports to Brazil amounted to $26.2 billion while U.S. imports from Brazil amounted to $20.1 billion.87 Doha Round of the World Trade Organization Talks 88 Brazil has had a leading role in the Doha round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) talks. In 2003, Brazil led the G-20 group of developing countries’ efforts to insist that developed countries agree to reduce and eventually eliminate agricultural subsidies as part of any settlement. In late July 2004, WTO members agreed on the framework for a possible Doha round agreement, but formal talks were suspended indefinitely in July 2006 after key negotiating groups failed to break a deadlock on the issue of agricultural tariffs and subsidies. In June 2007, negotiators from India and Brazil walked out of a round of informal talks with representatives from the United States and the European Union (EU), refusing to open their markets further unless U.S. and EU subsidies were substantially reduced. In recent years, trade ministers have repeatedly failed to reach an agreement to conclude the Doha round and the U.S. negotiating position remains a source of contention with Brazil.89 World Trade Organization Dispute90 On December 21, 2009, Brazil announced that the WTO had authorized the country to impose trade retaliation measures worth $829.3 million in 2010 as a result of a nearly decade long dispute over U.S. cotton subsidies. Although Brazil has not yet finalized its decision to impose retaliatory measures, it has indicated that it may levy duties of up to 100% on a preliminary list of 222 goods of U.S. origin valued at $561 million and implement cross-retaliation in sectors outside the trade in goods—such as U.S. copyrights and patents—for the remaining $268.3 million.91 Brazil initiated the dispute with the United States in 2002, and a WTO dispute settlement panel ruled in Brazil’s favor in September 2004. The United States appealed the ruling but it was reaffirmed by the WTO appellate body in March 2005. Although the Bush Administration asked Congress to modify the cotton subsidy program in July 2005, a WTO dispute panel ruled in December 2007 that the United States was not moving quickly enough to comply with the 2004 ruling.92 Brazil and the United States then went to arbitration over the level of trade sanctions Brazil has the right to impose against the United States, leading to an August 31, 2009 decision by a WTO arbitration panel, which largely favored Brazil’s retaliation request. Generalized System of Preferences 93 The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) provides duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from developing countries. In the 109th Congress, renewal of the preference (as established by Title V of the Trade Act of 1974) was somewhat controversial, owing, in part, to concerns of some Members that a number of the more advanced developing countries (such as Brazil and India) were contributing to the impasse in the Doha round of WTO talks. Compromise language worked out between the House and Senate extended GSP for two years for all countries, while asserting that the President “should” revoke “competitive need limitation (CNL)” waivers for products from certain countries, based on the criteria specified. In June 2007, the Bush Administration decided to revoke the CNL waivers on Brazilian brake parts and ferrozirconium.94 The 111th Congress extended GSP until December 31, 2010 with P.L. 111-124. On June 4, 2009, H.R. 2702 (C. Smith) was introduced in the House. The bill would suspend GSP for Brazil until the country meets its obligations under the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Intellectual Property Rights In the last few years, Brazil has taken steps to improve its record on protecting intellectual property rights (IPR). The Brazilian government has created a national action plan to address piracy and intellectual property crimes, which has included increased police actions. Brazil and the United States continue to work together to address intellectual property issues, primarily through the U.S.-Brazil Bilateral Consultative Mechanism and the U.S.-Brazil Commercial Dialogue. In recognition of this progress, the United States Trade Representative lowered Brazil from the Priority Watch List of countries with significant IPR violations to the Watch List in 2007. Brazil remained on the Watch List in 2008 and 2009. In order to build on progress that has been made, USTR recommends that Brazil should consider strengthening its IPR enforcement legislation, more vigorously addressing book and internet piracy, and signing the World Intellectual Property Organization Internet Treaties.95 The U.S. government has also expressed concerns about Brazil’s periodic threats to issue compulsory licenses for patented pharmaceutical products. In May 2007, Brazil broke a patent on a drug used to treat HIV/AIDS that is produced by Merck & Co. in order to import a cheaper version of that drug from India.96 In July 2009, President Lula suggested that developing countries should be allowed to lift patent rights to produce more vaccine to battle the A(H1N1) flu epidemic.97 Human Rights The U.S. State Department’s Country Report on Human Rights on Brazil covering 2008 states that while “the federal government generally respected the human rights of its citizens ... there continued to be numerous, serious abuses, and the records of several state governments were poor.” Some human rights issues of particular concern include ongoing crime and human rights abuses by police, race and discrimination, and trafficking in persons. Violent Crime and Human Rights Abuses by Police Most observers agree that the related problems of urban crime, drugs, and violence, on the one hand, and corruption and brutality in law enforcement and prisons, on the other, are threatening citizens’ security in Brazil. Crime is most rampant in the urban shanty towns (favelas) in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Violence has traditionally been linked to turf wars being waged between rival drug gangs for control of the drug industry or to clashes between drug gangs and police officials, who have been criticized for the brutal manner in which they have responded to the gang violence. The weaknesses in Brazil’s criminal justice system have became dramatically apparent in recent years as gangs have launched violent attacks that have destabilized the cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. In one such attack in May 2006, street combat and rioting organized by a prisonbased gang network, the First Capital Command (PCC), paralyzed the city of São Paulo for several days.98 Officially, the violent gang attacks, which were followed by police reprisals, resulted in at least 186 deaths.99 More recently, in October 2009, gunmen of the Red Command (CV) launched a raid on the Morro dos Macacos favela to wrest control of the drug trade from the rival Friends of Friends gang. Over the course of several days, 31 people were killed, including three police sharpshooters whose helicopter was shot down as they tried to control the situation.100 As police forces in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro have employed strong-arm tactics in hopes of curbing the rampant gang violence, some human rights groups have raised concerns over a rising number of extrajudicial killings. Upon completing a November 2007 visit to Brazil, a U.N. Special Rapporteur concluded that police in Brazil are allowed to “kill with impunity in the name of security.”101 Indeed, more than 11,000 people have been killed by the two police forces since 2003. Although the officers involved have reported nearly all of the killings as legitimate acts of self defense, or “resistance killings,” a recent two year investigation by Human Rights Watch concluded that “a substantial portion of the alleged resistance killings reported...(were) in fact extrajudicial executions.” The Human Rights Watch report also indicates that those police officers responsible for extrajudicial killings enjoy near total impunity. For example, of the over 7,800 complaints against police officers recorded by the Rio Police Ombudsman’s Office over the past decade, only 42 generated criminal charges by state prosecutors and just four led to convictions.102 Despite these criticisms, some have defended the strong-arm tactics. São Paulo’s public security secretariat maintains that Human Rights Watch failed to take note of the fact that annual state killings by police have declined by 50% since 2003 while the homicide rate has been reduced by 70% over the past decade.103 Many analysts have asserted that Brazilian politicians at all levels of government have failed to devote the resources and political will necessary to confront the country’s serious public security problems, however, this may be changing. The state of Rio de Janeiro launched a new anticrime initiative in 2009 that considerably expands the number of personnel charged with maintaining security. Whereas previous police efforts generally centered around quick raids, the new initiative establishes Police Pacification Units (UPPs) that will maintain permanent presences in the favelas. After the favelas are cleared of drug gangs, the UPPs are charged with maintaining security and other governmental institutions are brought in to provide basic social services. The new initiative has been rather successful in reducing crime and violence without extensive bloodshed. Rio de Janeiro’s government intends to expand the initiative from the seven pilot favelas targeted in 2009 to 40 additional favelas in 2010.104 Race and Discrimination 105 People of African descent in Brazil, also known as Afro-Brazilians, represent 45% of the country’s population, but constitute 64% of the poor and 69% of the extreme poor.106 During the Cardoso Administration, the Brazilian government began to collect better official statistics on Afro-Brazilians. These statistics found significant education, health, and wage disparities between Afro-Brazilians and Brazil’s general population. Brazil now has the most extensive anti-discrimination legislation geared towards Afrodescendants of any country in Latin America. In 2001, Brazil became the first Latin American country to endorse quotas in order to increase minority representation in government service. Since 2002, several state universities in Brazil have enacted quotas setting aside admission slots for black students. Although most Brazilians favor government programs to combat social exclusion, they disagree as to whether the beneficiaries of affirmative action programs should be selected on the basis of race or income.107 In 2003, Brazil became the first country in the world to establish a Special Secretariat with a ministerial rank to manage Racial Equity Promotion Policies. Afro-Brazilian activists, while acknowledging recent government efforts on behalf of Afro-descendants, have noted that most universities have preferred not to implement quota systems, and that the Special Secretariat lacks the funding, staff, and clout necessary to advance its initiatives.108 Despite these limitations, Brazil has taken a leadership role in advancing issues of race and discrimination within the Organization of American States, where it is leading the drafting of an Inter-American Convention for the Prevention of Racism and All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance. In March 2008, Brazil and the Untied States signed an agreement known as the United States-Brazil Joint Action Plan Against Racial Discrimination to bilaterally promote racial equality in areas such as education, health, housing, and labor.109 On September 9, 2008, the House passed H.Res. 1254 (Engel), expressing congressional support for the U.S.-Brazil antidiscrimination plan. Trafficking in Persons for Forced Labor 110 According to the U.S. State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report, Brazil does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, but is making significant efforts to do so. As a result, it is listed as a Tier 2 country.111 Brazil is a source, transit, and destination country for people, especially women and children, trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation. Brazilian Federal Police estimate that between 250,000 and 400,000 children are exploited in domestic prostitution, especially in the country’s coastal resort areas where child sex tourism is prevalent. Brazil is also a source country for men trafficked internally for forced labor. More than 25,000 men have reportedly been recruited to labor in slave-like conditions, many in the country’s agribusiness industry. Roughly half of the more than 11,000 people freed from debt slavery in 2007 and 2008 were found working on sugarcane plantations.112 While the Brazilian government announced an agreement with the sugar industry to provide decent working conditions for the country’s sugarcane cutters in June 2009, the accord does not establish minimum wages or formal obligations.113 Reports suggest that significant numbers of men working in cattle ranching, mining, and the production of charcoal for pig iron—a key ingredient of steel that is then purchased by major companies in the United States—are also subjected to slave labor.114 Over the past year, the Brazilian government has taken a number of actions to address the problem of human trafficking. Anti-slave labor mobile units under the Ministry of Labor increased their operations, inspecting remote areas, freeing victims, and forcing those responsible to pay fines and restitution. Slave labor victims received some $3.6 million in compensation as a result of the 2008 operations. The Brazilian government also continued prosecuting traffickers, providing assistance to victims, and broadcasting its anti-trafficking public awareness campaign. Additionally, the Brazilian government began implementing a national plan of action to prevent trafficking in persons. Despite these actions, Brazil has made only limited progress in bringing traffickers to justice and effectively penalizing those who exploit forced labor.115 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Over the past several years, a high-profile child custody case has focused attention on Brazil’s noncompliance with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.116 In June 2004, Sean Goldman was taken to Brazil by his mother, Bruna Bianchi Carneiro Ribeiro Goldman, a Brazilian native. Ms. Bianchi then divorced her husband David Goldman—a U.S. citizen—and asserted full custody of Sean. In August 2004, the Superior Court of New Jersey ruled that Ms. Bianchi’s continued retention of Sean constituted parental kidnapping under U.S. law and awarded Mr. Goldman custody.117 In September 2004, Mr. Goldman filed an application for Sean’s return under the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, to which both the United States and Brazil are party and which entered into force between the countries on December 1, 2003. Under the Convention, a child removed from a country in violation of a parent’s custodial rights should be promptly returned to the place of his or her habitual residence. The courts of the country of the child’s residence can then resolve the custody dispute.118 In 2005, a Brazilian federal judge ruled that although Sean had been moved to Brazil wrongfully, he should remain in Brazil because he had become settled in his new location.119 In August 2008, Ms. Bianchi died and a Brazilian state court judge granted temporary custody of Sean to the man Ms. Bianchi married following her move to Brazil, Joao Paulo Lins e Silva.120 The custody case then bounced between federal appeals courts and the Brazilian Supreme Court until December 22, 2009, when the Brazilian Supreme Court issued a definitive ruling that ordered that Sean be returned to his father. On December 24, 2009, Sean was handed over to Mr. Goldman at the U.S. Consulate in Rio de Janeiro.121 The U.S. State Department’s Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction cites Brazil for patterns of noncompliance with the Convention. It faults Brazilian courts for treating Convention cases as custody decisions, demonstrating bias toward Brazilian citizens, and making the judicial process excessively lengthy. There are currently some 50 unresolved cases of children being retained in Brazil after having been wrongly removed from the United States.122 On March 11, 2009, the House unanimously passed H.Res. 125 (C. Smith), calling on Brazil to meet its obligations under the Hague Convention to return Sean Goldman to his father in the United States. On March 24, 2009, the Senate approved S.Res. 37 (Lautenberg) by unanimous consent, calling on Brazil to comply with the requirements of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and to assist in the safe return of Sean Goldman to his father in the United States. On June 4, 2009, H.R. 2702 (C. Smith) was introduced in the House. The bill would suspend the Generalized System of Preferences for Brazil until the country meets its obligations under the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. HIV/AIDS Internationally recognized as having one of the world’s most successful HIV/AIDS programs, Brazil has made the fight against the spread of HIV/AIDS a national priority. Initially focused on disease prevention, Brazil’s HIV/AIDS program expanded to providing antiretroviral therapy (ART) on a limited basis by 1991, and later guaranteeing universal access by 1996. Currently some 172,000 Brazilians have access to free generic versions of ART drugs, some of which are locally produced and financed by the Brazilian government. The incidence of HIV/AIDS in Brazil has stabilized since 1997, and universal free access to ART has increased average survival times from 18 months for those diagnosed in 1995, to 58 months for those diagnosed in 1996.123 HIV prevalence has been stable at 0.5% for the general population in Brazil since 2000, so most government prevention efforts are now targeted at high-risk groups where prevalence rates are still above 5%. Brazil’s decision to develop generic ART drugs to treat HIV/AIDS under the compulsory licensing provision of its patent law led to a subsequent 80% drop in the cost of treatment. That decision brought Brazil into conflict with the United States and the international pharmaceutical industry. In May 2001, the United States submitted a complaint to the WTO, which was later withdrawn, that Brazil’s practices violated the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement and prevented companies from developing new products in Brazil. While the pharmaceutical industry argued that TRIPS was an essential tool to protect intellectual property rights, developing countries (like Brazil) countered that TRIPS inhibited their ability to fight public health emergencies in a cost-effective manner. In August 2003, a WTO decision temporarily waived part of the TRIPS rules to allow the export of generic drugs to countries confronting a grave public health challenge (such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, or malaria). That temporary waiver became permanent in late 2005.124 Brazil currently manufactures older ART drugs for domestic consumption and export to several African countries but has to import newer medicines. According to Brazil’s Ministry of Health, tough negotiations with pharmaceutical companies have resulted in $1.1 billion in savings for the country’s HIV/AIDS program. Amazon Conservation The Amazon basin spans the borders of eight countries and is the most biodiverse tract of tropical rainforest in the world. It holds 20% of the Earth’s fresh water and 10% of all known species. Approximately 60% of the Amazon falls within Brazilian borders, making Brazil home to 40% of the world’s remaining tropical forests.125 The Brazilian Amazon was largely undeveloped until the 1960s, when the military government began subsidizing the settlement and development of the region as a matter of national security. Over the last 40 years, the human population has grown from 4 million to over 20 million, and the resulting settlements, roads, logging, cattle ranching, and subsistence and commercial agriculture have led to approximately 15% of the Brazilian Amazon being deforested.126 In the 1980s, some predicted that deforestation would decline if the Brazilian government stopped providing tax incentives and credit subsidies to settlers and agricultural producers. Those predictions have not borne out, however, as the complex and often interrelated causes of deforestation have multiplied rather than decreased.127 Between 1990 and 2000, Brazil lost an area of rainforest twice the size of Portugal, however, deforestation rates have generally declined since the peak year of 2004.128 Domestic Efforts Recognizing that deforestation threatens the biodiversity of the Amazon region and is responsible for 70% of Brazil’s annual greenhouse-gas emissions, the Lula Administration has expanded protected areas and implemented new environmental policies.129 During its first five years in office, the Lula Administration created 62 new natural reserves, bringing the total area of the Brazilian Amazon protected by law to nearly 110,000 square miles, the fourth-largest percentage of protected area in relation to territory in the world.130 President Lula has also signed a Public Forest Management Law that encourages sustainable development and placed a moratorium on soybean plantings and cattle ranching in the Amazon. Moreover, Brazil intends to reduce the rate of Amazon deforestation by half—based on the 1996-2005 average—to 2,300 square miles per year—by 2017 and reduce Amazon deforestation by 80% by 2020. Brazil plans to meet these goals by increasing federal patrols of forested areas, replanting over 21,000 square miles of forest, and financing sustainable development projects in areas where the local economy depends on logging.131 The Lula Administration maintains that its efforts have been successful, highlighting the fact that just 2,706 square miles of the Amazon were deforested between July 2008 and July 2009, the lowest annual level since the National Institute for Space Studies began monitoring deforestation in 1988.132 Although some conservation groups have praised President Lula for his Administration’s actions, a number of environmentalists—including former Environment Minister Marina Silva and current Environment Minister Carlos Minc—have questioned the Administration’s commitment to sustainable development.133 Critics assert that the Administration favors agricultural interests over conservation. This claim was reinforced by President Lula’s June 2009 approval of an environmental law that grants nearly 260,000 square miles of the Amazon to illegal squatters, 72% of which will go to large land holders.134 Critics also maintain that Brazil’s occasional declines in deforestation rates are not the result of the Lula Administration’s initiatives, but correspond to declining global commodity prices that make it less profitable to clear the forests. They point out that deforestation rates only began falling as commodity prices collapsed in late 2008.135 In order to combat further deforestation, some analysts maintain that the Brazilian government will have to greatly increase the number of people employed to work in protected areas and do more to confront agricultural producers operating within the Amazon.136 Carbon Offsets and Other International Initiatives The Amazon holds 10% of the carbon stores in the world’s ecosystem and absorbs nearly two billion tons of carbon dioxide each year, making it a sink for global carbon emissions and an important asset in the prevention of climate change.137 The Kyoto Protocol—of which Brazil is a signatory—created a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which allows emission reduction projects in developing countries to earn certified emission reduction credits (CERs) that can then be traded or sold to industrialized countries to meet their mandated emission reduction targets. Brazil has taken full advantage of the CDM, and is host to over 9% of the worldwide emission reduction projects. These projects represent 33.5 million CERs, or a reduction of 33.5 million tons of carbon dioxide.138 The CDM allows for a wide variety of emission reduction projects, but in terms of forestry, CERs are only awarded for afforestation and reforestation projects, not forest conservation. As a result, forestry projects account for a very small percentage of the total CERs awarded. A number of industrialized countries that would like to achieve a greater percentage of their mandated emission reductions through carbon offsets have teamed with developing countries with substantial tropical forests to propose widening the CDM to include forest conservation. Brazil has opposed such a plan, arguing it would absolve rich countries from cutting their own emissions.139 Brazil has supported the rise of voluntary offset markets, however, in which organizations and individuals not subject to mandatory emission reductions can buy carbon offsets to contribute to conservation and clean energy projects. Brazil believes Amazon conservation should be done through public funding rather than a carbon market. Accordingly, it launched the “Amazon Fund” in August 2008. The fund is intended to attract donations from countries, companies, and non-governmental organizations to assist in Brazil’s Amazon conservation efforts. Brazil intends to raise $21 billion by 2021 to support forest conservation, scientific research, and sustainable development. Norway has pledged $1 billion to he fund through 2015 and Germany has pledged $26.8 million. The first projects funded by the Amazon Fund were announced in December 2009. They include projects to regenerate degraded land, monitor land registration titles, and pay rubber tappers and other forest dwellers to protect the forest.140 USAID environment programs support Amazon conservation through the promotion of proper land-use and encouragement of environmentally friendly income generation activities for the rural poor. In FY2006, USAID initiated the Amazon Basin Conservation Initiative, which supports community groups, governments, and public and private organizations working throughout the Amazon Basin in their efforts to conserve the Amazon’s globally important biodiversity. USAID provided $5.2 million for environmental programs in Brazil in FY2007, $9.5 million in FY2008, and $10 million in FY2009. The Conference Report (H.Rept. 111-366) to the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117) asserts that, of the funds appropriated in the act for biodiversity programs, $25 million are to go to the Amazon Basin Conservation Initiative, $10 million of which is directed to activities in Brazil.

**Russia**

**No Russia expansionism**

**Schwenninger, 8**

Sherle R. Schwenninger, New America Foundation, The Nation, 10-6-2008, “Ten National Security Myths”

First, Russia’s foreign policy has not been anti-American. Moscow has cooperated with Washington on a number of important international issues, from assisting NATO against the Taliban in Afghanistan and supporting Washington’s counterterrorism efforts, to joining the coalition to curb Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. Second, what McCain sees as a pattern of intimidation to re-establish the Russian empire more objective analysts see as a great power protecting its legitimate interests in the face of US provocations. These provocations started during the Clinton administration and have increased under Bush, with the expansion of NATO to Russia’s border and abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. They have continued with the promise of NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine and the decision to deploy a missile defense system in Central Europe. Yet Moscow has responded for the most part in a measured and defensive way, its most forceful move being the recent military actions in Georgia to protect South Ossetia. When the Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, sent forces into South Ossetia in violation of an earlier agreement, Russia responded much as the United States did when it intervened in 1999 against Serbia over Kosovo. Russian military actions in Georgia may have been disproportionate, but not as disproportionate as Washington’s extensive bombing of Serbia proper. Despite the souring of the earlier cooperative relationship with the Bush administration, Russia has made it clear that it would still prefer a strategic partnership that would reduce nuclear weapons, contain Islamist extremism, and expand the world’s oil and gas supplies. But it has also made it clear that this partnership must be based on mutual interests and compromise, not simply on Russian acquiescence in American dictates.

**Russia-Cuba ties are resilient**

**Lyakhov and Korotun, 5/19**

Alexei Lyakhov and Lada Korotun, reporters for the Voice of Russia; “Russia-Cuba ties are seeing renaissance – official,” 5/19/2013, http://voiceofrussia.com/2013\_05\_19/Russia-Cuba-ties-are-seeing-renaissance-official //bghs-ms

Russia-Cuba ties are seeing a renaissance, Valentina Matviyenko, chairwoman of Russia’s Federation Council stated during her visit to Cuba where she met with the country’s leader Raul Castro and President of Cuba’s National Assembly Esteban Lazo.¶ Matviyenko has also praised the expansion of bilateral partnership, trade, economic, scientific and humanitarian cooperation between the countries.¶ "The Russian Senate delegation came to Havana to upgrade and boost parliamentary cooperation between the two countries. We discussed a number of issues during a two-hour talk, including Fidel Castro’s health, Valentina Matviyenko told reporters on her flight back to Moscow, adding that Comandante is feeling ok and is following a strict regime under tight medical supervision."¶ Apart from being Russia’s important strategic partner Cuba is also its good and **reliable friend**, Valentina Matviyenko said. ¶ "**Our countries have special bonds of fraternity and mutual respect and Russia has really warm and sincere feelings for Cubans**. We love our Cuban friends and are ready for cooperation. Havana and Moscow became close allies under Fidel Castro and 2013 marks 50 years since his first visit to the USSR – the event is celebrated in Moscow and some other Russian cities. Now **bilateral cooperation is on the rise** and is mainly focused on trade and economy. Though last year’s trade turnover accounted for some modest 220 mln dollars we have a great potential to expand it."¶ The streets of Havana have many signs of long-lasting friendship like Soviet-made cars.

**Increased US presence in Cuba doesn’t crowd out Russia – zero solvency**

**Garrido, 13** (Mario Hubert Garrido, journalist and reporter for the Havana reporter, “Russia-Latin America Relations are Strategic”, the Havana reporter, last modified 7-21-13, http://havanareporternews.com/international/russia-latin-america-relations-are-strategic%E2%80%9D)

Havana.\_ Russia’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean are strategic and **independent** of differences with the United States or other nations in the region, said Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, in an exclusive interview with the Prensa Latina news agency during his official visit to Cuba in February.¶ Medvedev dismissed the idea that his country’s recent moves toward closer ties with the region were due to current problems related to Washington’s policy of trying to wield more influence in the area.¶ Latin America and Caribbean countries are in the middle of economic development and represent unexplored potentiality, he said. In that sense, he referred to the sovereign manner in which Moscow has relations in all sectors with nations in the BRICS group (Brazil, India, China and South Africa, in addition to Russia), and highlighted the progress Russia has made in its relations with countries such as Chile, Venezuela, Ecuador and Argentina.¶ In that respect he commented on his most recent visit to Brazil—immediately prior to his visit to Havana—and described it as the world’s fifth-largest economy.¶ Regarding cooperation with Latin America, Medvedev said that different stages and obstacles have existed from the 1990s to the present, but that the conditions were in place to move forward more rapidly and to solve existing problems jointly.¶ He also described the historic relationship and ties that unite Russia to Cuba as special. During his visit to Cuba in February, Moscow and Havana signed some 10 new legal instruments for bilateral cooperation in the areas of investment, trade, tourism, health, education, science, and culture, among others, he noted.

**Relations**

**Warming doesn’t cause extinction**

**NIPCC, 11** (Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change; “Surviving the unprecedented climate change of the IPCC,” 3/8/2011, http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html)

In a paper published in Systematics and Biodiversity, Willis et al. (2010) consider the IPCC (2007) "predicted climatic changes for the next century" -- i.e., their contentions that "global temperatures will increase by 2-4°C and possibly beyond, sea levels will rise (~1 m ± 0.5 m), and atmospheric CO2will increase by up to 1000 ppm" -- noting that it is "widely suggested that the magnitude and rate of these changes will result in many plants and animals going extinct," citing studies that suggest that "within the next century, over 35% of some biota will have gone extinct (Thomas et al., 2004; Solomon et al., 2007) and there will be extensive die-back of the tropical rainforest due to climate change (e.g. Huntingford et al., 2008)." On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos et al., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis et al. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."

**No nuke terror – even if any single step is possible – terrorists have to succeed at every step – it’s statistically impossible**

**Mueller 9** - John Mueller, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center  
Professor of Political Science30 April 2009 “THE ATOMIC TERRORIST?” http://www.icnnd.org/research/Mueller\_Terrorism.pdf

In an article on the prospects for atomic terrorism, Bill Keller of *The New York Times* suggests that “the best reason for thinking it won’t happen is that it hasn’t happened yet,” and that, he worries, “is terrible logic.”33 However, “logic” aside, there is another quite good reason for thinking it won’t happen: the task is incredibly difficult. I have arrayed a lengthy set of obstacles confronting the would-be atomic terrorist. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if often with great difficulty, surmount each obstacle—that doing so in each case is “not impossible.”34 But it is vital to point out that, while it may be “not impossible” to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Even the very alarmed Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier contend that the atomic terrorists’ task “would clearly be among the most difficult types of attack to carry out” or “one of the most difficult missions a terrorist group could hope to try.” But, stresses the CIA’s George Tenet, a terrorist atomic bomb is “possible” or “not beyond the realm of possibility.”35 Accordingly, it might be useful to take a stab at estimating just how “difficult” the atomic terrorists’ task, in aggregate, is—that is, how far from the fringe of the “realm of possibility” it might be. Most discussions of atomic terrorism deal in a rather piecemeal fashion with the subject--focusing separately on individual tasks such as procuring HEU or assembling a device or transporting it. However, as the Gilmore Commission, a special advisory panel to the President and Congress, stresses, setting off a nuclear device capable of producing mass destruction presents not only “Herculean challenges,” but it requires that a whole series of steps be accomplished: obtaining enough fissile material, designing a weapon “that will bring that mass together in a tiny fraction of a second,” and figuring out some way to deliver the thing. And it emphasizes that these merely constitute “the minimum requirements.” If each is not fully met, the result is not simply a less powerful weapon, but one that can’t produce any significant nuclear yield at all or can’t be delivered.36 Following this perspective, an approach that seems appropriate is to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome by a terrorist group in order to carry out the task of producing, transporting, and then successfully detonating an improvised nuclear device. Table 1 attempts to do this, and it arrays some 20 of these—*all* of which must be surmounted by the atomic aspirant. Actually, it would be quite possible to come up with a longer list: in the interests of keeping the catalogue of hurdles down to a reasonable number, some of the entries are actually collections of tasks and could be divided into two or three or more. For example, number 5 on the list requires that heisted highly-enriched uranium be neither a scam nor part of a sting nor of inadequate quality due to insider incompetence; but this hurdle could as readily be rendered as three separate ones. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists effectively *must* go though a exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do so, they are likely to find their prospects daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. Assigning and calculating probabilities The discussion thus far has followed a qualitative approach: synthesizing a considerable amount of material to lay out the route a terrorist group must take to acquire and detonate an atomic bomb in the most likely scenario. It seems to me that this exercise by itself suggests the almost breathtaking enormity of the difficulties facing the would-be atomic terrorist. This conclusion can be reinforced by a quantitative assessment. Assigning a probability that terrorists will be able to overcome each barrier is, of course, a tricky business, and any such exercise should be regarded as rather tentative and exploratory, or perhaps simply as illustrative—though it is done all the time in cost/benefit analysis. One might begin a quantitative approach by adopting probability estimates that purposely, and heavily, bias the case in the terrorists’ favor. In my view, this would take place if it is assumed that the terrorists have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles displayed in Table 1, though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are surely much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million, specifically 1,048,576. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion—specifically 3,486,784,401. What they would be at the (still entirely realistic) level of one in ten boggles the mind. Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive.

**Their impact author concludes low probability of terror**

**Ayson 10** - Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington

(Robert, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33.7, InformaWorld)

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

**Lifting the embargo doesn’t solve—Castro will put up internal restrictions**

**Suchlicki 2k** (JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. He is currently the Latin American Editor for Transaction Publishers and the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro (1997), now in its fourth edition, and editor with Irving L. Horowitz of Cuban Communism (1999). He is also the author of Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA (1998). He is a highly regarded consultant to both the private and public sector on Cuba and Latin American affairs. The U.S. Embargo of Cuba Jaime Suchlicki University of Miami June 2000 <http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf>, nkj)

Opponents of U.S. policy toward Cuba claim that if the embargo and the travel ban are lifted, the Cuban people would benefit economically; American companies will penetrate and influence the Cuban market; the Communist system would begin to crumble and a transition to a democratic society would be accelerated. These expectations are based on several incorrect assumptions. First, that Castro and the Cuban leadership are naïve and inexperienced and, therefore, would allow tourists and investments from the U.S. to subvert the revolution and influence internal developments in the island. Second, that Cuba would open up and allow U.S. investments in all sectors of the economy, instead of selecting which companies could trade and invest. Third, that Castro is so interested in close relations with the U.S. that he is willing to risk what has been upper-most in his mind for 40 years – total control of power and a legacy of opposition to “Yankee imperialism,” – in exchange for economic improvements for his people. During the Fifth Communist Party Congress in 1997, Castro emphasized “We will do what is necessary without renouncing our principles. We do not like capitalism and we will not abandon our Socialist system.” Castro also reiterated his long-standing anti-American posture, accusing the U.S. of waging economic war against his government and calling for “military preparedness against imperialist hostility.”

**6 degree warming inevitable**

**AP 9** (Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24, http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com\_content&do\_pdf=1&id=168)

Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees between now and the end of the century even if every country cuts greenhouse gas emissions as proposed, according to a United Nations update. Scientists looked at emission plans from 192 nations and calculated what would happen to global warming. The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. Much of projected rise in temperature is because of developing nations, which aren't talking much about cutting their emissions, scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. China alone adds nearly 2 degrees to the projections. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed papers on climate over the last three years. Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050, as some experts propose, the world is still facing a 3-degree increase by the end of the century, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. Global warming is speeding up, especially in the Arctic, and that means that some top-level science projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought, it looks like the seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago, Corell said. He said seas should rise about a foot every 20 to 25 years.

**Their Shifter ev says the plan prevents nuclear proliferation --- however, proliferation is stabilizing—reduces the frequency and intensity of war, data proves.**

**Sechser 9**—Prof @ U of Virginia, Todd, , “The Stabilizing Effects of Nuclear Proliferation”, Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations, http://faculty.virginia.edu/tsechser/Sechser-Haas-2009.pdf

PROL IFERATION AND THE HISTORICAL RECORD

Will additional nuclear proliferation stabilize world politics, or will it worsen the problem of interstate conflict? We cannot answer this question with certainty, of course, since we cannot collect data about the future. We can, however, learn from events that have already happened. Imagine that, at the advent of the nuclear age in 1945, today’s proliferation optimists and pessimists had put forth their competing predictions about the likely consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons. Whose predictions would be borne out? In this section I argue that historical data confirm the predictions of proliferation optimism, while offering little corroboration for rival perspectives. Scholars who take the view that proliferation bolsters global stability argue that the spread of nuclear weapons produces three observable effects. 2

First, by deterring aggression, nuclear weapons reduce the frequency with which wars occur. Second, nuclear weapons induce caution among leaders in crises and during wartime, thereby mitigating the intensity of wars. Third, nuclear weapons defuse arms races and obviate the need for high levels of conventionalarms spending. Let us now consider each claim with respect to five proliferators: China, Israel, India, South Africa, and Pakistan. These five states provide a useful laboratory for examining the behavior of proliferators because they more closely resemble the types of states most likely to proliferate today. The United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France were all major industrialized powers when they acquired nuclear weapons, but these five proliferators were weaker, poorer, and less internally stable—much as today’s proliferators are likely to be.

The Frequency of Armed Conflict

The optimist camp’s first and most important claim is that the presence of nuclear weapons suppresses international conflicts. Nuclear weapons, in this view, differ from conventional military tools in two central ways. First, nuclear weapons carry enormous destructive power. Whereas the targets of conventional weapons necessarily tend to be small in size (for instance, an airfield, communications center, or ammunition depot), the most powerful nuclear weapons can place entire cities at risk. The use of even a few nuclear weapons could destroy hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of human lives in a short span of time. Second, defenders have little control over the level of destruction they endure during a nuclear conflict. Without a reliable means to destroy incoming ballistic missiles or to shield cities from nuclear attack— neither of which exists today—nuclear combatants must rely on an enemy’s restraint to limit the amount of damage they suffer. These two characteristics—colossal destructive capacity and the lack of an effective defense— combine to induce caution among leaders facing the prospect of nuclear retaliation. Leaders will behave less aggressively and will more eagerly seek peaceful solutions to crises, the logic goes, since they do not want to endure even a small risk that a conventional war might become nuclear.

These propositions can be evaluated empirically by comparing the rates at which proliferators have participated in interstate conflicts both before and after their acquisition of nuclear weapons. If the optimists are correct, nuclear states should experience fewer conflicts after they acquire nuclear weapons. One way to measure the turbulence of a state’s foreign affairs is to calculate its participation in militarized interstate disputes, defined here as conflicts involving at least one military fatality. Figure 1 considers five proliferators and charts how much their involvement in military conflicts changed after they became nuclear states. Israel, for instance, participated in an average of 1.21 conflicts per year as a nonnuclear state, but entered into only 0.33 conflicts per year after becoming a nuclear state in 1972, so its bar in figure 1 drops below zero to illustrate that Israel has been involved in fewer interstate conflicts since acquiring nuclear weapons.

Optimists predict that states will participate in fewer conflicts after going nuclear, since they expect nuclear weapons to deter aggression and dissuade opposing leaders from escalating crises. And indeed, four of the five states examined here participated in fewer interstate conflicts, on average, once they became nuclear states. For example, Israel fought four interstate wars against its neighbors before acquiring nuclear weapons, but just two afterward. India and Pakistan have gone to war against one another four times since achieving independence, but only one of those wars occurred after the two rivals acquired nuclear weapons. Indeed, India and Pakistan saw the average incidence of militarized disputes between them decline by half (from 0.55 disputes per year to 0.27) once both states had acquired nuclear weapons. Only South Africa experienced an increase in its conflict participation rate after achieving nuclear status, although the magnitude of this change (+0.06) was the smallest of the five proliferators considered here.

These data tell us that proliferation optimists are right to expect a decline in the frequency of interstate wars as more states acquire nuclear weapons.

Admittedly, this analysis cannot demonstrate that these declines were caused entirely by nuclear weapons, but the strength of the correlation cannot be ignored. At a minimum, the data cast considerable doubt on the argument that nuclear weapons undermine conventional military stability.

What about conflicts which, despite the shadow of nuclear weapons, nevertheless occur? Proliferation optimists argue that even if nuclear-armed states fight one another, their wars will not be intense: leaders will prevent such conflicts from escalating to avoid the risk that nuclear weapons might be used. As Waltz writes, “Everyone knows that if force gets out of hand all the parties to a conflict face catastrophe. With conventional weapons, the crystal ball is clouded. With nuclear weapons, it is perfectly clear” (Sagan and Waltz 2003, 114).

This reasoning was borne out clearly by the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan—the only war ever to occur between two nuclear states. The episode is instructive because the war entailed far fewer causalities than any of the prior wars between India and Pakistan (see table 1), owing in part to the restraint of the Indian military in expelling Pakistani insurgents from the Kargil region. The Indian military could have reduced its own losses and ended the war more quickly by attacking critical communication and supply lines in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, yet because crossing into Pakistani territory might have widened the war and risked provoking a Pakistani nuclear threat, Indian leaders instead opted for caution.

It is not hard to find other military crises in which the risk of nuclear escalation induced restraint. In March 1969, Chinese forces ambushed Russian troops along the Ussuri River in northwest China, prompting a Soviet counterattack. But one important reason we do not read about the catastrophic Sino Soviet War of 1969 is that a Soviet threat to launch preventive strikes against Chinese nuclear targets induced Chinese leaders to de-escalate the crisis. Despite having initiated the challenge, China backed down rather than risk letting events get out of hand. The Soviet Union, of course, had itself recently backed down from a crisis it precipitated when Nikita Khrushchev agreed in 1962 to remove Soviet missile bases from Cuba rather than risk a potentially nuclear conflict with the United States.

These examples make clear that nuclear weapons cannot prevent all conflicts: indeed, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Ussuri River crisis, and the Kargil War all came about because one nuclear power was bold enough to challenge another. But in a world without nuclear weapons, these clashes might have escalated to large-scale conventional wars. Instead, in each case the shadow of nuclear weapons helped to cool tempers and contain the crisis: retaliation remained limited, escalatory options were rejected, and eventually the challenger backed down.

**Nuclear weapons solve all war—conventional conflict outweighs**

**Preston** **7**—Associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Washington State University, Thomas, From Lambs to Lions, p. 31-2

Advocates of deterrence seldom take the position that it will always work or that it cannot fail. Rather, they take the position that if one can achieve the requisite elements required to achieve a stable deterrent relationship between parties, it vastly decreases the chances of miscalculation and resorting to war—even in contexts where it might otherwise be expected to occur (George and Smoke 1974; Harvey 1997a; Powell 1990, 2003; Goldstein 2000). Un­fortunately, critics of deterrence take the understandable, if unrealistic, position that if deterrence cannot be 100 percent effective under all circum­stances, then it is an unsound strategic approach for states to rely upon, especially considering the immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Feaver (1993, 162), for example, criticizes reliance on nuclear deterrence be­cause it can fail and that rational deterrence theory can only predict that peace should occur most of the time (e.g., Lebow and Stein 1989).

Yet, were we to apply this standard of perfection to most other policy ap­proaches concerning security matters—whether it be arms control or prolif­eration regime efforts, military procurement policies, alliance formation strategies, diplomacy, or sanctions—none could be argued with any more cer­tainty to completely remove the threat of equally devastating wars either. In­deed, one could easily make the argument that these alternative means have shown themselves historically to be far less effective than nuclear arms in preventing wars. Certainly, the twentieth century was replete with examples of devastating conventional conflicts which were not deterred through non­nuclear measures. Although the potential costs of a nuclear exchange between small states would indeed cause a frightful loss of life, it would be no more costly (and likely far less so) than large-scale conventional conflicts have been for combatants.

Moreover, if nuclear deterrence raises the potential costs of war high enough for policy makers to want to avoid (rather than risk) conflict, it is just as legitimate (if not more so) for optimists to argue in favor of nuclear deterrence in terms of the lives saved through the avoidance of far more likely recourses to conventional wars, as it is for pessimists to warn of the potential costs of deterrence failure. And, while some accounts describing the "im­mense weaknesses" of deterrence theory (Lebow and Stein 1989, 1990) would lead one to believe deterrence was almost impossible to either obtain or maintain, since 1945 there has not been one single historical instance of nuclear deterrence failure (especially when this notion is limited to threats to key central state interests like survival, and not to minor probing of periph­eral interests). Moreover, the actual costs of twentieth-century conventional conflicts have been staggeringly immense, especially when compared to the actual costs of nuclear conflicts (for example, 210,000 fatalities in the com­bined 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings compared to 62 mil­lion killed overall during World War II, over three million dead in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, etc.) (McKinzie et al. 2001, 28).3

**Solving prolif causes a shift to bioweapons**

**Zilinskas 2K**—Former Clinical Microbiologist. Dir. – Chem/Bio Weapons Nonproliferation Program – Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Raymond, Biological warfare: modern offense and defense, 1-2

There are many who believe that today's bioscientists and chemical engineers working in unison and wielding the techniques of molecule biology developed since the early 1970s could, if so commanded, develop militarily effective biological weapons within a fairly short time. If this supposition is correct, our perception of biological weapons as being undependable, uncontrollable, and unreliable must change. The reason is simple: if these weapons are demonstrated to possess properties that make it possible for commanders to effect controlled, confined mass destruction on command, all governments would be forced to construct defenses against them and some undoubtedly would be tempted to arm their military with these weapons that would be both powerful and relatively inexpensive to acquire. Ironically, as tougher international controls are put into place to deter nations from seeking to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons, leaders may be even more drawn to biological arms as the most accessible form of weapon of mass destruction.

**Extinction**

**Ochs 2** (Richard, BS in Natural Resource Management from Rutgers University, with honors, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE IMMEDIATELY ABOLISHED, <http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html>)

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.

**Cuba won’t pursue an alliance with the U.S. – anti-Americanism outweighs**

**Suchlicki 13** (Jaime Suchlicki, Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, “Why Cuba Will Still Be Anti-American After Castro” <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/why-cuba-will-still-be-anti-american-after-castro/273680/> 3-4-13)f

Similarly, any serious overtures to the U.S. do not seem likely in the near future. It would mean the rejection of one of Fidel Castro's main legacies: anti-Americanism. It may create uncertainty within the government, leading to frictions and factionalism. It would require the weakening of Cuba's anti-American alliance with radical regimes in Latin America and elsewhere.¶ Raul is unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the United States. At a time that anti-Americanism is strong in Latin America and the Middle East, Raul's policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the United States and that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid.¶ Raul does not seem ready to provide meaningful and irreversible concessions for a U.S. - Cuba normalization. Like his brother in the past, public statements and speeches are politically motivated and directed at audiences in Cuba, the United States and Europe. Serious negotiations on important issues are not carried out in speeches from the plaza. They are usually carried out through the normal diplomatic avenues open to the Cubans in Havana, Washington and the United Nations or other countries, if they wish. These avenues have never been closed as evidenced by the migration accord and the anti-hijacking agreement between the United States and Cuba.¶ Raul remains a loyal follower and cheerleader of Fidel's anti-American policies.**¶** The issue between Cuba and the U.S. is not about negotiations or talking. These are not sufficient. There has to be a willingness on the part of the Cuban leadership to offer real concessions - in the area of human rights and political and economic openings as well as cooperation on anti-terrorism and drug interdiction - for the United States to change it policies.

**Many terminal alt causes to relations**

**Shifter, 8 –** Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown (Micheal, “U.S.-Latin American Relations: Recommendations for the New Administration”, Inter-American Dialogue, October 27, 2008, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=1625)

As if any further proof were needed, the ongoing financial crisis highlights the already diminished capacity of the United States to shape developments in the rest of the world. With its own house in disorder, the United States will struggle to get back on track as a responsible member of the international community.

Still, though the United States may be considerably chastened, it remains a superpower, whose decisions and actions have a huge global impact. When it falls to the next US administration to deal with the rapidly changing situation in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, or even Africa, it will likely reassess US interests and frame strategic choices in light of new realities.

But if the United States seriously undertakes such an effort for neighboring Latin America, it will mark the first time it has done so. For reasons of geography, history and power disparity, Latin America has typically been treated as a discrete compartment, separate from interest-based foreign relations.

Regardless of how one comes down on the issues of Cuba, immigration, drugs, and trade, the paternalistic impulse on the part of the United States has been unmistakable. Latin Americans find this tutorial attitude extremely irritating, and their objections have prompted a more collegial tone from the United States in certain cases. Unfortunately, it is still manifest in a variety of ways, from the overall diplomatic style to specific policies like drug cooperation decertification or suspending military training for countries that do not sign agreements that exempt US soldiers from prosecution under the International Criminal Court.

While domestic politics is never completely divorced from foreign policy, it has an inordinate and particularly distorting influence on Latin American policy. Hardliners and liberals alike rarely consider the effects policies and statements will have on US-Latin American relations or the ultimate impact for US interests. The decision to build a “wall” along the US-Mexico border, for example, may have been politically expedient but was deeply insulting, not only to Mexico, but to the entire region.

This ingrained reflex to dismiss Latin America as the “backyard” of the United States may have been understandable in a distant era, but today the region is wildly varied and defies lazy, superficial generalizations (e.g. “inflation is out of control” or “democracy is starting to take root”). Whether or not the United States recognizes it, the fact is that different parts of Latin America are moving in markedly different directions simultaneously.

**1nc generic (laundry list)**

**Text: The United States federal government should propose that it {PLAN} to through binding consultation to the Federal government of Brazil. The United States federal government should support this proposal during consultation and abide by the results of the consultation.**

**The counterplan builds effective cooperation and is critical to U.S. Brazil relations**

**Einaudi**, **11** – Member and research specialist of the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Distinguished Visiting Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (Luigi R., , “Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement,” March 2011)ahayes

Whether Brazil’s future policies will, like those of the United States, reflect greater caution and sensitivity to third party interests remains an open question. But there can be no question that Brazil’s global activism is here to stay. “The days when domestic weaknesses (an acumulo de vulnerabilidades) limited our scope of action abroad have been left behind,” stated Antonio de Aguiar Patriota in his first speech as the new Foreign Minister under President Rousseff on January 2, 2011.33 Brazilians cannot underestimate what is left to be done domestically, he argued, but they now expect “to engage on all major international debates.” The United States and Brazil, concludes one American observer, seem destined to keep bumping into each other all over the world.34 The key requirement for both countries is therefore to give strategic shape and rationality to these otherwise random interactions. Prospects and Policy Recommendations The United States has a basic national security interest in Brazil’s continuing democratic and marketoriented success, which improves its will and capacity to help address pressing global problems. We are in a rapidly changing period of international relations, in which a high premium is put on skilled and effective diplomacy in order to provide a measure of management to situations that could spin out of control. We are still haunted by nuclear weapons. In these circumstances, Brazil plays an important role. It is in the U.S. interest to find as many ways as possible not only to cooperate with Brazil, but also to engage with Brasilia as a regional and global partner in the maintenance of peace and prosperity. A prerequisite for improved mutual engagement will be changes in perspective on both sides. Mutually beneficial engagement requires the United States to welcome Brazil’s emergence as a global power. Brazil is more than a tropical China35; it is culturally and politically close to the United States and Europe. Brazil, in turn, needs to realize that the United States accepts its rise. Brazil also needs to recognize that the United States still matters greatly to Brasilia and that more can be achieved working with Washington than against it. The United States and Brazil have vast overlapping interests, but a formal strategic partnership is probably out of the question for both countries. In the United States, Brazil must compete for policy attention with China, India, Russia, Japan, Mexico, and several European countries. It poses no security threat to the United States. Moreover, despite Brazil’s importance in multilateral organizations, particularly the UN, Brazil can be of limited practical assistance at best to the United States in its two current wars. Brazil’s interests, in turn, may be fairly said to include the need to distinguish itself from the United States. Diplomatically, this means neither country can expect automatic agreement from the other. Interests differ and it may be politically necessary to highlight differences even when interests are similar. But both countries should make **every effort to develop** a habit of **“permanent consultation”** in an effort to coordinate policies, work pragmatically together where interests are common, and reduce surprises even while recognizing that specific interests and policies often may differ. A first operational step, therefore, is for both countries to hold regular **policy-level consultations**, increase exchanges of information, and coordinate carefully on multilateral matters. This is much easier said than done. The list of global issues on which Brazil is becoming a major player includes conflict resolution, all aspects of energy, including nuclear matters, **all types of trade**, the environment, space, and the development of international law, including law of the seas and nonproliferation. To share information and ensure effective consultation on so many functional issues will require finding ways to lessen the geographic stovepiping natural to bureaucracy. The U.S. Department of State, for example, has historically organized itself into geographical bureaus responsible for relations with countries in particular regions, leaving functional issues to offices organized globally. This organization hampers the exchange of information and consultation with countries such as Brazil, whose reach and policies go beyond their particular geographic region. One result is that multilateral affairs are still often an isolated afterthought in the U.S. Government. Are there things the United States and Brazil could do, whether bilaterally or in the World Trade Organization, that would offset some of the negative effects of the China trade on manufacturing in both their countries?36 Just posing the question reveals the complexity of the task.

**{Says yes}**

**U.S. – Brazil relations are high but consultation is necessary to maintain them – solves general conflict and a laundry list of impacts**

**Meyer**, **10 -** Latin American Affairs Analyst @ CRS, (Peter J., Analyst in Latin American Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, “Brazil-U.S. Relations,” 3/5/10,http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA521243) ahayes

Relations with the United States Currently, relations between the United States and Brazil may be characterized as friendly. The United States has increasingly regarded Brazil as a significant power, especially in its role as a stabilizing force in Latin America. U.S. officials assert that the United States seeks to increase cooperation with moderate leftist governments in Latin America (like Brazil) in order to ease mounting tensions among countries in South America, and to deal with populist governments in the region. Brazil under President Lula has helped diffuse potential political crises in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and supported Colombia’s ongoing struggle against terrorist organizations and drug traffickers. Brazil is also commanding the U.N. stabilization force in Haiti. Brazil and the United States have worked closely on a wide range of bilateral and regional issues, and Brazil-U.S. cooperation has increased in recent years, as reflected in the continuing high level contacts between the two governments, particularly on energy issues. Early in 2007, two high-level meetings between Presidents Bush and Lula culminated in the March 2007 signing of a U.S.-Brazil Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to promote bio-fuels development in the Western Hemisphere.59 The initiative was expanded in November 2008 to include additional countries in Africa, Central America, and the Caribbean (See “Ethanol and Other Biofuels” section below).60 Although Brazil and the United States share common goals for regional stability, Brazil’s independent approach to foreign policy has led to periodic disputes with the United States on trade and political issues, including how (and whether) to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and Brazil’s vocal opposition to the war in Iraq and the U.S. embargo of Cuba. Despite President Lula’s friendly relationship with President Obama, a number of differences between Brazil and the United States have emerged in recent months. In addition to ongoing disputes over the U.S. tariff on Brazilian ethanol and the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, Brazil has criticized the United States for failing to take a stronger stance on the political crisis in Honduras and has reacted negatively to a recent agreement that will provide the United States with access to seven Colombian military bases, which the Brazilian foreign minister described as “a strong military presence whose aim and capability seems to go well beyond what might be needed inside Colombia.”61 Brazil is considered a middle-income country and does not receive large amounts of U.S. foreign assistance. Brazil received $21.5 million in U.S. aid in FY2009, will receive an estimated $25 million in FY2010, and would receive $20.9 million under the Obama Administration’s request for FY2011. U.S. assistance priorities in Brazil include supporting environmental programs and the strengthening of local capacity to address threats to the Amazon, promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency to mitigate climate change, strengthening the professionalism and peacekeeping capabilities of the Brazilian military, and reducing the transmission of communicable diseases.62 The Bush Administration came to view Brazil as a strong partner **whose cooperation should be sought in order to solve regional and global problems**, and the Obama Administration appears to view Brazil in a similar light. Current issues of concern to both Brazil and the United States include counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts, energy security, trade, human rights, the fight against HIV/AIDS, and the environment Counternarcotics Although Brazil is not a major drug-producing country, it serves as a major transit country for illicit drugs from neighboring Andean countries destined primarily for Europe. Urban gangs— such as São Paulo’s First Command of the Capital (PCC) and Rio de Janeiro’s Red Command (CV)—have begun playing greater roles in narcotics and weapons smuggling, establishing their presence in other countries in the region and forging ties with Colombian and Mexican traffickers. Brazil has also become the second-largest consumer (after the United States) of cocaine in the world. With U.S. support, Brazil has taken several steps to improve its counternarcotics capabilities. In 2004, Brazil implemented an Air Bridge Denial program, which authorizes lethal force for air interdiction, and in 2006, Brazil passed an anti-drug law that prohibits and penalizes the cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs. Brazil has also worked with its neighbors to construct Joint Intelligence Centers at strategic points along its borders and invested in a sensor and radar project called the Amazon Vigilance System in an attempt to control illicit activity in its Amazon region. In 2009, Brazil’s federal police captured 18.9 metric tons of cocaine, 1.4 metric tons of cocaine base, 513 kilograms of crack cocaine, 150.6 metric tons of marijuana, 3.3 kilograms of heroin, and 183.3 tons of precursor chemicals.63 Brazil received $992,000 in U.S. counternarcotics assistance in FY2008, was expected to receive $1 million in FY2009, and an would receive an estimated $1 million in FY2010 under the Obama Administration’s request.64 U.S. counternarcotics assistance includes training for the Brazil’s federal police, support for interdiction programs at Brazil’s ports, and expanding the capabilities of special investigations units. Counterterrorism and the Tri-Border Area65 The Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay has long been used for arms smuggling, money laundering, and other illicit purposes. According to the 2009 State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, the United States remains concerned that Hezbollah and Hamas are raising funds through illicit activities and from sympathizers in the sizable Middle Eastern communities in the region. Indeed, reports have indicated that Hezbollah earns over $10 million a year from criminal activities in the TBA.66 Although it has been reported that al Qaeda’s operations chief Khalid Shaikh Mohammed lived in the Brazilian TBA city of Foz de Iguazu in 1995 and Brazilian authorities arrested Ali al-Mahdi Ibrahim—who was wanted by Egypt for his alleged role in the 1997 massacre of tourists at Luxor—in the TBA in 2003, the State Department report states that there have been no corroborated reports that any Islamic groups have an operational presence in the area.67 The United States joined with the countries of the TBA in the “3+1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security” in 2002 and the group built a Joint Intelligence Center to combat trans-border criminal organizations in the TBA in 2007. The United States has also worked bilaterally with Brazil to improve its counterterrorism capabilities. In addition to providing counterterrorism training, the United States has worked with Brazil to implement the Container Security Initiative (CSI) at the port of Santos. While the State Department Country Reports on Terrorism lauded the Brazilian government as a “cooperative partner in countering terrorism,” it also noted that Brazil’s failure to strengthen its legal counterterrorism framework by passing long-delayed anti-money laundering and counterterrorism bills “significantly undermined its overall commitment to combating terrorism.”68 Brazil, like many Latin American nations, has been reluctant to adopt specific antiterrorism legislation as a result of the difficulty of defining terrorism in a way that does not include the actions of social movements and other groups whose actions of political dissent were condemned as terrorism by repressive military regimes in the past.69 Nonetheless, some Brazilian officials continue to push for antiterrorism legislation, asserting that the country will face new threats as a result of hosting the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics.70 In January 2009, the Western Hemisphere Counterterrorism and Nonproliferation Act of 2009 (H.R. 375, Ros-Lehtinen) was introduced in the House. Among other provisions, the bill calls on the U.S. Secretary of State to negotiate with Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay to establish a Regional Coordination Center (RCC) in the TBA to serve as a joint operational facility dedicated to coordinating efforts, capacity, and intelligence to counter current and emerging threats and prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. A similar provision can be found in the Foreign Relations Authorization and Reform Act for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 (H.R. 2475, Ros-Lehtinen), which was introduced in the House in May 2009. Energy Security In the last few years, there has been significant congressional interest in issues related to Western Hemisphere energy security. Brazil is widely regarded as a world leader in energy policy for successfully reducing its reliance on foreign oil through increased domestic production and the development of alternative energy resources. In addition to being the world’s second largest producer of ethanol, Brazil currently generates over 85% of its electricity through hydropower.71 At the same time, Brazil has attained the ability to produce large amounts of enriched uranium as part of its nuclear energy program. More recently, Brazil’s state-run oil company, Petrobras, a leader in deep-water oil drilling, has discovered what may be the world’s largest oil field find in 25 years.72 Ethanol and Other Biofuels73 Brazil stands out as an example of a country that has become a net exporter of energy, partially by increasing its use and production of ethanol. On March 9, 2007, the United States and Brazil, the world’s two largest ethanol-producing countries, signed a Memorandum of Understanding to promote greater cooperation on ethanol and biofuels in the Western Hemisphere. The agreement involves: (1) technology sharing between the United States and Brazil; (2) feasibility studies and technical assistance to build domestic biofuels industries in third countries; and, (3) multilateral efforts to advance the global development of biofuels. The first countries to receive U.S.- Brazilian assistance were the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, and St. Kitts and Nevis.74 Since March 2007, the United States and Brazil have moved forward on all three facets of the agreement. U.S. and Brazilian consultants have carried out feasibility studies that identified shortterm technical assistance opportunities in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador. On November 20, 2008, the United States and Brazil announced an agreement to expand their biofuels cooperation and form new partnerships with Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, GuineaBissau, and Senegal.75 The United States and Brazil are also working with other members of the International Biofuels Forum (IBF) to make biofuels standards and codes more uniform. In March 2009, the Western Hemisphere Energy Compact (S. 587, Lugar) was introduced. The legislation would provide $6 million in FY2010 to expand U.S.-Brazil biofuels cooperation.76 Despite this progress, several potential obstacles to increased U.S.-Brazil cooperation on biofuels exist, including current U.S. tariffs on most Brazilian ethanol imports. The United States currently allows duty-free access on sugar-based ethanol imports from many countries through the Caribbean Basin Initiative, Central American Free Trade Agreement, and the Andean Trade Preferences Act, among others.77 Some Brazilian ethanol is processed at plants in the Caribbean for duty-free entry into the United States, but exports arriving directly from Brazil are currently subject to a 54-cent-per-gallon tax, plus a 2.5% tariff. Several bills were introduced in the 110th Congress that would have eliminated or adjusted the ethanol tariff. Nuclear Energy Between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, Brazil sought to develop nuclear weapons as it competed with Argentina for political and military dominance of the Southern Cone. Brazil’s 1988 constitution limits nuclear activity to peaceful purposes, however, and in 1991, Brazil and Argentina reached an agreement not to pursue nuclear weapons. Although Brazil subsequently joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and a number of other multilateral nonproliferation regimes, some international observers became concerned when Brazil commissioned a uranium enrichment plant in 2004 and refused to give International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors full access to the centrifuge plant in 2005. The Brazilian government maintained that it needed to enrich uranium in order to produce its own fuel, and it justified its refusal to give IAEA inspectors access by citing security concerns over the proprietary aspects of the country’s nuclear technology. Negotiations between Brazil and the IAEA ended in October 2005 when the Bush Administration lent its support to Brazil by asserting that limited inspections should be enough for Brazil to comply with its international obligations.78 President Lula has stated Brazil’s intention to spend $540 million over the next eight years to build a third nuclear power plant and a nuclear-powered submarine. In September 2008, the Brazilian Minister for Energy and Mining announced that he would like Brazil to build 60 new nuclear energy plants over the next 50 years. He claimed this expansion of nuclear power is the only way that Brazil will be able to meet the energy needs of its growing population while avoiding massive carbon emissions through the burning of fossil fuels.79 Oil The recent discovery of substantial oil fields in the Santos Basin, which extends 500 miles along the Brazilian coast, has the potential to turn Brazil into a major oil and gas producer and an important source of energy for the United States. The Tupi field, discovered in November 2007, has confirmed oil reserves of between five and eight billion barrels, and it is estimated that the entire Santos Basin could hold up to 50 billion barrels of oil. President Lula asserts that the oil fields have the potential to transform Brazil and improve living conditions for its people. He intends to implement a new regulatory framework, which will increase the state’s role in the exploitation of the reserves while investing the profits in a new social fund for education, infrastructure, science and technology, and poverty reduction.80 Exploiting the new fields will be difficult and costly, however, as the oil is located in the so-called “pre-salt” layer, beneath layers of rock and salt up to 7,000 meters below the seabed. Brazil’s state-owned oil company, Petrobras, has announced that it will need $270 billion in investment over the next 10 years to develop the reserves.81 Some foreign investors have questioned whether the company will be able to access sufficient finance should the Brazilian government implement its proposed regulatory framework. 82 Nonetheless, Petrobras has already received several financing commitments. In April 2009, the Export-Import Bank of the United States approved a preliminary $2 billion loan commitment to Petrobras.83 Since then, the U.S. government has reportedly indicated that it is prepared to go beyond the original agreement to provide up to $10 billion in financing.84 In May 2009, Brazil and China signed an agreement under which China will provide Petrobras with $10 billion in financing in exchange for guaranteed oil deliveries of 150,000 barrels per day (bdp) in 2009 and 200,000 bpd for the next decade.85 Brazil’s stateowned National Bank of Economic and Social Development (BNDES) will provide Petrobras with an additional $12.5 billion over 20 years.86 Trade Issues Trade issues are central to the bilateral relationship between Brazil and the United States, with both countries being heavily involved in subregional, regional, and global trade talks. Brazil has sought to strengthen Mercosur and to establish free trade agreements with most of the countries in South America, while also pursuing efforts to negotiate a Mercosur-European Union free trade agreement. The United States has been actively involved in the Doha negotiations and, until late 2005, pressed for action on the region-wide Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). Since negotiations for the FTAA have been largely abandoned, the United States has continued to sign bilateral and subregional agreements with countries throughout Latin America. Bilateral trade between the United States and Brazil totaled $46.2 billion in 2009, a nearly 23% decline from 2008. U.S. exports to Brazil amounted to $26.2 billion while U.S. imports from Brazil amounted to $20.1 billion.87 Doha Round of the World Trade Organization Talks 88 Brazil has had a leading role in the Doha round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) talks. In 2003, Brazil led the G-20 group of developing countries’ efforts to insist that developed countries agree to reduce and eventually eliminate agricultural subsidies as part of any settlement. In late July 2004, WTO members agreed on the framework for a possible Doha round agreement, but formal talks were suspended indefinitely in July 2006 after key negotiating groups failed to break a deadlock on the issue of agricultural tariffs and subsidies. In June 2007, negotiators from India and Brazil walked out of a round of informal talks with representatives from the United States and the European Union (EU), refusing to open their markets further unless U.S. and EU subsidies were substantially reduced. In recent years, trade ministers have repeatedly failed to reach an agreement to conclude the Doha round and the U.S. negotiating position remains a source of contention with Brazil.89 World Trade Organization Dispute90 On December 21, 2009, Brazil announced that the WTO had authorized the country to impose trade retaliation measures worth $829.3 million in 2010 as a result of a nearly decade long dispute over U.S. cotton subsidies. Although Brazil has not yet finalized its decision to impose retaliatory measures, it has indicated that it may levy duties of up to 100% on a preliminary list of 222 goods of U.S. origin valued at $561 million and implement cross-retaliation in sectors outside the trade in goods—such as U.S. copyrights and patents—for the remaining $268.3 million.91 Brazil initiated the dispute with the United States in 2002, and a WTO dispute settlement panel ruled in Brazil’s favor in September 2004. The United States appealed the ruling but it was reaffirmed by the WTO appellate body in March 2005. Although the Bush Administration asked Congress to modify the cotton subsidy program in July 2005, a WTO dispute panel ruled in December 2007 that the United States was not moving quickly enough to comply with the 2004 ruling.92 Brazil and the United States then went to arbitration over the level of trade sanctions Brazil has the right to impose against the United States, leading to an August 31, 2009 decision by a WTO arbitration panel, which largely favored Brazil’s retaliation request. Generalized System of Preferences 93 The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) provides duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from developing countries. In the 109th Congress, renewal of the preference (as established by Title V of the Trade Act of 1974) was somewhat controversial, owing, in part, to concerns of some Members that a number of the more advanced developing countries (such as Brazil and India) were contributing to the impasse in the Doha round of WTO talks. Compromise language worked out between the House and Senate extended GSP for two years for all countries, while asserting that the President “should” revoke “competitive need limitation (CNL)” waivers for products from certain countries, based on the criteria specified. In June 2007, the Bush Administration decided to revoke the CNL waivers on Brazilian brake parts and ferrozirconium.94 The 111th Congress extended GSP until December 31, 2010 with P.L. 111-124. On June 4, 2009, H.R. 2702 (C. Smith) was introduced in the House. The bill would suspend GSP for Brazil until the country meets its obligations under the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Intellectual Property Rights In the last few years, Brazil has taken steps to improve its record on protecting intellectual property rights (IPR). The Brazilian government has created a national action plan to address piracy and intellectual property crimes, which has included increased police actions. Brazil and the United States continue to work together to address intellectual property issues, primarily through the U.S.-Brazil Bilateral Consultative Mechanism and the U.S.-Brazil Commercial Dialogue. In recognition of this progress, the United States Trade Representative lowered Brazil from the Priority Watch List of countries with significant IPR violations to the Watch List in 2007. Brazil remained on the Watch List in 2008 and 2009. In order to build on progress that has been made, USTR recommends that Brazil should consider strengthening its IPR enforcement legislation, more vigorously addressing book and internet piracy, and signing the World Intellectual Property Organization Internet Treaties.95 The U.S. government has also expressed concerns about Brazil’s periodic threats to issue compulsory licenses for patented pharmaceutical products. In May 2007, Brazil broke a patent on a drug used to treat HIV/AIDS that is produced by Merck & Co. in order to import a cheaper version of that drug from India.96 In July 2009, President Lula suggested that developing countries should be allowed to lift patent rights to produce more vaccine to battle the A(H1N1) flu epidemic.97 Human Rights The U.S. State Department’s Country Report on Human Rights on Brazil covering 2008 states that while “the federal government generally respected the human rights of its citizens ... there continued to be numerous, serious abuses, and the records of several state governments were poor.” Some human rights issues of particular concern include ongoing crime and human rights abuses by police, race and discrimination, and trafficking in persons. Violent Crime and Human Rights Abuses by Police Most observers agree that the related problems of urban crime, drugs, and violence, on the one hand, and corruption and brutality in law enforcement and prisons, on the other, are threatening citizens’ security in Brazil. Crime is most rampant in the urban shanty towns (favelas) in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Violence has traditionally been linked to turf wars being waged between rival drug gangs for control of the drug industry or to clashes between drug gangs and police officials, who have been criticized for the brutal manner in which they have responded to the gang violence. The weaknesses in Brazil’s criminal justice system have became dramatically apparent in recent years as gangs have launched violent attacks that have destabilized the cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. In one such attack in May 2006, street combat and rioting organized by a prisonbased gang network, the First Capital Command (PCC), paralyzed the city of São Paulo for several days.98 Officially, the violent gang attacks, which were followed by police reprisals, resulted in at least 186 deaths.99 More recently, in October 2009, gunmen of the Red Command (CV) launched a raid on the Morro dos Macacos favela to wrest control of the drug trade from the rival Friends of Friends gang. Over the course of several days, 31 people were killed, including three police sharpshooters whose helicopter was shot down as they tried to control the situation.100 As police forces in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro have employed strong-arm tactics in hopes of curbing the rampant gang violence, some human rights groups have raised concerns over a rising number of extrajudicial killings. Upon completing a November 2007 visit to Brazil, a U.N. Special Rapporteur concluded that police in Brazil are allowed to “kill with impunity in the name of security.”101 Indeed, more than 11,000 people have been killed by the two police forces since 2003. Although the officers involved have reported nearly all of the killings as legitimate acts of self defense, or “resistance killings,” a recent two year investigation by Human Rights Watch concluded that “a substantial portion of the alleged resistance killings reported...(were) in fact extrajudicial executions.” The Human Rights Watch report also indicates that those police officers responsible for extrajudicial killings enjoy near total impunity. For example, of the over 7,800 complaints against police officers recorded by the Rio Police Ombudsman’s Office over the past decade, only 42 generated criminal charges by state prosecutors and just four led to convictions.102 Despite these criticisms, some have defended the strong-arm tactics. São Paulo’s public security secretariat maintains that Human Rights Watch failed to take note of the fact that annual state killings by police have declined by 50% since 2003 while the homicide rate has been reduced by 70% over the past decade.103 Many analysts have asserted that Brazilian politicians at all levels of government have failed to devote the resources and political will necessary to confront the country’s serious public security problems, however, this may be changing. The state of Rio de Janeiro launched a new anticrime initiative in 2009 that considerably expands the number of personnel charged with maintaining security. Whereas previous police efforts generally centered around quick raids, the new initiative establishes Police Pacification Units (UPPs) that will maintain permanent presences in the favelas. After the favelas are cleared of drug gangs, the UPPs are charged with maintaining security and other governmental institutions are brought in to provide basic social services. The new initiative has been rather successful in reducing crime and violence without extensive bloodshed. Rio de Janeiro’s government intends to expand the initiative from the seven pilot favelas targeted in 2009 to 40 additional favelas in 2010.104 Race and Discrimination 105 People of African descent in Brazil, also known as Afro-Brazilians, represent 45% of the country’s population, but constitute 64% of the poor and 69% of the extreme poor.106 During the Cardoso Administration, the Brazilian government began to collect better official statistics on Afro-Brazilians. These statistics found significant education, health, and wage disparities between Afro-Brazilians and Brazil’s general population. Brazil now has the most extensive anti-discrimination legislation geared towards Afrodescendants of any country in Latin America. In 2001, Brazil became the first Latin American country to endorse quotas in order to increase minority representation in government service. Since 2002, several state universities in Brazil have enacted quotas setting aside admission slots for black students. Although most Brazilians favor government programs to combat social exclusion, they disagree as to whether the beneficiaries of affirmative action programs should be selected on the basis of race or income.107 In 2003, Brazil became the first country in the world to establish a Special Secretariat with a ministerial rank to manage Racial Equity Promotion Policies. Afro-Brazilian activists, while acknowledging recent government efforts on behalf of Afro-descendants, have noted that most universities have preferred not to implement quota systems, and that the Special Secretariat lacks the funding, staff, and clout necessary to advance its initiatives.108 Despite these limitations, Brazil has taken a leadership role in advancing issues of race and discrimination within the Organization of American States, where it is leading the drafting of an Inter-American Convention for the Prevention of Racism and All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance. In March 2008, Brazil and the Untied States signed an agreement known as the United States-Brazil Joint Action Plan Against Racial Discrimination to bilaterally promote racial equality in areas such as education, health, housing, and labor.109 On September 9, 2008, the House passed H.Res. 1254 (Engel), expressing congressional support for the U.S.-Brazil antidiscrimination plan. Trafficking in Persons for Forced Labor 110 According to the U.S. State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report, Brazil does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, but is making significant efforts to do so. As a result, it is listed as a Tier 2 country.111 Brazil is a source, transit, and destination country for people, especially women and children, trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation. Brazilian Federal Police estimate that between 250,000 and 400,000 children are exploited in domestic prostitution, especially in the country’s coastal resort areas where child sex tourism is prevalent. Brazil is also a source country for men trafficked internally for forced labor. More than 25,000 men have reportedly been recruited to labor in slave-like conditions, many in the country’s agribusiness industry. Roughly half of the more than 11,000 people freed from debt slavery in 2007 and 2008 were found working on sugarcane plantations.112 While the Brazilian government announced an agreement with the sugar industry to provide decent working conditions for the country’s sugarcane cutters in June 2009, the accord does not establish minimum wages or formal obligations.113 Reports suggest that significant numbers of men working in cattle ranching, mining, and the production of charcoal for pig iron—a key ingredient of steel that is then purchased by major companies in the United States—are also subjected to slave labor.114 Over the past year, the Brazilian government has taken a number of actions to address the problem of human trafficking. Anti-slave labor mobile units under the Ministry of Labor increased their operations, inspecting remote areas, freeing victims, and forcing those responsible to pay fines and restitution. Slave labor victims received some $3.6 million in compensation as a result of the 2008 operations. The Brazilian government also continued prosecuting traffickers, providing assistance to victims, and broadcasting its anti-trafficking public awareness campaign. Additionally, the Brazilian government began implementing a national plan of action to prevent trafficking in persons. Despite these actions, Brazil has made only limited progress in bringing traffickers to justice and effectively penalizing those who exploit forced labor.115 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Over the past several years, a high-profile child custody case has focused attention on Brazil’s noncompliance with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.116 In June 2004, Sean Goldman was taken to Brazil by his mother, Bruna Bianchi Carneiro Ribeiro Goldman, a Brazilian native. Ms. Bianchi then divorced her husband David Goldman—a U.S. citizen—and asserted full custody of Sean. In August 2004, the Superior Court of New Jersey ruled that Ms. Bianchi’s continued retention of Sean constituted parental kidnapping under U.S. law and awarded Mr. Goldman custody.117 In September 2004, Mr. Goldman filed an application for Sean’s return under the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, to which both the United States and Brazil are party and which entered into force between the countries on December 1, 2003. Under the Convention, a child removed from a country in violation of a parent’s custodial rights should be promptly returned to the place of his or her habitual residence. The courts of the country of the child’s residence can then resolve the custody dispute.118 In 2005, a Brazilian federal judge ruled that although Sean had been moved to Brazil wrongfully, he should remain in Brazil because he had become settled in his new location.119 In August 2008, Ms. Bianchi died and a Brazilian state court judge granted temporary custody of Sean to the man Ms. Bianchi married following her move to Brazil, Joao Paulo Lins e Silva.120 The custody case then bounced between federal appeals courts and the Brazilian Supreme Court until December 22, 2009, when the Brazilian Supreme Court issued a definitive ruling that ordered that Sean be returned to his father. On December 24, 2009, Sean was handed over to Mr. Goldman at the U.S. Consulate in Rio de Janeiro.121 The U.S. State Department’s Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction cites Brazil for patterns of noncompliance with the Convention. It faults Brazilian courts for treating Convention cases as custody decisions, demonstrating bias toward Brazilian citizens, and making the judicial process excessively lengthy. There are currently some 50 unresolved cases of children being retained in Brazil after having been wrongly removed from the United States.122 On March 11, 2009, the House unanimously passed H.Res. 125 (C. Smith), calling on Brazil to meet its obligations under the Hague Convention to return Sean Goldman to his father in the United States. On March 24, 2009, the Senate approved S.Res. 37 (Lautenberg) by unanimous consent, calling on Brazil to comply with the requirements of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and to assist in the safe return of Sean Goldman to his father in the United States. On June 4, 2009, H.R. 2702 (C. Smith) was introduced in the House. The bill would suspend the Generalized System of Preferences for Brazil until the country meets its obligations under the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. HIV/AIDS Internationally recognized as having one of the world’s most successful HIV/AIDS programs, Brazil has made the fight against the spread of HIV/AIDS a national priority. Initially focused on disease prevention, Brazil’s HIV/AIDS program expanded to providing antiretroviral therapy (ART) on a limited basis by 1991, and later guaranteeing universal access by 1996. Currently some 172,000 Brazilians have access to free generic versions of ART drugs, some of which are locally produced and financed by the Brazilian government. The incidence of HIV/AIDS in Brazil has stabilized since 1997, and universal free access to ART has increased average survival times from 18 months for those diagnosed in 1995, to 58 months for those diagnosed in 1996.123 HIV prevalence has been stable at 0.5% for the general population in Brazil since 2000, so most government prevention efforts are now targeted at high-risk groups where prevalence rates are still above 5%. Brazil’s decision to develop generic ART drugs to treat HIV/AIDS under the compulsory licensing provision of its patent law led to a subsequent 80% drop in the cost of treatment. That decision brought Brazil into conflict with the United States and the international pharmaceutical industry. In May 2001, the United States submitted a complaint to the WTO, which was later withdrawn, that Brazil’s practices violated the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement and prevented companies from developing new products in Brazil. While the pharmaceutical industry argued that TRIPS was an essential tool to protect intellectual property rights, developing countries (like Brazil) countered that TRIPS inhibited their ability to fight public health emergencies in a cost-effective manner. In August 2003, a WTO decision temporarily waived part of the TRIPS rules to allow the export of generic drugs to countries confronting a grave public health challenge (such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, or malaria). That temporary waiver became permanent in late 2005.124 Brazil currently manufactures older ART drugs for domestic consumption and export to several African countries but has to import newer medicines. According to Brazil’s Ministry of Health, tough negotiations with pharmaceutical companies have resulted in $1.1 billion in savings for the country’s HIV/AIDS program. Amazon Conservation The Amazon basin spans the borders of eight countries and is the most biodiverse tract of tropical rainforest in the world. It holds 20% of the Earth’s fresh water and 10% of all known species. Approximately 60% of the Amazon falls within Brazilian borders, making Brazil home to 40% of the world’s remaining tropical forests.125 The Brazilian Amazon was largely undeveloped until the 1960s, when the military government began subsidizing the settlement and development of the region as a matter of national security. Over the last 40 years, the human population has grown from 4 million to over 20 million, and the resulting settlements, roads, logging, cattle ranching, and subsistence and commercial agriculture have led to approximately 15% of the Brazilian Amazon being deforested.126 In the 1980s, some predicted that deforestation would decline if the Brazilian government stopped providing tax incentives and credit subsidies to settlers and agricultural producers. Those predictions have not borne out, however, as the complex and often interrelated causes of deforestation have multiplied rather than decreased.127 Between 1990 and 2000, Brazil lost an area of rainforest twice the size of Portugal, however, deforestation rates have generally declined since the peak year of 2004.128 Domestic Efforts Recognizing that deforestation threatens the biodiversity of the Amazon region and is responsible for 70% of Brazil’s annual greenhouse-gas emissions, the Lula Administration has expanded protected areas and implemented new environmental policies.129 During its first five years in office, the Lula Administration created 62 new natural reserves, bringing the total area of the Brazilian Amazon protected by law to nearly 110,000 square miles, the fourth-largest percentage of protected area in relation to territory in the world.130 President Lula has also signed a Public Forest Management Law that encourages sustainable development and placed a moratorium on soybean plantings and cattle ranching in the Amazon. Moreover, Brazil intends to reduce the rate of Amazon deforestation by half—based on the 1996-2005 average—to 2,300 square miles per year—by 2017 and reduce Amazon deforestation by 80% by 2020. Brazil plans to meet these goals by increasing federal patrols of forested areas, replanting over 21,000 square miles of forest, and financing sustainable development projects in areas where the local economy depends on logging.131 The Lula Administration maintains that its efforts have been successful, highlighting the fact that just 2,706 square miles of the Amazon were deforested between July 2008 and July 2009, the lowest annual level since the National Institute for Space Studies began monitoring deforestation in 1988.132 Although some conservation groups have praised President Lula for his Administration’s actions, a number of environmentalists—including former Environment Minister Marina Silva and current Environment Minister Carlos Minc—have questioned the Administration’s commitment to sustainable development.133 Critics assert that the Administration favors agricultural interests over conservation. This claim was reinforced by President Lula’s June 2009 approval of an environmental law that grants nearly 260,000 square miles of the Amazon to illegal squatters, 72% of which will go to large land holders.134 Critics also maintain that Brazil’s occasional declines in deforestation rates are not the result of the Lula Administration’s initiatives, but correspond to declining global commodity prices that make it less profitable to clear the forests. They point out that deforestation rates only began falling as commodity prices collapsed in late 2008.135 In order to combat further deforestation, some analysts maintain that the Brazilian government will have to greatly increase the number of people employed to work in protected areas and do more to confront agricultural producers operating within the Amazon.136 Carbon Offsets and Other International Initiatives The Amazon holds 10% of the carbon stores in the world’s ecosystem and absorbs nearly two billion tons of carbon dioxide each year, making it a sink for global carbon emissions and an important asset in the prevention of climate change.137 The Kyoto Protocol—of which Brazil is a signatory—created a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which allows emission reduction projects in developing countries to earn certified emission reduction credits (CERs) that can then be traded or sold to industrialized countries to meet their mandated emission reduction targets. Brazil has taken full advantage of the CDM, and is host to over 9% of the worldwide emission reduction projects. These projects represent 33.5 million CERs, or a reduction of 33.5 million tons of carbon dioxide.138 The CDM allows for a wide variety of emission reduction projects, but in terms of forestry, CERs are only awarded for afforestation and reforestation projects, not forest conservation. As a result, forestry projects account for a very small percentage of the total CERs awarded. A number of industrialized countries that would like to achieve a greater percentage of their mandated emission reductions through carbon offsets have teamed with developing countries with substantial tropical forests to propose widening the CDM to include forest conservation. Brazil has opposed such a plan, arguing it would absolve rich countries from cutting their own emissions.139 Brazil has supported the rise of voluntary offset markets, however, in which organizations and individuals not subject to mandatory emission reductions can buy carbon offsets to contribute to conservation and clean energy projects. Brazil believes Amazon conservation should be done through public funding rather than a carbon market. Accordingly, it launched the “Amazon Fund” in August 2008. The fund is intended to attract donations from countries, companies, and non-governmental organizations to assist in Brazil’s Amazon conservation efforts. Brazil intends to raise $21 billion by 2021 to support forest conservation, scientific research, and sustainable development. Norway has pledged $1 billion to he fund through 2015 and Germany has pledged $26.8 million. The first projects funded by the Amazon Fund were announced in December 2009. They include projects to regenerate degraded land, monitor land registration titles, and pay rubber tappers and other forest dwellers to protect the forest.140 USAID environment programs support Amazon conservation through the promotion of proper land-use and encouragement of environmentally friendly income generation activities for the rural poor. In FY2006, USAID initiated the Amazon Basin Conservation Initiative, which supports community groups, governments, and public and private organizations working throughout the Amazon Basin in their efforts to conserve the Amazon’s globally important biodiversity. USAID provided $5.2 million for environmental programs in Brazil in FY2007, $9.5 million in FY2008, and $10 million in FY2009. The Conference Report (H.Rept. 111-366) to the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117) asserts that, of the funds appropriated in the act for biodiversity programs, $25 million are to go to the Amazon Basin Conservation Initiative, $10 million of which is directed to activities in Brazil.

**general**

**Brazil says yes – cooperation over economic integration of South America proves**

**Hakim**, **10 -** professor at MIT and Columbia, MA of Public and International Affairs from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue,president emeritus and senior fellow of the IAD, (Peter, “US-Brazil Relations: Expect More Conflict,” 10/21/10,Infolatam, <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2490>)

Although the US and Brazil will surely collide on other hemispheric questions in the years ahayesead, the US and Brazil have also demonstrated a capacity for cooperation in regional affairs. The US has strongly supported Brazil’s lead role in the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti since Aristides departure from the country in 2004, and has worked closely with Brazil on humanitarian relief in the aftermath of the country’s devastating earthquake. Washington has also expressed support for Brazilian leadership in developing a more politically and economically integrated South America—the so-called Union of South American nations or UNASUR—even though a stronger, more institutionalized UNASUR will likely restrict the role of the OAS and diminish US influence in hemispheric affairs And Brazil has, from time to time, helped to moderate the anti-American campaign of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, even though the US and Brazilian governments have taken very different approaches to addressing the challenge that Chavez represents.

**Brazil is seeking to cooperate now – they would say yes**

**Meyer, 13** (Brazil-U.S. Relations Peter J. Meyer Analyst in Latin American Affairs February 27, 2013 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf)

As Brazil’s economy has grown to be the seventh largest in the world, the country has utilized its growing economic clout to assert Brazilian influence on a range of global matters. On global trade and financial issues, where Brazil’s economic weight ensures the country a principal role in policy discussions, Brazil has sought to coordinate with, and represent, other developing nations. This has coincided with a broader focus on “South-South” cooperation, in which Brazil has expanded diplomatic and commercial ties with countries throughout the developing world. With its increasing international prominence, Brazil has pushed for a democratization of global governance institutions and a greater role for emerging powers in resolving issues of geopolitical importance. Although few analysts deny that Brazil’s international stature has risen significantly over the past decade, many believe that the country must overcome considerable challenges to be considered a world power. These include undertaking reforms to maintain strong economic growth, addressing long-standing domestic security challenges, and modernizing and expanding its military capacity.

**Brazil wants consultation – recent talks prove and the framework for consultation already exists**

**CFR** 20**11** – Council on Foreign Relations (Samuel W. Bodman and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairs Julia E. Sweig, Project Director, “Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations,” Independent Task Force Report No. 66)

The Obama-Rousseff meetings in Brazil earlier this year were a signal that both countries are willing to forge closer ties on bilateral, regional, and global issues. Obama’s trip, at a time of heightened tensions in the Middle East and military action in Libya, underscored the U.S. desire to put relations on a more positive track. The Task Force welcomes the ten new bilateral agreements that the two presidents signed, which include accords on biofuels, use of space, educational exchange, promotion of decent work in third countries, and—significantly—**a framework to negotiate new commercial and economic agreements.**44 Still, the Task 64 Force is concerned that no mechanism exists in the U.S. government to coordinate these initiatives and drive policy toward Brazil.

**Rousseff will coop – wants to improve US-Brazil ties**

**Sweig et al**, Senior fellow for Latin American Studies, **2011**

(Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil\_TFR\_66.pdf)

BRAZIL TODAY The world watches with great interest as Rousseff attempts to build on the legacy of the enormously popular former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) while charting her own course. Rousseff held two cabinet positions and served as Lula’s chief of staff before being chosen as the ruling party’s candidate. The daughter of a Bulgarian immigrant and a school teacher, Rousseff was jailed and tortured for her underground activism; she is an economist who had previously never run for election. Ambitious, results-driven, and pragmatic, **Rousseff now stands as one of the most powerful and influential women in the world.** Former presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula presided over sixteen years of democratic consolidation and sound economic policy. Brazil was well positioned to survive the global economic reces¬sion of 2008—having stabilized its currency, tackled rampant inflation, strengthened its banking system, and built up dollar reserves—and it emerged in 2009 relatively unscathed. In a break from its past, Brazil’s 2010 presidential election and recent political transition did not shake its strong stock market, bonds, or currency, signaling international confidence in its stability. Flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Brazil remain high: among non– Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, Brazil is second only to China as a destination for foreign investment. Though inflationary pressures remain a serious challenge, the Brazilian economy is expected to grow by more than 4 percent this year, after a particularly strong 2010 (7.5 percent growth). The country Rousseff inherited in 2011 is substantially different from the one Lula inherited in 2003, as is the international environment. In the early stages of her presidency, Rousseff has stressed the need **for Brazil’s domestic agenda to drive and be served by the country’s international engagement.** In that vein, Brazil’s foreign policy priorities under her leadership are likely to emphasize integrating with South America, establishing deeper ties and investment in Africa, managing a complex relationship with China, **improving relations with the United States**, and strengthening Brazil’s influence in the restructuring of mul-tilateral institutions.

**2NC**

**say yes – cuba**

**embargo (general)**

**Brazil says yes – thinks current embargo policy is absurd**

**Hakim**, president emeritus and senior fellow of the IAD, **2010**

(10/21/10, Peter, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, previously taught at both MIT and Columbia, MA of Public and International Affairs from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School, MS in Physics at the University of Pennsylvania, “US-Brazil Relations: Expect More Conflict,” Infolatam, <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2490>) ahayes

US and Brazil also take **polar opposite positions** with regard to Cuba’s role in hemispheric affairs. In this instance, it is Washington that **stands alone** in its refusal to end its diplomatic and economic isolation of Cuba. Every other country in the Americas has re-established normal relations with the island. For most Brazilians and other Latin Americans, US policy toward Cuba is virtually incomprehensible.

**Pressuring the U.S. to act**

**Lynch**, U.N. reporter for FP, **2012**

(9/25/12, Colum, reports on the U.N. for Foreign Policy, “Rousseff broadside at U.S. Cuba embargo,” <http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/25/rousseff_broadside_at_us_cuba_embargo>) ahayes

**Brazilian President** Dilma Rousseff, the first national speaker at the U.N. General Assembly today, delivered a broadside against the United States, blasting Washington for subjecting “Dear Cuba” to an economic embargo that has “chastised” its people for too long. “**Time has come to end this** anachronistic” measure that enjoys virtually no support in the U.N. community, she said in remarks that veered from her official distributed speech. Rousseff also took aim at the West for its colonial past and for its failure to stop a wave of Islamophobia.

**Removal builds Brazilian support**

**Einaudi**, Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, **2011**

(March 2011, Luigi R., Member of the Advisory Council of the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Distinguished Visiting Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, “Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement,” <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20266%20Einaudi.pdf>) ahayes

As much as both countries need it, however, improved cooperation may require them to make changes for which they are not yet ready.44 Depending somewhat on their politics, many Brazilians will be dubious about cooperation with the United States as long as it continues to massively subsidize and protect key agricultural products, maintains an embargo on Cuba, is thought by important political groups to have ambitions on the Amazon or troops in South America, or fails to endorse Brazil’s UN Security Council ambitions. Similarly, some in the United States will question working closely with a Brazil that they see as enjoying the luxuries of the irresponsible until it accepts greater responsibility on nuclear nonproliferation (including more UN monitoring of its facilities), distances itself from Iran, is more present on democracy and human rights issues (in the Middle East, Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela), is more active on these issues at the UN and OAS, and generally treats the United States better in its diplomacy than it has often done recently.

**Brazil will say yes – past efforts prove**

**ABC News, 2009**

(3/13/09, Kirit Radia, ABC News digital correspondent in Moscow, “Treading Carefully, U.S. Hints It Wants to Engage Cuba, Venezuela,” http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/03/treading-carefu/) ahayes

The Brazilian president is expected to urge President Obama to re-engage with Cuba and Venezuela when the two leaders meet at the White House tomorrow. "We are intent on engaging all countries constructively," Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon told reporters today when asked about the prospects of deeper engagement with countries in the region at odds with the United States. This will all be on display when President Obama attends the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago in April. "We will be going to the summit with an open and constructive attitude," Shannon said, though he noted it’s not only up to Washington. "Ultimately, our willingness to engage constructively with countries around the region depends on a reciprocal willingness on their part to engage with us," he said.

# Solvency

**general**

**Consultation is key to an effective US-Brazil relationship**

**Hakim, 10 -** president emeritus and senior fellow of the IAD,

(10/21/10, Peter, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, previously taught at both MIT and Columbia, MA of Public and International Affairs from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School, MS in Physics at the University of Pennsylvania, “US-Brazil Relations: Expect More Conflict,” Infolatam, <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2490>) ahayes

Even as the US-Brazil relationship has become increasing strained in recent years, the two countries have never considered themselves adversaries—and both governments, with few exceptions, have sought downplay disputes and have been willing to tolerate considerable disagreement. For the US and a newly powerful Brazil to build and sustain a constructive relationship into the future, **however**, will likely demand **far greater effort** and attention by both governments than has been the case to date Both sides need to better understand the interests, priorities, and positions of the other on important regional and global issues—and to be routinely informed of proposed decision and actions of the other. **More systematic consultation** might have avoided (or at least reduced the intensity of) both the dispute over the Brazil-Turkey-Iran negotiations and the friction over the US-Colombia security agreement. The US and Brazil should also be able to identify more opportunities for cooperation on many of the issues discussed above, in which both countries have a major stake.

**Consultation ensures multilateral effectiveness**

**Haass, 2000** (Richard N. Haass, formerly a senior aide to President George Bush, is Director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies,” Survival, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer, The International Institute for Strategic Studies)-mikee

**There is growing consensus that sanctions, when employed unilaterally, are rarely effective. Not surprisingly, a corollary exists for the provision of incentives**; **engagement strategies which disregard the international environment in which they are crafted are also likely to** **fail**. Just as a US embargo on a country’s oil sales is ineffective in coercing changes when Europe will buy the barrels America forgoes, **incentives are less powerful when their equivalents are being offered elsewhere unconditionally.** For example, had China been willing to donate or to sell subsidised fuel oil to North Korea, or to assist Pyongyang in the construction of additional energy sources, the package offered under the Agreed Framework would have carried far less weight. The differing policies of Western countries towards Iran demonstrate how a failure to coordinate policies can diminish the force of either a punitive approach or an engagement strategy. European efforts to influence Iran through substantial economic contacts have all but undermined American attempts to use economic coercion to pressure the Islamic regime into changing its behaviour. Rather than leaving it without export markets and foreign-exchange resources, European and Asian companies quickly filled the gap created by the American withdrawal from Iran. US secondary sanctions mandated under the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act requiring the imposition of penalties on foreign firms that invest in Iran’s oil sector have also proven to be largely feckless; instead of making Iran desperate for investment, the law has stoked not only transatlantic tensions, but also frictions between the US congressional and executive branches.13

**Consultation ensures US credibility in the engagement strategy.**

**O'Sullivan, 2000** (Meghan L. and Richard N. Haass, “Engaging Problem Countries,” Brookings Policy Brief Series, June, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2000/06/sanctions-haass)

Implementation of engagement strategies is a demanding enterprise. U**.S. policymakers seeking to engage a recalcitrant regime should consult intensively with American allies**; **a failure to do so increases the possibility that another country will undermine the U.S. strategy by offering similar benefits without demanding any changes in behavior**. Moreover, as the European Union's unsuccessful attempt to engage Iran through its 'critical dialogue' policy demonstrated, the extension of incentives for cooperation should be accompanied by the threat of credible penalties for defiance. It was Europe's reluctance to jeopardize its extensive economic contacts with Iran for political objectives (in addition to believing in the value of diplomatic contacts) that undermined its ability to influence Iranian behavior.

**China Econ -- XT I/L**

**XT Farnsworth – Latin American influence is key to China’s economy because it allows it to “lock in the natural resources that fuel its growth**” **and is a precondition to political stability**

**Latin America is key to Chinese economic growth**

- Latin America is uniquely key to China’s export market and they have invested their economy in Latin America because of US lack of engagement-new contracts and investment is key to sustain growth

**Arnson et al. ‘9** (Cynthia Anderson, Mark Mohr, Riordan Roett, writers for Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin America”, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf)//RJ

To China, Latin America represents a signiﬁcant source of the necessary natural resources that will **help China maintain its economic growth**. Due primarily to trade with China, Latin America’s trade volume grew from $2.8 billion in 1988 to $49 billion in 2005. Also, and as publicly announced, China intends to surpass $180 billion in trade with Latin America by 2010, not only due to the country’s need for natural resources, but also as a result of China’s intention to diversify and expand its markets in the region. Thus, Latin America represents a substantial market for Chinese goods

**Latin America key to Chinese economy – it’s dependent on export growth – China is also key to Latin American growth**

**Jenkins, 13** - Professor of development economics with an particular interest in Latin America, 13 (Rhys, “Latin America and China- A New Dependency?,” 6/11, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2012.691834#.UbphhvlQFsk)//VP

Nevertheless, the trend over the past decade has been for the USA’s share in both Latin American imports and exports to decline while that of the EU has remained roughly constant and China’s has increased signiﬁcantly. The Economic Commission for Latin America has projected, based on data for 16 Latin American countries, that, by 2020, China will have overtaken the EU as both an export destination and as a source of imports for the region, and will have narrowed the gap with the USA. In 2020 it is projected that China will account for almost a ﬁfth of Latin American exports and a sixth of imports. In terms of FDI China’s role in the region continues to be marginal. Despite the signiﬁcant recent growth of Chinese investment, in 2010 China accounted for less than 0.3% of the total stock of foreign capital in the region and its share of FDI inﬂows in that year was only 0.8%.47 Even though the oﬃcial ﬁgures may underestimate the true extent of Chinese FDI and a number of major new investments were made in 2010, the role of Chinese ﬁrms in the region remains very limited. As they continue to expand globally, their presence in Latin America is likely to become more signiﬁcant in the future. Nevertheless Chinese FDI is starting from such a low base that it will be some time before it achieves levels comparable to that of US or EU FDI in the region. The global ﬁnancial crisis provides a good test of the extent to which China has emerged as a key driver of economic growth in Latin America, making the region less vulnerable to ﬂuctuations in the US economy. The crisis had a major impact on Latin American exports in 2009, with a decline in value of 23% compared to 2008.48 Exports to the USA fell by 26% and to the European Union by 28%. In stark contrast **Latin American exports to China continued to increase in 2009, by 7.5%, reﬂecting the continued growth of the Chinese economy through the crisis** (see Table 10). This has led ECLAC to claim that ‘China’s economic dynamism has come to the rescue of Latin America and the Caribbean’s exports’.

**China Econ – Impact**

**Chinese economic collapse causes nuclear war**

**Mead 98** – Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (Walter Russell, “Rule 1: Don’t Panic. Rule 2: Panic first,” Oct 1998) //JG

Few Americans understand just how explosive the situation in China is. As the country undergoes the biggest economic revolution in world history, it is also in for the wildest ride in world history on the roller coaster of revolutionary capitalism. State-owned rust-bucket industries from Maoist times are slowly collapsing, putting heavy demands on the national treasury. Yet China's banks-which may have the worst balance sheets in the world would go bankrupt if the state cut off subsidies to the indebted state industries. And if these industries lay off workers faster than the private economy can find them jobs, China faces mass unrest in the big cities. This is what the Chinese government fears most, and it has good reason. Already, millions of Chinese, uprooted from the rural areas where they were born, are flooding into the coastal cities, looking for work. Many of them are young men-the most volatile group in any society. And in China today, they are especially volatile. Thanks to the government's one-child policy, many Chinese families have aborted female fetuses to ensure that their one child is a boy. This preference has led to no boys being born for every loo girls. Here's a Chinese nightmare: millions of young, poorly educated men who have no jobs and no girlfriends. It's almost unthinkable that China can escape a prolonged Asian slowdown. China has also based its whole plan on exportled growth working far into the future; with the failure of that strategy China's economy must slow dramatically. To survive, the Chinese government will have to play the nationalist card, taking a tougher foreign-policy line on issues like Taiwan and whipping up public support by talking about foreign (read: American) threats to China. Alternatively, China could fall apart as it did earlier in the twentieth century, going through a period of civil war and anarchy-**in a country with nuclear weapons**-before a new and probably very unpleasant government establishes control.

**China economic collapse causes WW3- hotspot for escalation**

**Plate, 03 -** Mr. Plate is a member of the Pacific Council on International Policy, the Century Association of New York and the Phi Beta Kappa Society(Tom Plate, “Why Not Invade China” Asia Pacific Media Networks, 6/30, http://asiamedia.ucla.edu/TomPlate2003/06302003.htm)//JS

But imagine a China disintegrating -- on its own, without neo-con or CIA prompting, much less outright military invasion -- because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos. Refugees by the gazillions would head for Indonesia and other poorly border-patrolled places, which don't want them and can't handle them; some in Japan might lick their chops for World War II Redux and look to annex a slice of China. That would send small but successful Singapore and Malaysia -- once Japanese colonies -- into absolute nervous breakdowns. India might make a grab for Tibet, and while it does, Pakistan for Kashmir. **Say hello to World War III** Asia-style! That's why wise policy encourages Chinese stability, security and economic growth -- the very direction the White House now seems to prefer. If neo-cons like Kristol really care about Bush, they ought to relocate their common sense and get off his back. Bush has enough on his plate, trying to put Iraq back together. In the final analysis, neo-con insanity is more of a danger to the Bush presidency than China

**China’s economy is on the brink now**

**Fisher 6/20** – Foreign Affairs writer at the Washington Post (Max, “China’s economy is freezing up. How freaked out should we be?,” Washington Post, June 20 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/06/20/chinas-economy-is-freezing-up-how-freaked-out-should-we-be/ ) //JG

**Thursday was a very bad day for China’s economy**, the world’s second-largest and a crucial pillar of the global economy, **with credit markets freezing up in an unnerving parallel to the first days of the U.S. financial collapse**. The question of how bad depends on whom you talk to, how much faith you have in Chinese leaders and, unfortunately, several factors that are largely unknowable. But we do know two things. First, Chinese leaders appear to be causing this problem deliberately, likely to try to avert a much worse problem. And, second, if this continues and even it works, it could see China’s economy finally cool after years of breakneck growth**, with serious repercussions** for the rest of us. Things got so bad that the Bank of China has been fighting rumors all day that it defaulted on its loans; if true, this would risk bank runs and more defaults, not unlike the first days of the U.S. financial collapse. There’s no indication that the rumors are true, and no one is running on China’s banks. But the fact that the trouble has even gotten to this point is a sign of how potentially serious this could be. Here’s what has happened: China’s credit market has been in a bubble for years, with too much lending and borrowing, similar to what happened in the United States during the financial crisis. All that lending helps grow the economy until, one day, the bubble bursts, and it all comes crashing down, as happened the United States. China’s economic growth has been slowing, making a similar a crisis more likely. Chinese leaders seem to be trying to prevent a disaster by basically popping the bubble, a kind of controlled mini-collapse meant to avoid The Big One.

**Collapses the US and world economies**

**Karabell 13** - President of River Twice Research (Zachary, “The U.S. can’t afford a Chinese economic collapse,” Reuters, March 7 2013, http://blogs.reuters.com/edgy-optimist/2013/03/07/the-u-s-cant-afford-a-chinese-economic-collapse/ ) //JG

The consequences of a Chinese collapse, however, would be severe for the United States and for the world. There could be no major Chinese contraction without a concomitant contraction in the United States. That would mean sharply curtailed Chinese purchases of U.S. Treasury bonds, far less revenue for companies like General Motors, Nike, KFC and Apple that have robust business in China (Apple made $6.83 billion in the fourth quarter of 2012, up from $4.08 billion a year prior), and far fewer Chinese imports of high-end goods from American and Asian companies. It would also mean a collapse of Chinese imports of materials such as copper, which would in turn harm economic growth in emerging countries that continue to be a prime market for American, Asian and European goods. China is now the world’s second-largest economy, and property booms have been one aspect of its growth. Individual Chinese cannot invest outside of the country, and the limited options of China’s stock exchanges and almost nonexistent bond market mean that if you are middle class and want to do more than keep your money in cash or low-yielding bank accounts, you buy either luxury goods or apartments. That has meant a series of property bubbles over the past decade and a series of measures by state and local officials to contain them. These recent measures are hardly the first, and they are not likely to be the last.

**Nuke war**

**Harris and Burrows 9** (Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f\_0016178\_13952.pdf, AM)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, **history may be more instructive than ever**. While we continue to believe that **the Great Depression** is not likely to be repeated, the **lessons** to be drawn from that period **include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies** (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) **and** on the **sustainability of multilateral institutions** (think League of Nations in the same period). **There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century.** For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for greater conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt **in a constantly volatile economic environment** as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced.** For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. **Terrorist groups** in 2025 **will** likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that **become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would** almost certainly **be the Middle East**. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, **worries** about a nuclear-armed Iran **could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions**. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity **conflict** and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella **could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict** if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. **The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also **will produce inherent difficulties** in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, **short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty** of Iranian intentions **may place more focus on preemption** rather than defense, potentially **leading to escalating crises.** 36 Types of **conflict** that the world continues to experience, such as **over resources, could reemerge**, particularly if **protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions** of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this **could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources,** for example, to be **essential for** maintaining domestic stability and the **survival of their regime**. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. **If** the **fiscal stimulus focus for** these **countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional** naval **capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves**, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. **With water** also **becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.**

**Threatens billions**

**Daily Bell 10** – (“What Happens When China Collapses?,” November 24 2010, http://www.thedailybell.com/1549/What-Happens-When-China-Collapses.html) //JG

There is no doubt that the Chinese "miracle" is going to end badly. We would venture to say that India, anyway, is not far behind China in terms of being unable to control its inflation. The question, we suppose is one of timing. When the Chinese economy crashes, or deflates, especially if it does so in near term (and granted it could be a kind of slow motion crash) we will see just what effects it will have on the world's economy and especially Europe and America. If the event is coupled with rising food prices and a kind of artificially imposed trade war that further freezes goods and services worldwide, then the results could be truly **catastrophic for** millions, even **billions**. This is when we will begin to see whether the powers-that-be are truly Machiavellian in terms of their strategies and goals. This is when we will begin to find out if there is a workable plan to introduce a one-world financial system, and even one-world government. China may be the trigger. The economic system that the elite imposed on the world via central banking was bound to end in the kinds of implosions that we are seeing today – in the US, in Europe and sooner or later in China, India, etc. The wild card, however, is the Internet. We do not believe the power elite had any idea of the amount of antipathy that would be generated by this new communication tool. We believe, in aggregate, it is still in shock. In past decades, popular rage was always turned against imaginary private sector enemies. Wall Street was blamed for economic disasters, or even the "bankers." But today's finger-pointing includes a primary dominant social theme of the power elite – central banking. Additionally, governments are coming in for their share of the blame.

# T

**Off**

**A. Interpretation – “economic engagement” means the aff must be an exclusively economic action – it cannot encompass broader forms of engagement**

**Jakstaite, 10** - Doctoral Candidate Vytautas Magnus University Faculty of Political Sciences and Diplomacy (Lithuania) (Gerda, “Containment and Engagement as Middle-Range Theories” Baltic Journal of Law & Politics Volume 3, Number 2 (2010), DOI: 10.2478/V10076-010-0015-7)

The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state‟s behaviour and to improve bilateral relations

**That means trade and aid in the form of loans or grants**

**Resnick, 1** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” Vol. 54 No. 2, Political Science Complete)

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT

In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:

DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS

Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations

Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes

Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa

MILITARY CONTACTS

Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa

Arms transfers

Military aid and cooperation

Military exchange and training programs

Confidence and security-building measures

Intelligence sharing

ECONOMIC CONTACTS

Trade agreements and promotion

Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants

CULTURAL CONTACTS

Cultural treaties

Inauguration of travel and tourism links

Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25)

**B. Violation – the affirmative \_\_\_\_\_, which is not an exclusively economic instrument**

**C. Vote negative**

**1. Predictable limits – blurring the lines between economic and other forms of engagement makes any positive interaction with another country topical – becomes impossible for the neg to predict or prepare**

**2. Equitable ground – the economic limit is vital to critiques of economics, trade disads, and non-economic counterplans**

**1NC**

**DA**

**China’s engagement in Latin America is high now and its zero sum- even if US engagement is happening now, China’s influence is overpowering us**

**Rosenthal, 9/11** – political consultant and writer who is currently interning at The Center for Security Policy in Washington DC (Terence, 2013, “China’s Pivot to Latin America”, Global Balita, http://globalbalita.com/2013/09/11/chinas-pivot-to-latin-america/)//VP

The quest for global naval power runs parallel to competition for control of markets in Latin America.. The two largest world economies, the United States, and China are vying for control of these markets. China has an enormous population of approximately 1.3 billion people but is only able to use a very small percentage of its land mass. Its’ consumer market is the wealthiest it has been in modern times. China desires access to key resources such as petroleum, coal, iron, uranium, as well as agricultural products. Latin America is in high global demand, with 500 million people, and a $3trillion market. In its quest to be Latin America’s foremost business partner, China has risen out of ambiguity to become one of the top three exporters, sometimes surpassing the United States in countries like Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, Chile, and Brazil. China has sought to be the prime lender in Latin America, loaning $110 billion dollars thus exceeding the World Bank’s contribution for the past two years. Some of China’s other most noteworthy loans include $28 billion to Venezuela, $10.2 billion to the Argentine debt swap, and 10 billion to Brazilian oil company, Petrobras. China wishes to benefit from developing infrastructure, ports, roads and rail systems in Latin America. In Nicaragua, China is planning the start of a canal bigger than the Panama Canal, facilitating passage to larger container ships than the Panama Canal is now able to handle. In Panama, China controls the leases at both ends of the Panama Canal and is in the process of widening the Canal in order to accommodate larger vessels. This constitutes excellent strategic positioning for China, giving them virtual control over two major passageways. Though a huge amount of the world’s trade transits the Panama Canal, the United States remains its biggest user. China’s economic relations in the Caribbean are also growing by leaps and bounds. Consider a $2.6 billion resort, among a gaggle of Chinese owned hotels and casinos being built by the Chinese in the Bahamas, 80 miles off the U.S. coast. Or Complant, a Chinese company, investing millions of dollars in Jamaica’s sugar industry. The Bahamas and Jamaica are great strategic places for the Chinese to invest due to their close proximity to the U.S., as well as in Cuba, with whom they already have solid military, diplomatic and commercial relations. In recent years, China has embarked on a well-planned pivot to Latin America, focusing on a multifaceted military approach. In terms of soft military power, the Chinese naval hospital, Peace Ark has sailed the Caribbean offering medical and military services, similar to America’s USNS Comfort, but, with the addition of military council. China conducts military exchange and arm sales with Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. In Argentina, the Chinese are providing technological assistance with aircraft and helicopters and in Brazil with civilian and military operations. In addition, specific attention is being paid to Venezuela as a launching pad for military and diplomatic influence in South America.

**US-Cuba relations decrease Chinese influence in the region**

**Benjamin-Alvadaro ‘6** (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special,” http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf)

Additionally, Venezuela remains the fourth largest importer of oil to the United States and one can surmise that the existing trade arrangements between the U.S. and Venezuela will remain intact, the evolution of the Bolivarian revolution under Chavez and **a growing Chinese presence in the region notwithstanding.** Additionally, pursuing such a path would allow United States policymakers to take advantage of what Cuba has to offer in the following areas: domestic technical capabilities; continuing human capital development; strategic positioning in the Caribbean, and an improved diplomatic stature. Cuba, by any measure, possesses a largely untapped technical capacity owing to advanced training and education in the core mathematic and scientific areas. This was clearly demonstrated by its attempt to develop a nuclear energy capability in the 1980s and 1990s whereby thousands of Cubans pursued highly technical career paths leaving Cuba with among the highest ratios of scientists and engineers to the general population in all of the Americas. Moreover, the foundation of Cuba’s vaunted public education system remains intact and increased investment under various scenarios suggests that Cuba will continue to produce a welleducated workforce that will be critical to its future economic vitality. This raises an important consideration that being the role that Cuba will play in the region in the 21st century. It suffices to say that Cuba remains the strategically important state by virtue of its geographical location alone, in efforts against drug and human trafficking and related national and regional security matters. The extent to which a stable Cuban government has cooperated with the U.S. in drug interdiction efforts in the past suggests that the results from improved diplomatic relations between neighbors would have the effect of improving national security concerns related to terrorist activity, illicit weapons transfers and the like. Ultimately, **a successful normalization of relations** between the U.S. and Cuba in these areas may well enhance and stabilize regional relations that could possibly lessen (or at a minimum, balancing) **fears of a Chinese incursion** in hemispheric affairs. To lessen those fears it may be useful to review the present structure of joint-venture projects in the energy sector in Cuba to ascertain the feasibility and possible success of such an undertaking become available to American firms. Moreover, it is interesting to note that U.S. firms in the agriculture sector have successfully negotiated and consummated sales to Cuba totaling more than $1 billion dollars over the past four years under conditions that are less than optimal circumstances but have well-served the commercial interests of all parties involved.

**China’s engagement in Latin America is key to its economy**

**Farnsworth, 12** – Vice-president of the Council of the Americas in Washington DC (Eric, “Memo to Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America,” Americas Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter, 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth)//VP

What is China doing in the Americas? It’s a good question—and an increasingly important one for policymakers in Washington. According to one U.S. analyst, it’s about “goodwill, good business and strategic position.”1 Perhaps. But the jury is still out, mostly because China’s interest in the Western Hemisphere is barely a decade old. For many years, beyond attempts to wean Latin American and Caribbean nations away from support for Taiwan and efforts to build Third World solidarity, China’s footprint in the Americas was light. That has now changed. Since then-President Jiang Zemin’s 13-day trip to Latin America in April 2001 and the subsequent visits of President Hu Jintao in 2004 and 2011, Chinese engagement with the region has exploded. Today, China is the top trade partner of Brazil and Chile, and the second trade partner of Argentina and Peru. By late 2010, Chinese enterprises had invested almost $44 billion in the region, according to China’s National Development and Reform Commission, almost a quarter of which was invested in 2010 alone. Top investment targets included Brazil, but also Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Innovative financing by Chinese entities was often behind the deals—and in some cases, such as Ecuador and Venezuela, investments took the form of loans secured by guaranteed future deliveries of oil. That is a marked change from 2003, the year before Hu’s first visit, when China invested just $1 billion in all of Latin America. By now the outlines of the story are well known. As part of the dash for economic growth that the Chinese Communist Party believes will help to maintain its legitimacy—an average annual rate of 9.8 percent from 1979 to 2009, including an 8.7 percent growth rate in 2009 when much of the rest of the world faced economic collapse—Beijing is on a global quest to lock in the natural resources that fuel its growth. From Southeast Asia to Africa to Latin America and beyond, China is scouring the globe to invest in primary commodities. By the end of 2011, more than $3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves provided an impressive war chest from which to purchase the global assets that China’s leaders believe they need to support economic growth—and thus political stability—for the medium to longer term. As China faces its own near-term leadership transition, efforts to purchase domestic political stability with foreign trade and investment are likely to intensify. At the same time, Latin American nations that have been the primary trade and investment partners with China have also gained handsomely, at least in the short term, in the sectors that produce primary goods. Longer term questions abound regarding the balance and terms of trade, the nature of the investments that China is making, and the values that are being promoted or undermined by such investments.2 Additionally, nations that are not supplying significant amounts of commodities to China, including Mexico and Central America, view China more as an aggressive competitor than as an economic partner. The costs and benefits of trade with China are unequally distributed across the Americas.

**That solves global economic collapse and nuclear lashout**

**Buzan and Foot 04 –** professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College, (Barry and Rosemary, “Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal”, ed., Questia, p. 145-147, USC Libraries)//JK

China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - **get**ting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

**Topicality**

**A. Interpretation – Removing sanctions is a form of appeasement**

**Stern 6** (Martin, University of Maryland Graduate, Debunking detente, 11/27/06, http://www.diamondbackonline.com/article\_56223e79-7009-56a3-8afe-5d08bfff6e08.html)

Appeasement is defined as "granting concessions to potential enemies to maintain peace." Giving Iran international legitimacy and removing sanctions would have maintained peace with a potential enemy without changing the undemocratic practices of the enemy. If this isn't appeasement, I don't know how better to define the word.

**Engagement and appeasement are distinct**

**Resnick 1** (Evan, Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United States Programme at RSIS, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2, http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?sid=1b56e6b4-ade2-4052-9114-7d107fdbd019%40sessionmgr12&vid=2&hid=24&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN=4437301

Thus, a rigid conceptual distinction can be drawn between engagement and appeasement. Whereas both policies are positive sanctions--insofar as they add to the power and prestige of the target state--engagement does so in a less direct and less militarized fashion than appeasement. In addition, engagement differs from appeasement by establishing an increasingly interdependent relationship between the sender and the target state. At any juncture, the sender state can, in theory, abrogate such a relationship at some (ideally prohibitive) cost to the target state.(n34) Appeasement, on the other hand, does not involve the establishment of contacts or interdependence between the appeaser and the appeased. Territory and/or a sphere of influence are merely transferred by one party to the other either unconditionally or in exchange for certain concessions on the part of the target state.

**B. Violation – they remove restrictions – that’s appeasement**

**C. Voting issue**

**1. Limits – infinite amount of restrictions the aff can remove – explodes neg research burden**

**2. Ground – Lose spending links based off of increases in funding**

**DA**

**INSERT UNIQUENESS**

**Plan drains capital**

**Stieglitz, 11**

Matthew, Law Clerk at Vladeck, Waldman, Elias & Engelhard, P.C, Judicial Intern at United States District Court, Masters @ Cornell University, http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/Fellows2011/Stieglitz-\_Final\_Paper.pdf

This collaboration represented positive dialogue with Cuba, yet it did nothing to improve relations with Cuba. Subsequent to the Balsero crisis, the US Congress acted to enforce stricter standards towards the island in a landmark legislation that would effectively relegate the presidency to the backburner in relation to Cuba. Driven in part by CANF and the **lobbying efforts** of the exile community, the Cuban Liberty & Solidarity Act was passed in 1996 (also known as the Helms-Burton Act) further complicating relations with Cuba (Bardach, 2002). Essentially, the legislation cedes greater authority to the US Congress in ending the trade embargo, making a potential **pro-embargo majority in Congress** the **powerbrokers on everything US-Cuba related.** Simply stated, the Cuban Liberty & Democratic Solidarity Act disempowers the presidency in relation to Cuba. While the legislation calls for a variety of different elements, it has two key components in relation to the presidency: the embargo can only be repealed by Congressional vote, and it cannot be repealed until a democratic government is elected in Cuba that includes neither Fidel nor Raul Castro. This clearly hinders normalization because it effectively mitigates any transition efforts or progressive policies that the Castro brothers sponsor. Unless the legislation is repealed or amended, any progressive efforts or dialogue from the Cuban government will be irrelevant so long as the Castro brothers continue to lead the government. It also constrains the US presidency, as President Obama—or any future president— cannot simply end the embargo with Cuba. Instead, presidents must defer to the US Congress, which will make progressive policy with Cuba **difficult.** This again **exemplifies the strength and importance of the Cuban-American lobby** in policy discussions with Cuba. Not only did their efforts result in Congressional legislation that effectively ceded control of US relations with Cuba to Congress, but they also **imposed the agenda** of the electorate on American foreign policy. Subsequent to this legislation passing, the Cuban-American lobby would again work to have its voice heard when a young boy, Elian González, was found floating in American waters, one of three survivors of an ill-fated voyage that claimed the lives of eleven people, including his mother. Under the Wet Foot, Dry Foot policy, Elian González could not be granted asylum in the United States because he was found in water. While his family in the US was more than willing to take the boy in, his status as a minor complicated matters with his father remaining in Cuba. This placed the Clinton Administration in the middle of a **highly contested** debate that the Cuban-American electorate **immediately moved to shape** (Bardach, 2002). The González case called into questions components of family law, immigration law, refugee policy, and politics, and presented the Cuban-American electorate its greatest opportunity to embarrass the Castro government. For President Clinton, it presented a crisis that necessitated caution, and would ultimately entail a moral debate that stirred immense media coverage of the Cuba dilemma itself. González's mother drowned in late 1999 while traveling with her son to the United States, and while the INS originally placed him with paternal family in Miami, his father objected to González remaining in the United States (Bardach, 2002). What ensued was a media nightmare, with national media outlets descending on Miami to interview the boy. Local politicians became involved, with the case eventually being deliberated in court where the family’s asylum petition was dismissed and González was ordered to return to his father. President Clinton almost exclusively deferred to Attorney General Janet Reno during the proceedings, who ultimately ordered the return of González to his father prior to the court decision. González’s return to Cuba coincided with the beginning of yet another decade in which the Cuban trade embargo would continue, and to date is the last controversial event of US-Cuba policy during the Castro regime (Bardach, 2002). Reflecting upon the Castro reign during the 20th century, two themes emerge: the prominence of the Cuban-American community, and the actions of US presidents towards Cuba. The **clout of the Cuban-American lobby cannot be understated,** as the 2000 presidential election showed us. President George W. Bush secured his victory as president in no small part due to the Cuban-American vote, which he and Al Gore campaign vigorously for. As such, the Gore and Bush campaigns remained relatively silent on the Elian González case, leaving the matter to the courts so as **not to risk any backlash from the Cuban-American community**. After his victory, President Bush tightened restrictions on Cuba much like his Republican predecessors. He further restricted travel to the island for CubanAmericans, reduced the amount of remittances that could be sent to the island, placed Cuba on terror-watch lists after 9/11, and maintained that Cuba was a strategic threat to national security (Erlich, 2009). Further, cultural and academic exchanges were suspended, and many Cuban and American artists found themselves unable to attain visas to travel between Cuba and the United States to share the rich culture of both nations. By the time President Bush left office, the only Americans legally allowed to enter Cuba were journalists, family members (who could only go once every three years), and those visiting the island for religious reasons.

**PC is key**

**McMorris-Santoro, 10/15**

Evan McMorris-Santoro, political reporter for Buzzfeed; “Obama Has Already Won The Shutdown Fight And He’s Coming For Immigration Next,” 10/15/2013, http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/obama-has-already-won-the-shutdown-fight-and-hes-coming-for //bghs-ms

The White House and Democrats are “ready” to jump back into the immigration fray when the fiscal crises ends, Sharry said. And advocates are already drawing up their plans to put immigration back on the agenda — plans they’ll likely initiate the morning after a fiscal deal is struck.¶ “We’re talking about it. We want to be next up and we’re going to position ourselves that way,” Sharry said. “There are different people doing different things, and **our movement will be increasingly confrontational with Republicans**, including civil disobedience. A lot of people are going to say, ‘We’re not going to wait.’”¶ The White House isn’t ready to talk about the world after the debt limit fight yet, but officials have signaled strongly they want to put immigration back on the agenda.¶ Asked about future strategic plans after the shutdown Monday, a senior White House official said, “That’s a conversation for when the government opens and we haven’t defaulted.” But on Tuesday, Press Secretary Jay Carney specifically mentioned immigration when asked “how the White House proceeds” after the current fracas is history.¶ “Just like we wish for the country, for deficit reduction, for our economy, that the House would follow the Senate’s lead and pass comprehensive immigration reform with a big bipartisan vote,” he said. “That might be good for the Republican Party. Analysts say so; Republicans say so. We hope they do it.”¶ The president set immigration as his next priority in an interview with Univision Tuesday.¶ “Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform,” Obama said. He also set up another fight with the House GOP on the issue.¶ “We had a very strong Democratic and Republican vote in the Senate,” Obama said. “The only thing right now that’s holding it back is, again, Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives.”¶ Don’t expect the White House effort to include barnstorming across the country on behalf of immigration reform in the days after the fiscal crisis ends, reform proponents predict. Advocates said the White House has tried hard to help immigration reform along, and in the current climate that means trying to **thread the needle with Republicans** who support reform but have also reflexively opposed every one of Obama’s major policy proposals.¶ Democrats and advocates seem to hope the GOP comes back to immigration on its own, albeit with a boost from Democrats eager to join them. Po cir lls show Republicans have taken on more of the blame from the fiscal battle of the past couple of weeks. But Tom Jensen, a pollster with the Democratic firm Public Policy Polling, said moving to pass immigration reform could be just what the doctor ordered to get the public back on the side of the Republicans.¶ “We’ve consistently found that a sizable chunk of Republican voters support immigration reform, and obviously a decent number of Republican politicians do too,” Jensen said. “After this huge partisan impasse, they may want to focus on something that’s not quite as polarized, and immigration would certainly fit the bill since we see voters across party lines calling for reform.”

**Visa policy is dragging down US-India relations now – only CIR can reaffirm our alliance with India**

**Zee News 12**

[“Krishna, Hillary to discuss visa fee hike in NY”, October 1st, 2012, http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/krishna-hillary-to-discuss-visa-fee-hike-in-ny\_802978.html]

New York: The issue of US visa fee hike, which has hurt several Indian IT firms, is expected to come up for discussion when External Affairs Minister SM Krishna meets US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton here on Monday on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session. India has "consistently" taken up the issue of the visa fee hike with the US and the issue will figure in talks between Krishna and Clinton, official sources said. The US had raised visa fee in 2010 to fund its enhanced costs on securing border with Mexico under the Border Security Act. Some of the top Indian companies TCS, Infosys, Wipro and Mahindra Satyam were affected by the US action and India is expected to soon seek consultations with the US at the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the issue. The sources said that young Indian professionals working in the US have been the "cornerstone" of India-US relations and are a pillar in the improved bilateral relations that has brought the two countries closer. Hiking visa fees or limiting the number of work visas available to Indian companies is tantamount to **"undermining that pillar and growth in India-US relations,"** they added. "Raising visa fees and putting other barriers is not in consonance with the forward thinking of growing bilateral ties," the sources said. This will be the third bilateral meeting between Krishna and Clinton this year. They had previously met in India in April and again in June in Washington. The sources said that the two countries have a fairly elaborate agenda and the visa issue is one of the issues in a broader relationship. Krishna will also address the 67th session of the UN General Assembly today. part of the world are **essential** to the peace and prosperity of the world.

**Solves laundry list of global conflicts – spills over and solves Asian power vacuum**

**Armitage et al ’10** [Richard is the President of Armitage International and former Deputy Secretary of State. R. Nicholas Burns is a Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Richard Fontaine is the President of the Center for New American Security. “Natural Allies: A Blueprint for the Future of U.S.-India Relations,” October, Center for New American Security, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Burns%20-%20Natural%20Allies.pdf]

A strengthened U.S.-India strategic partnership is thus imperative in this new era. The transformation of U.S. ties with New Delhi over the past 10 years, led by Presidents Clinton and Bush, stands as one of the most significant triumphs of recent American foreign policy. It has also been a bipartisan success. In the last several years alone, the United States and India have completed a landmark civil nuclear cooperation agreement, enhanced military ties, expanded defense trade, increased bilateral trade and investment and deepened their global political cooperation.¶ Many prominent Indians and Americans, however, now fear this rapid expansion of ties has stalled. Past projects remain incomplete, few new ideas have been embraced by both sides, and the forward momentum that characterized recent cooperation has subsided. The Obama administration has taken significant steps to break through this inertia, including with its Strategic Dialogue this spring and President Obama’s planned state visit to India in November 2010. Yet there remains a sense among observers in both countries that this critical relationship is falling short of its promise.¶ We believe it is critical to rejuvenate the U.S.- India partnership and put U.S. relations with India on a more solid foundation. The relationship requires a bold leap forward. The United States should establish a vision for what it seeks in the relationship and give concrete meaning to the phrase “strategic partnership.” A nonpartisan working group of experts met at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) over the past eight months to review the main pillars of the U.S.-India relationship and we articulate here a specific agenda of action.¶ In order to chart a more ambitious U.S.-India strategic partnership, we believe that the United States should commit, publicly and explicitly, to work with India in support of its permanent membership in an enlarged U.N. Security Council; seek a broad expansion of bilateral trade and investment, beginning with a Bilateral Investment Treaty; greatly expand the security relationship and boost defense trade; support Indian membership in key export control organizations, a step toward integrating India into global nonproliferation efforts; and liberalize U.S. export controls, including the removal of Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) subsidiaries from the U.S. Entity List.¶ These and the other actions outlined in this report will require India to make a number of commitments and policy changes, including taking rapid action to fully implement the Civil Nuclear Agreement; raising its caps on foreign investment; reducing barriers to defense and other forms of trade; enhancing its rules for protecting patents and other intellectual property; further harmonizing its export control lists with multilateral regimes; and seeking closer cooperation with the United States and like-minded partners in international organizations, including the United Nations. ¶ The U.S. relationship with India should be rooted in shared interests and values and should not be simply transactional or limited to occasional collaboration. India’s rise to global power is, we believe, in America’s strategic interest. As a result, the United States should not only seek a closer relationship with India, but actively assist its further emergence as a great power.¶ U.S. interests in a closer relationship with India include:¶ • Ensuring a stable Asian and global balance of power.¶ • Strengthening an open global trad[e]ing system.¶ • Protecting and preserving access to the global commons (air, sea, space, and cyber realms).¶ • Countering terrorism and violent extremism.¶ • Ensuring access to secure global energy resources.¶ • Bolstering the international nonproliferation regime.¶ • Promoting democracy and human rights.¶ • Fostering greater stability, security and economic prosperity in South Asia, including in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.¶ A strong U.S.-India strategic partnership will prove indispensable to the region’s continued peace and prosperity. Both India and the United States have a vital interest in maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia. Neither seeks containment of China, but the likelihood of a peaceful Chinese rise increases if it ascends in a region where the great democratic powers are also strong. Growing U.S.-India strategic ties will ensure that Asia will not have a vacuum of power and will make it easier for both Washington and New Delhi to have productive relations with Beijing. In addition, a strengthened relationship with India, a natural democratic partner, will signal that the United States remains committed to a strong and enduring presence in Asia.¶ The need for closer U.S.-India cooperation goes well beyond regional concerns. In light of its rise, India will play an increasingly vital role in addressing virtually **all major global challenges**. Now is the time to transform a series of bilateral achievements into a lasting regional and global partnership.

**CP**

**Text: The United States federal government should propose that it {PLAN} to through binding consultation to the Federal government of Brazil. The United States federal government should support this proposal during consultation and abide by the results of the consultation.**

**The counterplan builds effective cooperation and is critical to U.S. Brazil relations**

**Einaudi**, **11** – Member and research specialist of the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Distinguished Visiting Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (Luigi R., , “Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement,” March 2011)ahayes

Whether Brazil’s future policies will, like those of the United States, reflect greater caution and sensitivity to third party interests remains an open question. But there can be no question that Brazil’s global activism is here to stay. “The days when domestic weaknesses (an acumulo de vulnerabilidades) limited our scope of action abroad have been left behind,” stated Antonio de Aguiar Patriota in his first speech as the new Foreign Minister under President Rousseff on January 2, 2011.33 Brazilians cannot underestimate what is left to be done domestically, he argued, but they now expect “to engage on all major international debates.” The United States and Brazil, concludes one American observer, seem destined to keep bumping into each other all over the world.34 The key requirement for both countries is therefore to give strategic shape and rationality to these otherwise random interactions. Prospects and Policy Recommendations The United States has a basic national security interest in Brazil’s continuing democratic and marketoriented success, which improves its will and capacity to help address pressing global problems. We are in a rapidly changing period of international relations, in which a high premium is put on skilled and effective diplomacy in order to provide a measure of management to situations that could spin out of control. We are still haunted by nuclear weapons. In these circumstances, Brazil plays an important role. It is in the U.S. interest to find as many ways as possible not only to cooperate with Brazil, but also to engage with Brasilia as a regional and global partner in the maintenance of peace and prosperity. A prerequisite for improved mutual engagement will be changes in perspective on both sides. Mutually beneficial engagement requires the United States to welcome Brazil’s emergence as a global power. Brazil is more than a tropical China35; it is culturally and politically close to the United States and Europe. Brazil, in turn, needs to realize that the United States accepts its rise. Brazil also needs to recognize that the United States still matters greatly to Brasilia and that more can be achieved working with Washington than against it. The United States and Brazil have vast overlapping interests, but a formal strategic partnership is probably out of the question for both countries. In the United States, Brazil must compete for policy attention with China, India, Russia, Japan, Mexico, and several European countries. It poses no security threat to the United States. Moreover, despite Brazil’s importance in multilateral organizations, particularly the UN, Brazil can be of limited practical assistance at best to the United States in its two current wars. Brazil’s interests, in turn, may be fairly said to include the need to distinguish itself from the United States. Diplomatically, this means neither country can expect automatic agreement from the other. Interests differ and it may be politically necessary to highlight differences even when interests are similar. But both countries should make **every effort to develop** a habit of **“permanent consultation”** in an effort to coordinate policies, work pragmatically together where interests are common, and reduce surprises even while recognizing that specific interests and policies often may differ. A first operational step, therefore, is for both countries to hold regular **policy-level consultations**, increase exchanges of information, and coordinate carefully on multilateral matters. This is much easier said than done. The list of global issues on which Brazil is becoming a major player includes conflict resolution, all aspects of energy, including nuclear matters, **all types of trade**, the environment, space, and the development of international law, including law of the seas and nonproliferation. To share information and ensure effective consultation on so many functional issues will require finding ways to lessen the geographic stovepiping natural to bureaucracy. The U.S. Department of State, for example, has historically organized itself into geographical bureaus responsible for relations with countries in particular regions, leaving functional issues to offices organized globally. This organization hampers the exchange of information and consultation with countries such as Brazil, whose reach and policies go beyond their particular geographic region. One result is that multilateral affairs are still often an isolated afterthought in the U.S. Government. Are there things the United States and Brazil could do, whether bilaterally or in the World Trade Organization, that would offset some of the negative effects of the China trade on manufacturing in both their countries?36 Just posing the question reveals the complexity of the task.

**Brazil says yes – thinks current embargo policy is absurd**

**Hakim**, president emeritus and senior fellow of the IAD, **2010**

(10/21/10, Peter, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, previously taught at both MIT and Columbia, MA of Public and International Affairs from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School, MS in Physics at the University of Pennsylvania, “US-Brazil Relations: Expect More Conflict,” Infolatam, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2490) ahayes

US and Brazil also take **polar opposite positions** with regard to Cuba’s role in hemispheric affairs. In this instance, it is Washington that **stands alone** in its refusal to end its diplomatic and economic isolation of Cuba. Every other country in the Americas has re-established normal relations with the island. For most Brazilians and other Latin Americans, US policy toward Cuba is virtually incomprehensible.

**U.S. – Brazil relations are high but consultation is necessary to maintain them – solves general conflict and a laundry list of impacts**

**Meyer**, **10 -** Latin American Affairs Analyst @ CRS, (Peter J., Analyst in Latin American Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, “Brazil-U.S. Relations,” 3/5/10,http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA521243) ahayes

Relations with the United States Currently, relations between the United States and Brazil may be characterized as friendly. The United States has increasingly regarded Brazil as a significant power, especially in its role as a stabilizing force in Latin America. U.S. officials assert that the United States seeks to increase cooperation with moderate leftist governments in Latin America (like Brazil) in order to ease mounting tensions among countries in South America, and to deal with populist governments in the region. Brazil under President Lula has helped diffuse potential political crises in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and supported Colombia’s ongoing struggle against terrorist organizations and drug traffickers. Brazil is also commanding the U.N. stabilization force in Haiti. Brazil and the United States have worked closely on a wide range of bilateral and regional issues, and Brazil-U.S. cooperation has increased in recent years, as reflected in the continuing high level contacts between the two governments, particularly on energy issues. Early in 2007, two high-level meetings between Presidents Bush and Lula culminated in the March 2007 signing of a U.S.-Brazil Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to promote bio-fuels development in the Western Hemisphere.59 The initiative was expanded in November 2008 to include additional countries in Africa, Central America, and the Caribbean (See “Ethanol and Other Biofuels” section below).60 Although Brazil and the United States share common goals for regional stability, Brazil’s independent approach to foreign policy has led to periodic disputes with the United States on trade and political issues, including how (and whether) to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and Brazil’s vocal opposition to the war in Iraq and the U.S. embargo of Cuba. Despite President Lula’s friendly relationship with President Obama, a number of differences between Brazil and the United States have emerged in recent months. In addition to ongoing disputes over the U.S. tariff on Brazilian ethanol and the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, Brazil has criticized the United States for failing to take a stronger stance on the political crisis in Honduras and has reacted negatively to a recent agreement that will provide the United States with access to seven Colombian military bases, which the Brazilian foreign minister described as “a strong military presence whose aim and capability seems to go well beyond what might be needed inside Colombia.”61 Brazil is considered a middle-income country and does not receive large amounts of U.S. foreign assistance. Brazil received $21.5 million in U.S. aid in FY2009, will receive an estimated $25 million in FY2010, and would receive $20.9 million under the Obama Administration’s request for FY2011. U.S. assistance priorities in Brazil include supporting environmental programs and the strengthening of local capacity to address threats to the Amazon, promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency to mitigate climate change, strengthening the professionalism and peacekeeping capabilities of the Brazilian military, and reducing the transmission of communicable diseases.62 The Bush Administration came to view Brazil as a strong partner **whose cooperation should be sought in order to solve regional and global problems**, and the Obama Administration appears to view Brazil in a similar light. Current issues of concern to both Brazil and the United States include counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts, energy security, trade, human rights, the fight against HIV/AIDS, and the environment Counternarcotics Although Brazil is not a major drug-producing country, it serves as a major transit country for illicit drugs from neighboring Andean countries destined primarily for Europe. Urban gangs— such as São Paulo’s First Command of the Capital (PCC) and Rio de Janeiro’s Red Command (CV)—have begun playing greater roles in narcotics and weapons smuggling, establishing their presence in other countries in the region and forging ties with Colombian and Mexican traffickers. Brazil has also become the second-largest consumer (after the United States) of cocaine in the world. With U.S. support, Brazil has taken several steps to improve its counternarcotics capabilities. In 2004, Brazil implemented an Air Bridge Denial program, which authorizes lethal force for air interdiction, and in 2006, Brazil passed an anti-drug law that prohibits and penalizes the cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs. Brazil has also worked with its neighbors to construct Joint Intelligence Centers at strategic points along its borders and invested in a sensor and radar project called the Amazon Vigilance System in an attempt to control illicit activity in its Amazon region. In 2009, Brazil’s federal police captured 18.9 metric tons of cocaine, 1.4 metric tons of cocaine base, 513 kilograms of crack cocaine, 150.6 metric tons of marijuana, 3.3 kilograms of heroin, and 183.3 tons of precursor chemicals.63 Brazil received $992,000 in U.S. counternarcotics assistance in FY2008, was expected to receive $1 million in FY2009, and an would receive an estimated $1 million in FY2010 under the Obama Administration’s request.64 U.S. counternarcotics assistance includes training for the Brazil’s federal police, support for interdiction programs at Brazil’s ports, and expanding the capabilities of special investigations units. Counterterrorism and the Tri-Border Area65 The Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay has long been used for arms smuggling, money laundering, and other illicit purposes. According to the 2009 State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, the United States remains concerned that Hezbollah and Hamas are raising funds through illicit activities and from sympathizers in the sizable Middle Eastern communities in the region. Indeed, reports have indicated that Hezbollah earns over $10 million a year from criminal activities in the TBA.66 Although it has been reported that al Qaeda’s operations chief Khalid Shaikh Mohammed lived in the Brazilian TBA city of Foz de Iguazu in 1995 and Brazilian authorities arrested Ali al-Mahdi Ibrahim—who was wanted by Egypt for his alleged role in the 1997 massacre of tourists at Luxor—in the TBA in 2003, the State Department report states that there have been no corroborated reports that any Islamic groups have an operational presence in the area.67 The United States joined with the countries of the TBA in the “3+1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security” in 2002 and the group built a Joint Intelligence Center to combat trans-border criminal organizations in the TBA in 2007. The United States has also worked bilaterally with Brazil to improve its counterterrorism capabilities. In addition to providing counterterrorism training, the United States has worked with Brazil to implement the Container Security Initiative (CSI) at the port of Santos. While the State Department Country Reports on Terrorism lauded the Brazilian government as a “cooperative partner in countering terrorism,” it also noted that Brazil’s failure to strengthen its legal counterterrorism framework by passing long-delayed anti-money laundering and counterterrorism bills “significantly undermined its overall commitment to combating terrorism.”68 Brazil, like many Latin American nations, has been reluctant to adopt specific antiterrorism legislation as a result of the difficulty of defining terrorism in a way that does not include the actions of social movements and other groups whose actions of political dissent were condemned as terrorism by repressive military regimes in the past.69 Nonetheless, some Brazilian officials continue to push for antiterrorism legislation, asserting that the country will face new threats as a result of hosting the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics.70 In January 2009, the Western Hemisphere Counterterrorism and Nonproliferation Act of 2009 (H.R. 375, Ros-Lehtinen) was introduced in the House. Among other provisions, the bill calls on the U.S. Secretary of State to negotiate with Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay to establish a Regional Coordination Center (RCC) in the TBA to serve as a joint operational facility dedicated to coordinating efforts, capacity, and intelligence to counter current and emerging threats and prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. A similar provision can be found in the Foreign Relations Authorization and Reform Act for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 (H.R. 2475, Ros-Lehtinen), which was introduced in the House in May 2009. Energy Security In the last few years, there has been significant congressional interest in issues related to Western Hemisphere energy security. Brazil is widely regarded as a world leader in energy policy for successfully reducing its reliance on foreign oil through increased domestic production and the development of alternative energy resources. In addition to being the world’s second largest producer of ethanol, Brazil currently generates over 85% of its electricity through hydropower.71 At the same time, Brazil has attained the ability to produce large amounts of enriched uranium as part of its nuclear energy program. More recently, Brazil’s state-run oil company, Petrobras, a leader in deep-water oil drilling, has discovered what may be the world’s largest oil field find in 25 years.72 Ethanol and Other Biofuels73 Brazil stands out as an example of a country that has become a net exporter of energy, partially by increasing its use and production of ethanol. On March 9, 2007, the United States and Brazil, the world’s two largest ethanol-producing countries, signed a Memorandum of Understanding to promote greater cooperation on ethanol and biofuels in the Western Hemisphere. The agreement involves: (1) technology sharing between the United States and Brazil; (2) feasibility studies and technical assistance to build domestic biofuels industries in third countries; and, (3) multilateral efforts to advance the global development of biofuels. The first countries to receive U.S.- Brazilian assistance were the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, and St. Kitts and Nevis.74 Since March 2007, the United States and Brazil have moved forward on all three facets of the agreement. U.S. and Brazilian consultants have carried out feasibility studies that identified shortterm technical assistance opportunities in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador. On November 20, 2008, the United States and Brazil announced an agreement to expand their biofuels cooperation and form new partnerships with Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, GuineaBissau, and Senegal.75 The United States and Brazil are also working with other members of the International Biofuels Forum (IBF) to make biofuels standards and codes more uniform. In March 2009, the Western Hemisphere Energy Compact (S. 587, Lugar) was introduced. The legislation would provide $6 million in FY2010 to expand U.S.-Brazil biofuels cooperation.76 Despite this progress, several potential obstacles to increased U.S.-Brazil cooperation on biofuels exist, including current U.S. tariffs on most Brazilian ethanol imports. The United States currently allows duty-free access on sugar-based ethanol imports from many countries through the Caribbean Basin Initiative, Central American Free Trade Agreement, and the Andean Trade Preferences Act, among others.77 Some Brazilian ethanol is processed at plants in the Caribbean for duty-free entry into the United States, but exports arriving directly from Brazil are currently subject to a 54-cent-per-gallon tax, plus a 2.5% tariff. Several bills were introduced in the 110th Congress that would have eliminated or adjusted the ethanol tariff. Nuclear Energy Between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, Brazil sought to develop nuclear weapons as it competed with Argentina for political and military dominance of the Southern Cone. Brazil’s 1988 constitution limits nuclear activity to peaceful purposes, however, and in 1991, Brazil and Argentina reached an agreement not to pursue nuclear weapons. Although Brazil subsequently joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and a number of other multilateral nonproliferation regimes, some international observers became concerned when Brazil commissioned a uranium enrichment plant in 2004 and refused to give International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors full access to the centrifuge plant in 2005. The Brazilian government maintained that it needed to enrich uranium in order to produce its own fuel, and it justified its refusal to give IAEA inspectors access by citing security concerns over the proprietary aspects of the country’s nuclear technology. Negotiations between Brazil and the IAEA ended in October 2005 when the Bush Administration lent its support to Brazil by asserting that limited inspections should be enough for Brazil to comply with its international obligations.78 President Lula has stated Brazil’s intention to spend $540 million over the next eight years to build a third nuclear power plant and a nuclear-powered submarine. In September 2008, the Brazilian Minister for Energy and Mining announced that he would like Brazil to build 60 new nuclear energy plants over the next 50 years. He claimed this expansion of nuclear power is the only way that Brazil will be able to meet the energy needs of its growing population while avoiding massive carbon emissions through the burning of fossil fuels.79 Oil The recent discovery of substantial oil fields in the Santos Basin, which extends 500 miles along the Brazilian coast, has the potential to turn Brazil into a major oil and gas producer and an important source of energy for the United States. The Tupi field, discovered in November 2007, has confirmed oil reserves of between five and eight billion barrels, and it is estimated that the entire Santos Basin could hold up to 50 billion barrels of oil. President Lula asserts that the oil fields have the potential to transform Brazil and improve living conditions for its people. He intends to implement a new regulatory framework, which will increase the state’s role in the exploitation of the reserves while investing the profits in a new social fund for education, infrastructure, science and technology, and poverty reduction.80 Exploiting the new fields will be difficult and costly, however, as the oil is located in the so-called “pre-salt” layer, beneath layers of rock and salt up to 7,000 meters below the seabed. Brazil’s state-owned oil company, Petrobras, has announced that it will need $270 billion in investment over the next 10 years to develop the reserves.81 Some foreign investors have questioned whether the company will be able to access sufficient finance should the Brazilian government implement its proposed regulatory framework. 82 Nonetheless, Petrobras has already received several financing commitments. In April 2009, the Export-Import Bank of the United States approved a preliminary $2 billion loan commitment to Petrobras.83 Since then, the U.S. government has reportedly indicated that it is prepared to go beyond the original agreement to provide up to $10 billion in financing.84 In May 2009, Brazil and China signed an agreement under which China will provide Petrobras with $10 billion in financing in exchange for guaranteed oil deliveries of 150,000 barrels per day (bdp) in 2009 and 200,000 bpd for the next decade.85 Brazil’s stateowned National Bank of Economic and Social Development (BNDES) will provide Petrobras with an additional $12.5 billion over 20 years.86 Trade Issues Trade issues are central to the bilateral relationship between Brazil and the United States, with both countries being heavily involved in subregional, regional, and global trade talks. Brazil has sought to strengthen Mercosur and to establish free trade agreements with most of the countries in South America, while also pursuing efforts to negotiate a Mercosur-European Union free trade agreement. The United States has been actively involved in the Doha negotiations and, until late 2005, pressed for action on the region-wide Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). Since negotiations for the FTAA have been largely abandoned, the United States has continued to sign bilateral and subregional agreements with countries throughout Latin America. Bilateral trade between the United States and Brazil totaled $46.2 billion in 2009, a nearly 23% decline from 2008. U.S. exports to Brazil amounted to $26.2 billion while U.S. imports from Brazil amounted to $20.1 billion.87 Doha Round of the World Trade Organization Talks 88 Brazil has had a leading role in the Doha round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) talks. In 2003, Brazil led the G-20 group of developing countries’ efforts to insist that developed countries agree to reduce and eventually eliminate agricultural subsidies as part of any settlement. In late July 2004, WTO members agreed on the framework for a possible Doha round agreement, but formal talks were suspended indefinitely in July 2006 after key negotiating groups failed to break a deadlock on the issue of agricultural tariffs and subsidies. In June 2007, negotiators from India and Brazil walked out of a round of informal talks with representatives from the United States and the European Union (EU), refusing to open their markets further unless U.S. and EU subsidies were substantially reduced. In recent years, trade ministers have repeatedly failed to reach an agreement to conclude the Doha round and the U.S. negotiating position remains a source of contention with Brazil.89 World Trade Organization Dispute90 On December 21, 2009, Brazil announced that the WTO had authorized the country to impose trade retaliation measures worth $829.3 million in 2010 as a result of a nearly decade long dispute over U.S. cotton subsidies. Although Brazil has not yet finalized its decision to impose retaliatory measures, it has indicated that it may levy duties of up to 100% on a preliminary list of 222 goods of U.S. origin valued at $561 million and implement cross-retaliation in sectors outside the trade in goods—such as U.S. copyrights and patents—for the remaining $268.3 million.91 Brazil initiated the dispute with the United States in 2002, and a WTO dispute settlement panel ruled in Brazil’s favor in September 2004. The United States appealed the ruling but it was reaffirmed by the WTO appellate body in March 2005. Although the Bush Administration asked Congress to modify the cotton subsidy program in July 2005, a WTO dispute panel ruled in December 2007 that the United States was not moving quickly enough to comply with the 2004 ruling.92 Brazil and the United States then went to arbitration over the level of trade sanctions Brazil has the right to impose against the United States, leading to an August 31, 2009 decision by a WTO arbitration panel, which largely favored Brazil’s retaliation request. Generalized System of Preferences 93 The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) provides duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from developing countries. In the 109th Congress, renewal of the preference (as established by Title V of the Trade Act of 1974) was somewhat controversial, owing, in part, to concerns of some Members that a number of the more advanced developing countries (such as Brazil and India) were contributing to the impasse in the Doha round of WTO talks. Compromise language worked out between the House and Senate extended GSP for two years for all countries, while asserting that the President “should” revoke “competitive need limitation (CNL)” waivers for products from certain countries, based on the criteria specified. In June 2007, the Bush Administration decided to revoke the CNL waivers on Brazilian brake parts and ferrozirconium.94 The 111th Congress extended GSP until December 31, 2010 with P.L. 111-124. On June 4, 2009, H.R. 2702 (C. Smith) was introduced in the House. The bill would suspend GSP for Brazil until the country meets its obligations under the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Intellectual Property Rights In the last few years, Brazil has taken steps to improve its record on protecting intellectual property rights (IPR). The Brazilian government has created a national action plan to address piracy and intellectual property crimes, which has included increased police actions. Brazil and the United States continue to work together to address intellectual property issues, primarily through the U.S.-Brazil Bilateral Consultative Mechanism and the U.S.-Brazil Commercial Dialogue. In recognition of this progress, the United States Trade Representative lowered Brazil from the Priority Watch List of countries with significant IPR violations to the Watch List in 2007. Brazil remained on the Watch List in 2008 and 2009. In order to build on progress that has been made, USTR recommends that Brazil should consider strengthening its IPR enforcement legislation, more vigorously addressing book and internet piracy, and signing the World Intellectual Property Organization Internet Treaties.95 The U.S. government has also expressed concerns about Brazil’s periodic threats to issue compulsory licenses for patented pharmaceutical products. In May 2007, Brazil broke a patent on a drug used to treat HIV/AIDS that is produced by Merck & Co. in order to import a cheaper version of that drug from India.96 In July 2009, President Lula suggested that developing countries should be allowed to lift patent rights to produce more vaccine to battle the A(H1N1) flu epidemic.97 Human Rights The U.S. State Department’s Country Report on Human Rights on Brazil covering 2008 states that while “the federal government generally respected the human rights of its citizens ... there continued to be numerous, serious abuses, and the records of several state governments were poor.” Some human rights issues of particular concern include ongoing crime and human rights abuses by police, race and discrimination, and trafficking in persons. Violent Crime and Human Rights Abuses by Police Most observers agree that the related problems of urban crime, drugs, and violence, on the one hand, and corruption and brutality in law enforcement and prisons, on the other, are threatening citizens’ security in Brazil. Crime is most rampant in the urban shanty towns (favelas) in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Violence has traditionally been linked to turf wars being waged between rival drug gangs for control of the drug industry or to clashes between drug gangs and police officials, who have been criticized for the brutal manner in which they have responded to the gang violence. The weaknesses in Brazil’s criminal justice system have became dramatically apparent in recent years as gangs have launched violent attacks that have destabilized the cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. In one such attack in May 2006, street combat and rioting organized by a prisonbased gang network, the First Capital Command (PCC), paralyzed the city of São Paulo for several days.98 Officially, the violent gang attacks, which were followed by police reprisals, resulted in at least 186 deaths.99 More recently, in October 2009, gunmen of the Red Command (CV) launched a raid on the Morro dos Macacos favela to wrest control of the drug trade from the rival Friends of Friends gang. Over the course of several days, 31 people were killed, including three police sharpshooters whose helicopter was shot down as they tried to control the situation.100 As police forces in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro have employed strong-arm tactics in hopes of curbing the rampant gang violence, some human rights groups have raised concerns over a rising number of extrajudicial killings. Upon completing a November 2007 visit to Brazil, a U.N. Special Rapporteur concluded that police in Brazil are allowed to “kill with impunity in the name of security.”101 Indeed, more than 11,000 people have been killed by the two police forces since 2003. Although the officers involved have reported nearly all of the killings as legitimate acts of self defense, or “resistance killings,” a recent two year investigation by Human Rights Watch concluded that “a substantial portion of the alleged resistance killings reported...(were) in fact extrajudicial executions.” The Human Rights Watch report also indicates that those police officers responsible for extrajudicial killings enjoy near total impunity. For example, of the over 7,800 complaints against police officers recorded by the Rio Police Ombudsman’s Office over the past decade, only 42 generated criminal charges by state prosecutors and just four led to convictions.102 Despite these criticisms, some have defended the strong-arm tactics. São Paulo’s public security secretariat maintains that Human Rights Watch failed to take note of the fact that annual state killings by police have declined by 50% since 2003 while the homicide rate has been reduced by 70% over the past decade.103 Many analysts have asserted that Brazilian politicians at all levels of government have failed to devote the resources and political will necessary to confront the country’s serious public security problems, however, this may be changing. The state of Rio de Janeiro launched a new anticrime initiative in 2009 that considerably expands the number of personnel charged with maintaining security. Whereas previous police efforts generally centered around quick raids, the new initiative establishes Police Pacification Units (UPPs) that will maintain permanent presences in the favelas. After the favelas are cleared of drug gangs, the UPPs are charged with maintaining security and other governmental institutions are brought in to provide basic social services. The new initiative has been rather successful in reducing crime and violence without extensive bloodshed. Rio de Janeiro’s government intends to expand the initiative from the seven pilot favelas targeted in 2009 to 40 additional favelas in 2010.104 Race and Discrimination 105 People of African descent in Brazil, also known as Afro-Brazilians, represent 45% of the country’s population, but constitute 64% of the poor and 69% of the extreme poor.106 During the Cardoso Administration, the Brazilian government began to collect better official statistics on Afro-Brazilians. These statistics found significant education, health, and wage disparities between Afro-Brazilians and Brazil’s general population. Brazil now has the most extensive anti-discrimination legislation geared towards Afrodescendants of any country in Latin America. In 2001, Brazil became the first Latin American country to endorse quotas in order to increase minority representation in government service. Since 2002, several state universities in Brazil have enacted quotas setting aside admission slots for black students. Although most Brazilians favor government programs to combat social exclusion, they disagree as to whether the beneficiaries of affirmative action programs should be selected on the basis of race or income.107 In 2003, Brazil became the first country in the world to establish a Special Secretariat with a ministerial rank to manage Racial Equity Promotion Policies. Afro-Brazilian activists, while acknowledging recent government efforts on behalf of Afro-descendants, have noted that most universities have preferred not to implement quota systems, and that the Special Secretariat lacks the funding, staff, and clout necessary to advance its initiatives.108 Despite these limitations, Brazil has taken a leadership role in advancing issues of race and discrimination within the Organization of American States, where it is leading the drafting of an Inter-American Convention for the Prevention of Racism and All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance. In March 2008, Brazil and the Untied States signed an agreement known as the United States-Brazil Joint Action Plan Against Racial Discrimination to bilaterally promote racial equality in areas such as education, health, housing, and labor.109 On September 9, 2008, the House passed H.Res. 1254 (Engel), expressing congressional support for the U.S.-Brazil antidiscrimination plan. Trafficking in Persons for Forced Labor 110 According to the U.S. State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report, Brazil does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, but is making significant efforts to do so. As a result, it is listed as a Tier 2 country.111 Brazil is a source, transit, and destination country for people, especially women and children, trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation. Brazilian Federal Police estimate that between 250,000 and 400,000 children are exploited in domestic prostitution, especially in the country’s coastal resort areas where child sex tourism is prevalent. Brazil is also a source country for men trafficked internally for forced labor. More than 25,000 men have reportedly been recruited to labor in slave-like conditions, many in the country’s agribusiness industry. Roughly half of the more than 11,000 people freed from debt slavery in 2007 and 2008 were found working on sugarcane plantations.112 While the Brazilian government announced an agreement with the sugar industry to provide decent working conditions for the country’s sugarcane cutters in June 2009, the accord does not establish minimum wages or formal obligations.113 Reports suggest that significant numbers of men working in cattle ranching, mining, and the production of charcoal for pig iron—a key ingredient of steel that is then purchased by major companies in the United States—are also subjected to slave labor.114 Over the past year, the Brazilian government has taken a number of actions to address the problem of human trafficking. Anti-slave labor mobile units under the Ministry of Labor increased their operations, inspecting remote areas, freeing victims, and forcing those responsible to pay fines and restitution. Slave labor victims received some $3.6 million in compensation as a result of the 2008 operations. The Brazilian government also continued prosecuting traffickers, providing assistance to victims, and broadcasting its anti-trafficking public awareness campaign. Additionally, the Brazilian government began implementing a national plan of action to prevent trafficking in persons. Despite these actions, Brazil has made only limited progress in bringing traffickers to justice and effectively penalizing those who exploit forced labor.115 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Over the past several years, a high-profile child custody case has focused attention on Brazil’s noncompliance with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.116 In June 2004, Sean Goldman was taken to Brazil by his mother, Bruna Bianchi Carneiro Ribeiro Goldman, a Brazilian native. Ms. Bianchi then divorced her husband David Goldman—a U.S. citizen—and asserted full custody of Sean. In August 2004, the Superior Court of New Jersey ruled that Ms. Bianchi’s continued retention of Sean constituted parental kidnapping under U.S. law and awarded Mr. Goldman custody.117 In September 2004, Mr. Goldman filed an application for Sean’s return under the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, to which both the United States and Brazil are party and which entered into force between the countries on December 1, 2003. Under the Convention, a child removed from a country in violation of a parent’s custodial rights should be promptly returned to the place of his or her habitual residence. The courts of the country of the child’s residence can then resolve the custody dispute.118 In 2005, a Brazilian federal judge ruled that although Sean had been moved to Brazil wrongfully, he should remain in Brazil because he had become settled in his new location.119 In August 2008, Ms. Bianchi died and a Brazilian state court judge granted temporary custody of Sean to the man Ms. Bianchi married following her move to Brazil, Joao Paulo Lins e Silva.120 The custody case then bounced between federal appeals courts and the Brazilian Supreme Court until December 22, 2009, when the Brazilian Supreme Court issued a definitive ruling that ordered that Sean be returned to his father. On December 24, 2009, Sean was handed over to Mr. Goldman at the U.S. Consulate in Rio de Janeiro.121 The U.S. State Department’s Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction cites Brazil for patterns of noncompliance with the Convention. It faults Brazilian courts for treating Convention cases as custody decisions, demonstrating bias toward Brazilian citizens, and making the judicial process excessively lengthy. There are currently some 50 unresolved cases of children being retained in Brazil after having been wrongly removed from the United States.122 On March 11, 2009, the House unanimously passed H.Res. 125 (C. Smith), calling on Brazil to meet its obligations under the Hague Convention to return Sean Goldman to his father in the United States. On March 24, 2009, the Senate approved S.Res. 37 (Lautenberg) by unanimous consent, calling on Brazil to comply with the requirements of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and to assist in the safe return of Sean Goldman to his father in the United States. On June 4, 2009, H.R. 2702 (C. Smith) was introduced in the House. The bill would suspend the Generalized System of Preferences for Brazil until the country meets its obligations under the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. HIV/AIDS Internationally recognized as having one of the world’s most successful HIV/AIDS programs, Brazil has made the fight against the spread of HIV/AIDS a national priority. Initially focused on disease prevention, Brazil’s HIV/AIDS program expanded to providing antiretroviral therapy (ART) on a limited basis by 1991, and later guaranteeing universal access by 1996. Currently some 172,000 Brazilians have access to free generic versions of ART drugs, some of which are locally produced and financed by the Brazilian government. The incidence of HIV/AIDS in Brazil has stabilized since 1997, and universal free access to ART has increased average survival times from 18 months for those diagnosed in 1995, to 58 months for those diagnosed in 1996.123 HIV prevalence has been stable at 0.5% for the general population in Brazil since 2000, so most government prevention efforts are now targeted at high-risk groups where prevalence rates are still above 5%. Brazil’s decision to develop generic ART drugs to treat HIV/AIDS under the compulsory licensing provision of its patent law led to a subsequent 80% drop in the cost of treatment. That decision brought Brazil into conflict with the United States and the international pharmaceutical industry. In May 2001, the United States submitted a complaint to the WTO, which was later withdrawn, that Brazil’s practices violated the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement and prevented companies from developing new products in Brazil. While the pharmaceutical industry argued that TRIPS was an essential tool to protect intellectual property rights, developing countries (like Brazil) countered that TRIPS inhibited their ability to fight public health emergencies in a cost-effective manner. In August 2003, a WTO decision temporarily waived part of the TRIPS rules to allow the export of generic drugs to countries confronting a grave public health challenge (such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, or malaria). That temporary waiver became permanent in late 2005.124 Brazil currently manufactures older ART drugs for domestic consumption and export to several African countries but has to import newer medicines. According to Brazil’s Ministry of Health, tough negotiations with pharmaceutical companies have resulted in $1.1 billion in savings for the country’s HIV/AIDS program. Amazon Conservation The Amazon basin spans the borders of eight countries and is the most biodiverse tract of tropical rainforest in the world. It holds 20% of the Earth’s fresh water and 10% of all known species. Approximately 60% of the Amazon falls within Brazilian borders, making Brazil home to 40% of the world’s remaining tropical forests.125 The Brazilian Amazon was largely undeveloped until the 1960s, when the military government began subsidizing the settlement and development of the region as a matter of national security. Over the last 40 years, the human population has grown from 4 million to over 20 million, and the resulting settlements, roads, logging, cattle ranching, and subsistence and commercial agriculture have led to approximately 15% of the Brazilian Amazon being deforested.126 In the 1980s, some predicted that deforestation would decline if the Brazilian government stopped providing tax incentives and credit subsidies to settlers and agricultural producers. Those predictions have not borne out, however, as the complex and often interrelated causes of deforestation have multiplied rather than decreased.127 Between 1990 and 2000, Brazil lost an area of rainforest twice the size of Portugal, however, deforestation rates have generally declined since the peak year of 2004.128 Domestic Efforts Recognizing that deforestation threatens the biodiversity of the Amazon region and is responsible for 70% of Brazil’s annual greenhouse-gas emissions, the Lula Administration has expanded protected areas and implemented new environmental policies.129 During its first five years in office, the Lula Administration created 62 new natural reserves, bringing the total area of the Brazilian Amazon protected by law to nearly 110,000 square miles, the fourth-largest percentage of protected area in relation to territory in the world.130 President Lula has also signed a Public Forest Management Law that encourages sustainable development and placed a moratorium on soybean plantings and cattle ranching in the Amazon. Moreover, Brazil intends to reduce the rate of Amazon deforestation by half—based on the 1996-2005 average—to 2,300 square miles per year—by 2017 and reduce Amazon deforestation by 80% by 2020. Brazil plans to meet these goals by increasing federal patrols of forested areas, replanting over 21,000 square miles of forest, and financing sustainable development projects in areas where the local economy depends on logging.131 The Lula Administration maintains that its efforts have been successful, highlighting the fact that just 2,706 square miles of the Amazon were deforested between July 2008 and July 2009, the lowest annual level since the National Institute for Space Studies began monitoring deforestation in 1988.132 Although some conservation groups have praised President Lula for his Administration’s actions, a number of environmentalists—including former Environment Minister Marina Silva and current Environment Minister Carlos Minc—have questioned the Administration’s commitment to sustainable development.133 Critics assert that the Administration favors agricultural interests over conservation. This claim was reinforced by President Lula’s June 2009 approval of an environmental law that grants nearly 260,000 square miles of the Amazon to illegal squatters, 72% of which will go to large land holders.134 Critics also maintain that Brazil’s occasional declines in deforestation rates are not the result of the Lula Administration’s initiatives, but correspond to declining global commodity prices that make it less profitable to clear the forests. They point out that deforestation rates only began falling as commodity prices collapsed in late 2008.135 In order to combat further deforestation, some analysts maintain that the Brazilian government will have to greatly increase the number of people employed to work in protected areas and do more to confront agricultural producers operating within the Amazon.136 Carbon Offsets and Other International Initiatives The Amazon holds 10% of the carbon stores in the world’s ecosystem and absorbs nearly two billion tons of carbon dioxide each year, making it a sink for global carbon emissions and an important asset in the prevention of climate change.137 The Kyoto Protocol—of which Brazil is a signatory—created a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which allows emission reduction projects in developing countries to earn certified emission reduction credits (CERs) that can then be traded or sold to industrialized countries to meet their mandated emission reduction targets. Brazil has taken full advantage of the CDM, and is host to over 9% of the worldwide emission reduction projects. These projects represent 33.5 million CERs, or a reduction of 33.5 million tons of carbon dioxide.138 The CDM allows for a wide variety of emission reduction projects, but in terms of forestry, CERs are only awarded for afforestation and reforestation projects, not forest conservation. As a result, forestry projects account for a very small percentage of the total CERs awarded. A number of industrialized countries that would like to achieve a greater percentage of their mandated emission reductions through carbon offsets have teamed with developing countries with substantial tropical forests to propose widening the CDM to include forest conservation. Brazil has opposed such a plan, arguing it would absolve rich countries from cutting their own emissions.139 Brazil has supported the rise of voluntary offset markets, however, in which organizations and individuals not subject to mandatory emission reductions can buy carbon offsets to contribute to conservation and clean energy projects. Brazil believes Amazon conservation should be done through public funding rather than a carbon market. Accordingly, it launched the “Amazon Fund” in August 2008. The fund is intended to attract donations from countries, companies, and non-governmental organizations to assist in Brazil’s Amazon conservation efforts. Brazil intends to raise $21 billion by 2021 to support forest conservation, scientific research, and sustainable development. Norway has pledged $1 billion to he fund through 2015 and Germany has pledged $26.8 million. The first projects funded by the Amazon Fund were announced in December 2009. They include projects to regenerate degraded land, monitor land registration titles, and pay rubber tappers and other forest dwellers to protect the forest.140 USAID environment programs support Amazon conservation through the promotion of proper land-use and encouragement of environmentally friendly income generation activities for the rural poor. In FY2006, USAID initiated the Amazon Basin Conservation Initiative, which supports community groups, governments, and public and private organizations working throughout the Amazon Basin in their efforts to conserve the Amazon’s globally important biodiversity. USAID provided $5.2 million for environmental programs in Brazil in FY2007, $9.5 million in FY2008, and $10 million in FY2009. The Conference Report (H.Rept. 111-366) to the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117) asserts that, of the funds appropriated in the act for biodiversity programs, $25 million are to go to the Amazon Basin Conservation Initiative, $10 million of which is directed to activities in Brazil.

**Russia**

**No Russia expansionism**

**Schwenninger, 8**

Sherle R. Schwenninger, New America Foundation, The Nation, 10-6-2008, “Ten National Security Myths”

First, Russia’s foreign policy has not been anti-American. Moscow has cooperated with Washington on a number of important international issues, from assisting NATO against the Taliban in Afghanistan and supporting Washington’s counterterrorism efforts, to joining the coalition to curb Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. Second, what McCain sees as a pattern of intimidation to re-establish the Russian empire more objective analysts see as a great power protecting its legitimate interests in the face of US provocations. These provocations started during the Clinton administration and have increased under Bush, with the expansion of NATO to Russia’s border and abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. They have continued with the promise of NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine and the decision to deploy a missile defense system in Central Europe. Yet Moscow has responded for the most part in a measured and defensive way, its most forceful move being the recent military actions in Georgia to protect South Ossetia. When the Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, sent forces into South Ossetia in violation of an earlier agreement, Russia responded much as the United States did when it intervened in 1999 against Serbia over Kosovo. Russian military actions in Georgia may have been disproportionate, but not as disproportionate as Washington’s extensive bombing of Serbia proper. Despite the souring of the earlier cooperative relationship with the Bush administration, Russia has made it clear that it would still prefer a strategic partnership that would reduce nuclear weapons, contain Islamist extremism, and expand the world’s oil and gas supplies. But it has also made it clear that this partnership must be based on mutual interests and compromise, not simply on Russian acquiescence in American dictates.

**Russia-Cuba ties are resilient**

**Lyakhov and Korotun, 5/19**

Alexei Lyakhov and Lada Korotun, reporters for the Voice of Russia; “Russia-Cuba ties are seeing renaissance – official,” 5/19/2013, http://voiceofrussia.com/2013\_05\_19/Russia-Cuba-ties-are-seeing-renaissance-official //bghs-ms

Russia-Cuba ties are seeing a renaissance, Valentina Matviyenko, chairwoman of Russia’s Federation Council stated during her visit to Cuba where she met with the country’s leader Raul Castro and President of Cuba’s National Assembly Esteban Lazo.¶ Matviyenko has also praised the expansion of bilateral partnership, trade, economic, scientific and humanitarian cooperation between the countries.¶ "The Russian Senate delegation came to Havana to upgrade and boost parliamentary cooperation between the two countries. We discussed a number of issues during a two-hour talk, including Fidel Castro’s health, Valentina Matviyenko told reporters on her flight back to Moscow, adding that Comandante is feeling ok and is following a strict regime under tight medical supervision."¶ Apart from being Russia’s important strategic partner Cuba is also its good and **reliable friend**, Valentina Matviyenko said. ¶ "**Our countries have special bonds of fraternity and mutual respect and Russia has really warm and sincere feelings for Cubans**. We love our Cuban friends and are ready for cooperation. Havana and Moscow became close allies under Fidel Castro and 2013 marks 50 years since his first visit to the USSR – the event is celebrated in Moscow and some other Russian cities. Now **bilateral cooperation is on the rise** and is mainly focused on trade and economy. Though last year’s trade turnover accounted for some modest 220 mln dollars we have a great potential to expand it."¶ The streets of Havana have many signs of long-lasting friendship like Soviet-made cars.

**Increased US presence in Cuba doesn’t crowd out Russia – zero solvency**

**Garrido, 13** (Mario Hubert Garrido, journalist and reporter for the Havana reporter, “Russia-Latin America Relations are Strategic”, the Havana reporter, last modified 7-21-13, http://havanareporternews.com/international/russia-latin-america-relations-are-strategic%E2%80%9D)

Havana.\_ Russia’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean are strategic and **independent** of differences with the United States or other nations in the region, said Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, in an exclusive interview with the Prensa Latina news agency during his official visit to Cuba in February.¶ Medvedev dismissed the idea that his country’s recent moves toward closer ties with the region were due to current problems related to Washington’s policy of trying to wield more influence in the area.¶ Latin America and Caribbean countries are in the middle of economic development and represent unexplored potentiality, he said. In that sense, he referred to the sovereign manner in which Moscow has relations in all sectors with nations in the BRICS group (Brazil, India, China and South Africa, in addition to Russia), and highlighted the progress Russia has made in its relations with countries such as Chile, Venezuela, Ecuador and Argentina.¶ In that respect he commented on his most recent visit to Brazil—immediately prior to his visit to Havana—and described it as the world’s fifth-largest economy.¶ Regarding cooperation with Latin America, Medvedev said that different stages and obstacles have existed from the 1990s to the present, but that the conditions were in place to move forward more rapidly and to solve existing problems jointly.¶ He also described the historic relationship and ties that unite Russia to Cuba as special. During his visit to Cuba in February, Moscow and Havana signed some 10 new legal instruments for bilateral cooperation in the areas of investment, trade, tourism, health, education, science, and culture, among others, he noted.

**Relations**

**Warming doesn’t cause extinction**

**NIPCC, 11** (Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change; “Surviving the unprecedented climate change of the IPCC,” 3/8/2011, http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html)

In a paper published in Systematics and Biodiversity, Willis et al. (2010) consider the IPCC (2007) "predicted climatic changes for the next century" -- i.e., their contentions that "global temperatures will increase by 2-4°C and possibly beyond, sea levels will rise (~1 m ± 0.5 m), and atmospheric CO2will increase by up to 1000 ppm" -- noting that it is "widely suggested that the magnitude and rate of these changes will result in many plants and animals going extinct," citing studies that suggest that "within the next century, over 35% of some biota will have gone extinct (Thomas et al., 2004; Solomon et al., 2007) and there will be extensive die-back of the tropical rainforest due to climate change (e.g. Huntingford et al., 2008)." On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos et al., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis et al. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."

**No nuke terror – even if any single step is possible – terrorists have to succeed at every step – it’s statistically impossible**

**Mueller 9** - John Mueller, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center  
Professor of Political Science30 April 2009 “THE ATOMIC TERRORIST?” http://www.icnnd.org/research/Mueller\_Terrorism.pdf

In an article on the prospects for atomic terrorism, Bill Keller of *The New York Times* suggests that “the best reason for thinking it won’t happen is that it hasn’t happened yet,” and that, he worries, “is terrible logic.”33 However, “logic” aside, there is another quite good reason for thinking it won’t happen: the task is incredibly difficult. I have arrayed a lengthy set of obstacles confronting the would-be atomic terrorist. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if often with great difficulty, surmount each obstacle—that doing so in each case is “not impossible.”34 But it is vital to point out that, while it may be “not impossible” to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Even the very alarmed Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier contend that the atomic terrorists’ task “would clearly be among the most difficult types of attack to carry out” or “one of the most difficult missions a terrorist group could hope to try.” But, stresses the CIA’s George Tenet, a terrorist atomic bomb is “possible” or “not beyond the realm of possibility.”35 Accordingly, it might be useful to take a stab at estimating just how “difficult” the atomic terrorists’ task, in aggregate, is—that is, how far from the fringe of the “realm of possibility” it might be. Most discussions of atomic terrorism deal in a rather piecemeal fashion with the subject--focusing separately on individual tasks such as procuring HEU or assembling a device or transporting it. However, as the Gilmore Commission, a special advisory panel to the President and Congress, stresses, setting off a nuclear device capable of producing mass destruction presents not only “Herculean challenges,” but it requires that a whole series of steps be accomplished: obtaining enough fissile material, designing a weapon “that will bring that mass together in a tiny fraction of a second,” and figuring out some way to deliver the thing. And it emphasizes that these merely constitute “the minimum requirements.” If each is not fully met, the result is not simply a less powerful weapon, but one that can’t produce any significant nuclear yield at all or can’t be delivered.36 Following this perspective, an approach that seems appropriate is to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome by a terrorist group in order to carry out the task of producing, transporting, and then successfully detonating an improvised nuclear device. Table 1 attempts to do this, and it arrays some 20 of these—*all* of which must be surmounted by the atomic aspirant. Actually, it would be quite possible to come up with a longer list: in the interests of keeping the catalogue of hurdles down to a reasonable number, some of the entries are actually collections of tasks and could be divided into two or three or more. For example, number 5 on the list requires that heisted highly-enriched uranium be neither a scam nor part of a sting nor of inadequate quality due to insider incompetence; but this hurdle could as readily be rendered as three separate ones. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists effectively *must* go though a exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do so, they are likely to find their prospects daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. Assigning and calculating probabilities The discussion thus far has followed a qualitative approach: synthesizing a considerable amount of material to lay out the route a terrorist group must take to acquire and detonate an atomic bomb in the most likely scenario. It seems to me that this exercise by itself suggests the almost breathtaking enormity of the difficulties facing the would-be atomic terrorist. This conclusion can be reinforced by a quantitative assessment. Assigning a probability that terrorists will be able to overcome each barrier is, of course, a tricky business, and any such exercise should be regarded as rather tentative and exploratory, or perhaps simply as illustrative—though it is done all the time in cost/benefit analysis. One might begin a quantitative approach by adopting probability estimates that purposely, and heavily, bias the case in the terrorists’ favor. In my view, this would take place if it is assumed that the terrorists have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles displayed in Table 1, though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are surely much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million, specifically 1,048,576. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion—specifically 3,486,784,401. What they would be at the (still entirely realistic) level of one in ten boggles the mind. Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive.

**Their impact author concludes low probability of terror**

**Ayson 10** - Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington

(Robert, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33.7, InformaWorld)

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

**Lifting the embargo doesn’t solve—Castro will put up internal restrictions**

**Suchlicki 2k** (JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. He is currently the Latin American Editor for Transaction Publishers and the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro (1997), now in its fourth edition, and editor with Irving L. Horowitz of Cuban Communism (1999). He is also the author of Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA (1998). He is a highly regarded consultant to both the private and public sector on Cuba and Latin American affairs. The U.S. Embargo of Cuba Jaime Suchlicki University of Miami June 2000 <http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf>, nkj)

Opponents of U.S. policy toward Cuba claim that if the embargo and the travel ban are lifted, the Cuban people would benefit economically; American companies will penetrate and influence the Cuban market; the Communist system would begin to crumble and a transition to a democratic society would be accelerated. These expectations are based on several incorrect assumptions. First, that Castro and the Cuban leadership are naïve and inexperienced and, therefore, would allow tourists and investments from the U.S. to subvert the revolution and influence internal developments in the island. Second, that Cuba would open up and allow U.S. investments in all sectors of the economy, instead of selecting which companies could trade and invest. Third, that Castro is so interested in close relations with the U.S. that he is willing to risk what has been upper-most in his mind for 40 years – total control of power and a legacy of opposition to “Yankee imperialism,” – in exchange for economic improvements for his people. During the Fifth Communist Party Congress in 1997, Castro emphasized “We will do what is necessary without renouncing our principles. We do not like capitalism and we will not abandon our Socialist system.” Castro also reiterated his long-standing anti-American posture, accusing the U.S. of waging economic war against his government and calling for “military preparedness against imperialist hostility.”

**6 degree warming inevitable**

**AP 9** (Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24, http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com\_content&do\_pdf=1&id=168)

Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees between now and the end of the century even if every country cuts greenhouse gas emissions as proposed, according to a United Nations update. Scientists looked at emission plans from 192 nations and calculated what would happen to global warming. The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. Much of projected rise in temperature is because of developing nations, which aren't talking much about cutting their emissions, scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. China alone adds nearly 2 degrees to the projections. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed papers on climate over the last three years. Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050, as some experts propose, the world is still facing a 3-degree increase by the end of the century, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. Global warming is speeding up, especially in the Arctic, and that means that some top-level science projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought, it looks like the seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago, Corell said. He said seas should rise about a foot every 20 to 25 years.

**Their Shifter ev says the plan prevents nuclear proliferation --- however, proliferation is stabilizing—reduces the frequency and intensity of war, data proves.**

**Sechser 9**—Prof @ U of Virginia, Todd, , “The Stabilizing Effects of Nuclear Proliferation”, Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations, http://faculty.virginia.edu/tsechser/Sechser-Haas-2009.pdf

PROL IFERATION AND THE HISTORICAL RECORD

Will additional nuclear proliferation stabilize world politics, or will it worsen the problem of interstate conflict? We cannot answer this question with certainty, of course, since we cannot collect data about the future. We can, however, learn from events that have already happened. Imagine that, at the advent of the nuclear age in 1945, today’s proliferation optimists and pessimists had put forth their competing predictions about the likely consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons. Whose predictions would be borne out? In this section I argue that historical data confirm the predictions of proliferation optimism, while offering little corroboration for rival perspectives. Scholars who take the view that proliferation bolsters global stability argue that the spread of nuclear weapons produces three observable effects. 2

First, by deterring aggression, nuclear weapons reduce the frequency with which wars occur. Second, nuclear weapons induce caution among leaders in crises and during wartime, thereby mitigating the intensity of wars. Third, nuclear weapons defuse arms races and obviate the need for high levels of conventionalarms spending. Let us now consider each claim with respect to five proliferators: China, Israel, India, South Africa, and Pakistan. These five states provide a useful laboratory for examining the behavior of proliferators because they more closely resemble the types of states most likely to proliferate today. The United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France were all major industrialized powers when they acquired nuclear weapons, but these five proliferators were weaker, poorer, and less internally stable—much as today’s proliferators are likely to be.

The Frequency of Armed Conflict

The optimist camp’s first and most important claim is that the presence of nuclear weapons suppresses international conflicts. Nuclear weapons, in this view, differ from conventional military tools in two central ways. First, nuclear weapons carry enormous destructive power. Whereas the targets of conventional weapons necessarily tend to be small in size (for instance, an airfield, communications center, or ammunition depot), the most powerful nuclear weapons can place entire cities at risk. The use of even a few nuclear weapons could destroy hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of human lives in a short span of time. Second, defenders have little control over the level of destruction they endure during a nuclear conflict. Without a reliable means to destroy incoming ballistic missiles or to shield cities from nuclear attack— neither of which exists today—nuclear combatants must rely on an enemy’s restraint to limit the amount of damage they suffer. These two characteristics—colossal destructive capacity and the lack of an effective defense— combine to induce caution among leaders facing the prospect of nuclear retaliation. Leaders will behave less aggressively and will more eagerly seek peaceful solutions to crises, the logic goes, since they do not want to endure even a small risk that a conventional war might become nuclear.

These propositions can be evaluated empirically by comparing the rates at which proliferators have participated in interstate conflicts both before and after their acquisition of nuclear weapons. If the optimists are correct, nuclear states should experience fewer conflicts after they acquire nuclear weapons. One way to measure the turbulence of a state’s foreign affairs is to calculate its participation in militarized interstate disputes, defined here as conflicts involving at least one military fatality. Figure 1 considers five proliferators and charts how much their involvement in military conflicts changed after they became nuclear states. Israel, for instance, participated in an average of 1.21 conflicts per year as a nonnuclear state, but entered into only 0.33 conflicts per year after becoming a nuclear state in 1972, so its bar in figure 1 drops below zero to illustrate that Israel has been involved in fewer interstate conflicts since acquiring nuclear weapons.

Optimists predict that states will participate in fewer conflicts after going nuclear, since they expect nuclear weapons to deter aggression and dissuade opposing leaders from escalating crises. And indeed, four of the five states examined here participated in fewer interstate conflicts, on average, once they became nuclear states. For example, Israel fought four interstate wars against its neighbors before acquiring nuclear weapons, but just two afterward. India and Pakistan have gone to war against one another four times since achieving independence, but only one of those wars occurred after the two rivals acquired nuclear weapons. Indeed, India and Pakistan saw the average incidence of militarized disputes between them decline by half (from 0.55 disputes per year to 0.27) once both states had acquired nuclear weapons. Only South Africa experienced an increase in its conflict participation rate after achieving nuclear status, although the magnitude of this change (+0.06) was the smallest of the five proliferators considered here.

These data tell us that proliferation optimists are right to expect a decline in the frequency of interstate wars as more states acquire nuclear weapons.

Admittedly, this analysis cannot demonstrate that these declines were caused entirely by nuclear weapons, but the strength of the correlation cannot be ignored. At a minimum, the data cast considerable doubt on the argument that nuclear weapons undermine conventional military stability.

What about conflicts which, despite the shadow of nuclear weapons, nevertheless occur? Proliferation optimists argue that even if nuclear-armed states fight one another, their wars will not be intense: leaders will prevent such conflicts from escalating to avoid the risk that nuclear weapons might be used. As Waltz writes, “Everyone knows that if force gets out of hand all the parties to a conflict face catastrophe. With conventional weapons, the crystal ball is clouded. With nuclear weapons, it is perfectly clear” (Sagan and Waltz 2003, 114).

This reasoning was borne out clearly by the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan—the only war ever to occur between two nuclear states. The episode is instructive because the war entailed far fewer causalities than any of the prior wars between India and Pakistan (see table 1), owing in part to the restraint of the Indian military in expelling Pakistani insurgents from the Kargil region. The Indian military could have reduced its own losses and ended the war more quickly by attacking critical communication and supply lines in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, yet because crossing into Pakistani territory might have widened the war and risked provoking a Pakistani nuclear threat, Indian leaders instead opted for caution.

It is not hard to find other military crises in which the risk of nuclear escalation induced restraint. In March 1969, Chinese forces ambushed Russian troops along the Ussuri River in northwest China, prompting a Soviet counterattack. But one important reason we do not read about the catastrophic Sino Soviet War of 1969 is that a Soviet threat to launch preventive strikes against Chinese nuclear targets induced Chinese leaders to de-escalate the crisis. Despite having initiated the challenge, China backed down rather than risk letting events get out of hand. The Soviet Union, of course, had itself recently backed down from a crisis it precipitated when Nikita Khrushchev agreed in 1962 to remove Soviet missile bases from Cuba rather than risk a potentially nuclear conflict with the United States.

These examples make clear that nuclear weapons cannot prevent all conflicts: indeed, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Ussuri River crisis, and the Kargil War all came about because one nuclear power was bold enough to challenge another. But in a world without nuclear weapons, these clashes might have escalated to large-scale conventional wars. Instead, in each case the shadow of nuclear weapons helped to cool tempers and contain the crisis: retaliation remained limited, escalatory options were rejected, and eventually the challenger backed down.

**Nuclear weapons solve all war—conventional conflict outweighs**

**Preston** **7**—Associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Washington State University, Thomas, From Lambs to Lions, p. 31-2

Advocates of deterrence seldom take the position that it will always work or that it cannot fail. Rather, they take the position that if one can achieve the requisite elements required to achieve a stable deterrent relationship between parties, it vastly decreases the chances of miscalculation and resorting to war—even in contexts where it might otherwise be expected to occur (George and Smoke 1974; Harvey 1997a; Powell 1990, 2003; Goldstein 2000). Un­fortunately, critics of deterrence take the understandable, if unrealistic, position that if deterrence cannot be 100 percent effective under all circum­stances, then it is an unsound strategic approach for states to rely upon, especially considering the immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Feaver (1993, 162), for example, criticizes reliance on nuclear deterrence be­cause it can fail and that rational deterrence theory can only predict that peace should occur most of the time (e.g., Lebow and Stein 1989).

Yet, were we to apply this standard of perfection to most other policy ap­proaches concerning security matters—whether it be arms control or prolif­eration regime efforts, military procurement policies, alliance formation strategies, diplomacy, or sanctions—none could be argued with any more cer­tainty to completely remove the threat of equally devastating wars either. In­deed, one could easily make the argument that these alternative means have shown themselves historically to be far less effective than nuclear arms in preventing wars. Certainly, the twentieth century was replete with examples of devastating conventional conflicts which were not deterred through non­nuclear measures. Although the potential costs of a nuclear exchange between small states would indeed cause a frightful loss of life, it would be no more costly (and likely far less so) than large-scale conventional conflicts have been for combatants.

Moreover, if nuclear deterrence raises the potential costs of war high enough for policy makers to want to avoid (rather than risk) conflict, it is just as legitimate (if not more so) for optimists to argue in favor of nuclear deterrence in terms of the lives saved through the avoidance of far more likely recourses to conventional wars, as it is for pessimists to warn of the potential costs of deterrence failure. And, while some accounts describing the "im­mense weaknesses" of deterrence theory (Lebow and Stein 1989, 1990) would lead one to believe deterrence was almost impossible to either obtain or maintain, since 1945 there has not been one single historical instance of nuclear deterrence failure (especially when this notion is limited to threats to key central state interests like survival, and not to minor probing of periph­eral interests). Moreover, the actual costs of twentieth-century conventional conflicts have been staggeringly immense, especially when compared to the actual costs of nuclear conflicts (for example, 210,000 fatalities in the com­bined 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings compared to 62 mil­lion killed overall during World War II, over three million dead in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, etc.) (McKinzie et al. 2001, 28).3

**Solving prolif causes a shift to bioweapons**

**Zilinskas 2K**—Former Clinical Microbiologist. Dir. – Chem/Bio Weapons Nonproliferation Program – Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Raymond, Biological warfare: modern offense and defense, 1-2

There are many who believe that today's bioscientists and chemical engineers working in unison and wielding the techniques of molecule biology developed since the early 1970s could, if so commanded, develop militarily effective biological weapons within a fairly short time. If this supposition is correct, our perception of biological weapons as being undependable, uncontrollable, and unreliable must change. The reason is simple: if these weapons are demonstrated to possess properties that make it possible for commanders to effect controlled, confined mass destruction on command, all governments would be forced to construct defenses against them and some undoubtedly would be tempted to arm their military with these weapons that would be both powerful and relatively inexpensive to acquire. Ironically, as tougher international controls are put into place to deter nations from seeking to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons, leaders may be even more drawn to biological arms as the most accessible form of weapon of mass destruction.

**Extinction**

**Ochs 2** (Richard, BS in Natural Resource Management from Rutgers University, with honors, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE IMMEDIATELY ABOLISHED, <http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html>)

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.

**Cuba won’t pursue an alliance with the U.S. – anti-Americanism outweighs**

**Suchlicki 13** (Jaime Suchlicki, Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, “Why Cuba Will Still Be Anti-American After Castro” <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/why-cuba-will-still-be-anti-american-after-castro/273680/> 3-4-13)f

Similarly, any serious overtures to the U.S. do not seem likely in the near future. It would mean the rejection of one of Fidel Castro's main legacies: anti-Americanism. It may create uncertainty within the government, leading to frictions and factionalism. It would require the weakening of Cuba's anti-American alliance with radical regimes in Latin America and elsewhere.¶ Raul is unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the United States. At a time that anti-Americanism is strong in Latin America and the Middle East, Raul's policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the United States and that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid.¶ Raul does not seem ready to provide meaningful and irreversible concessions for a U.S. - Cuba normalization. Like his brother in the past, public statements and speeches are politically motivated and directed at audiences in Cuba, the United States and Europe. Serious negotiations on important issues are not carried out in speeches from the plaza. They are usually carried out through the normal diplomatic avenues open to the Cubans in Havana, Washington and the United Nations or other countries, if they wish. These avenues have never been closed as evidenced by the migration accord and the anti-hijacking agreement between the United States and Cuba.¶ Raul remains a loyal follower and cheerleader of Fidel's anti-American policies.**¶** The issue between Cuba and the U.S. is not about negotiations or talking. These are not sufficient. There has to be a willingness on the part of the Cuban leadership to offer real concessions - in the area of human rights and political and economic openings as well as cooperation on anti-terrorism and drug interdiction - for the United States to change it policies.

**Many terminal alt causes to relations**

**Shifter, 8 –** Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown (Micheal, “U.S.-Latin American Relations: Recommendations for the New Administration”, Inter-American Dialogue, October 27, 2008, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=1625)

As if any further proof were needed, the ongoing financial crisis highlights the already diminished capacity of the United States to shape developments in the rest of the world. With its own house in disorder, the United States will struggle to get back on track as a responsible member of the international community.

Still, though the United States may be considerably chastened, it remains a superpower, whose decisions and actions have a huge global impact. When it falls to the next US administration to deal with the rapidly changing situation in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, or even Africa, it will likely reassess US interests and frame strategic choices in light of new realities.

But if the United States seriously undertakes such an effort for neighboring Latin America, it will mark the first time it has done so. For reasons of geography, history and power disparity, Latin America has typically been treated as a discrete compartment, separate from interest-based foreign relations.

Regardless of how one comes down on the issues of Cuba, immigration, drugs, and trade, the paternalistic impulse on the part of the United States has been unmistakable. Latin Americans find this tutorial attitude extremely irritating, and their objections have prompted a more collegial tone from the United States in certain cases. Unfortunately, it is still manifest in a variety of ways, from the overall diplomatic style to specific policies like drug cooperation decertification or suspending military training for countries that do not sign agreements that exempt US soldiers from prosecution under the International Criminal Court.

While domestic politics is never completely divorced from foreign policy, it has an inordinate and particularly distorting influence on Latin American policy. Hardliners and liberals alike rarely consider the effects policies and statements will have on US-Latin American relations or the ultimate impact for US interests. The decision to build a “wall” along the US-Mexico border, for example, may have been politically expedient but was deeply insulting, not only to Mexico, but to the entire region.

This ingrained reflex to dismiss Latin America as the “backyard” of the United States may have been understandable in a distant era, but today the region is wildly varied and defies lazy, superficial generalizations (e.g. “inflation is out of control” or “democracy is starting to take root”). Whether or not the United States recognizes it, the fact is that different parts of Latin America are moving in markedly different directions simultaneously.